126. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- U.S. Military Assistance to India; Pakistan Concern at Indian Intentions
PARTICIPANTS
- H.E. Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador, Embassy of Pakistan
- Mr. M. Masood, Minister, Embassy of Pakistan
- Mr. Salman Ali, Political Counselor, Embassy of Pakistan
- The Secretary
- NEA-Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary
- SOA-John N. Gatch, Jr.
The Ambassador presented an aid-memoire1 outlining his government’s concern at the reported possibility that the United States was [Page 256] thinking of supplying F-104s to India, and its general concern over Indian intentions towards Pakistan.
He said that Pakistan was particularly worried by Krishna Menon’s statement in the recent Security Council debate on Kashmir that implied India was no longer bound by the cease-fire line imposed by UN action and UN resolutions. He said Menon’s statement, coupled with the reports that India was seeking to improve its already strong military forces, make it appear that India was considering aggressive moves against Pakistan or was at least preparing to maintain and even increase its intransigence on Kashmir.
In the view of Pakistan, the threat to India from Communist China was really a part of the whole threat to the subcontinent from the Communist Bloc. The continuance or increase of tension within the subcontinent thus made the Communist task easier. The Ambassador said there were two ways to deal with the problem: (1) to back India completely; (2) or strengthen the region as a whole. Pakistan naturally favored the latter course, but the Ambassador said he could detect real concern over U.S. intentions on Ayub’s part when he made public statements questioning the worth of CENTO, SEATO and the alliance with the United States.
The Secretary replied first on the subject of F-104s. He reminded the Ambassador of the President’s commitment to Ayub in 1961 that the United States would consult with Pakistan before any change was contemplated in our policy on military assistance to India. He said he regretted that Pakistan felt compelled, on the basis of newspaper reports, to make a query of this nature. In direct reply he said that India had not asked the United States for F-104s nor had the United States offered them. As far as we were aware, the situation was that India was deter-mined to develop a supersonic capability and was exploring sources of supply, including the Soviet Union. Our Ambassador had expressed his concern to Indian leaders that they might not fully realize the implications of a MIG deal with the Soviet Union. We did not yet know how the situation would evolve but once again could assure Pakistan there would be no change in United States policy without prior consultation.
Turning to a broader aspect of the picture, the Secretary mentioned the possibility that had been discussed in 1959 of joint defense between India and Pakistan and regretted that it had not materialized, in view of the regional nature of the Chinese Communist threat. The Ambassador recounted the history of the joint defense proposal which had come up first after the Chinese occupation of Tibet. Nehru at first had rejected it because it would “align” India militarily, but after the Indus Waters settlement had become more favorably disposed towards the idea. The Kashmir’s dispute, however, remained the chief obstacle.
The Ambassador then turned to the subject of the Sino-Pakistan border demarcation negotiations. He recalled that Ayub had discussed [Page 257] the subject with the President last summer and had outlined Pakistan’s belief that the negotiation of an agreed border would remove a possible threat to Pakistan from Communist China. The timing of the present announcement was entirely at the initiative of the Communist Chinese. He had no doubt that the Communist Chinese had taken this step to put pressure on India, but said Pakistan had no such intention. The Ambassador said that Pakistan believed India’s rights in the matter had been well protected by the terms of the agreement which called for the demarcation of a provisional boundary subject to final approval after the Kashmir issue had been settled.
The Ambassador then said it had not been his or his government’s intention to question the President’s commitment about informing Pakistan of any impending changes in U.S. policy on military assistance to India. He was simply seeking information and clarification because of the many news reports. The Secretary indicated that the Ambassador should not consider his remarks on the subject to be meant in an unfriendly sense.