127. National Intelligence Estimate0
NIE 31-62
Washington, May 31,
1962.
THE PROSPECTS FOR INDIA
Conclusions
- A.
- The dominance of the Congress Party in Indian affairs was confirmed in the 1962 elections and during the next few years is unlikely to be threatened by the Communist Party of India (CPI) or by the parties which draw support from their regional or religious appeal. (Paras. 5-8.)
- B.
- We believe that the ambitious Third Five-Year Plan will be generally successful, enabling India to maintain a satisfactory rate of investment [Page 258] and at the same time provide a modest increase in living standards. The Plan’s success will be heavily dependent on a high level of foreign aid and could be undercut by other factors, such as crop failures, an unexpected decline in exports, or sharply increased defense outlays. (Paras. 9-12)
- C.
- India’s federal democratic system will be severely tested after the steadying influence of Nehru is no longer available. If the central political leadership provided by his successors should prove ineffective, or in the event of a persistent economic crisis, India would experience severe political and social strains. The forces of regionalism and communism would be strengthened. Should the presently nonpolitical Indian military come to believe that competent government and the integrity of the national state were threatened, they probably would feel compelled to intervene. (Paras. 17-20)
- D.
- India is almost certain to continue its nonalignment policy. US-Indian relations have improved in recent years, and probably will continue to be generally satisfactory, but differences in interest and points of view will from time to time create serious frictions. At the same time, India will continue to attach high priority to maintaining good relations with the USSR, to which it will look for aid and trade, for support on the Kashmir issue, and especially for help in India’s problems with Peiping. (Paras. 21-25)
- E.
- India now recognizes that its major foreign policy problem for the indefinite future will be centered on the threat of Communist China. Neither side is likely to make sufficient concessions to enable a border settlement to be reached in the near future. India’s attempt to force Chinese withdrawal from forward positions in the Ladakh section of Kashmir probably will result in border clashes, though the odds are against any major military escalation. (Paras. 27-28)
- F.
- Relations with Pakistan, which improved during President Ayub’s first two years in power, have again deteriorated. There has been an upsurge of Hindu-Moslem tensions in both countries, and the Kashmir dispute is once more active. We believe a Kashmir settlement is unlikely and that a further worsening of lndo-Pakistani relations is probable. (Para. 29)
- G.
- India is concerned at the establishment of closer relations between Nepal and Communist China. New Delhi will continue its efforts to persuade the Nepalese King of the dangers of this policy and to bring about a rapprochement between him and the disaffected Nepali Congress Party. With respect to southeast Asia, India is unlikely, during the next few years at least, to develop either the will or the capability significantly to affect events in the area, and its policy is likely to amount to little more than urging peace and conciliation. (Paras. 30-31)
[Here follows an 8-page Discussion section.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 0102A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files, Box 212. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, AEC, and NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on May 31, except the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction.↩