Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State⁰

Karachi, March 3, 1962, 5 p.m.

1509. From Bowles. Re New Delhi’s 2621,¹ 2684, 2685 and 2686.² Subsequent to first conversation with Nehru already reported in reference telegrams, I met in New Delhi with Nehru a second time, with Foreign Secretary Desai, General Kaul, Finance Minister Morarji Desai and (unexpectedly) Krishna Menon (at latter’s request). Here is brief resume of pertinent points. (Details by Airgram):³

1. Southeast Asia: All Indian officials with whom I talked endorsed our present efforts in Laos and suggest that political settlement in South Vietnam may become possible if a neutral and independent Laos can be fully established. Even Menon strongly approved Harriman’s efforts in Geneva and felt it could have broader implications. MJ Desai believes that if Laos settlement achieved it may be possible persuade Hanoi to agree to ease pressure on South Vietnam. He convinced continuing deepseated North Vietnamese suspicions of Chinese intentions strong restraining factor on all-out North Vietnamese effort. This impresses me as wishful thinking but the view is strongly held.

2. Kashmir: Indians appear reluctant take advantage present Pak difficulties over East Bengal and Afghanistan since they convinced Ayub may be more rather than less difficult deal with if his sense of insecurity grows and his other difficulties increase. Nehru hopeful Ayub will respond constructively to invitation visit India although not optimistic. Nehru convinced further UN discussion will be futile exercise from Pak point of view, and will demonstrate to Ayub his lack of support among Asians and Africans generally.

Comment: My impression is that possibility exceedingly slim achieving any real progress on Kashmir in immediate future unless Ayub becomes convinced by his other difficulties that time has come to cut his losses.

3. Chinese Communists: All Indians with whom I spoke and particularly Nehru showed deep appreciation Chinese threat. General Kaul asked me bluntly in great confidence whether we would come to India’s aid in event open ChiCom armed invasion. I assured him that in my opinion we would do so. Kaul then urged that we engage in secret conversations with Indian military on contingency plans for such an eventuality, possibly under cover of three or four day visit New Delhi by some high level US military figure. In response my questions, Kaul insisted such talks should take place even if not fully sanctioned by Menon and/or Nehru. I suggested he pursue subject with Galbraith.

Comment: I was at first skeptical of Kaul’s approach, thinking he may have been carrying out some obscure Menon play. However, was assured in New Delhi that Kaul has been showing more and more self-assurance and independence vis-a-vis Menon in recent months and appears to have confidence of the Prime Minister. Approach therefore may have been sincere, and should be given serious consideration.

4. My overriding impression was of tremendously increased Indian self-confidence, both in economic field and vis-a-vis China. Country is moving forward in economic field rapidly; increased decentralization of real political power to elected councils at village level achieved during last two-three years is very impressive sign of progress; problems in many areas which appeared to Indians almost insurmountable only three or four years ago are now being tackled vigorously. In the international field this confidence is greatly bolstering India’s resolve vis-a-vis Chinese.

Hall

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/3-362. Secret. Repeated to New Delhi.
1. Document 104.
2. Telegrams 2684, 2685, and 2686, all dated February 27, reported on a conversation that Bowles and Galbraith had that morning with M.J. Desai. Telegram 2684 dealt with developments in Southeast Asia; telegram 2685 dealt with the Kashmir problem; and telegram 2686 dealt with Nepal. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/2-2762)
3. Airgram A-354 from Karachi, March 6, reported Bowles’ second conversation with Nehru on February 26. He also met with Kaul on February 24, Morarji Desai on February 26, and Menon on February 27. (Ibid., 611.91/3-662)