Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

106. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State⁰

Kabul, March 3, 1962, 2 p.m.

529. On March 1 Ambassador Bowles interviewed Prime Minister Daud and also had talks with Minister Finance Malikyar and Minister of Mines Yusuf.¹

In hour and quarter talk with Daud, Bowles gave tour d’horizon stating administration desire reassess problems troubling Asia and Middle East. Re Pakistan Bowles discussed generally theory underlying US military commitments saying that while some had advocated these commitments as essential offset to Soviet pressure, others had feared they might upset regional balance. Any event commitments had been made and must be honored although relative emphasis on economic and military aspects may gradually be changed.

As Daud clearly preferred leave initiative to Bowles to guide conversation latter then moved into specific fields. Discussed historic Afghan devotion to independence and neutrality and hard lessons of Afghan history. Alluding to current problem re transit, Bowles discussed in general terms possible Iranian routes and asserted desire help in Afghan second 5-year plan provided outlook for success of US effort and Afghan independence reasonably favorable. Said while he knew every effort would be made ensure US money would be well spent, there was concern in US over large number Russians in Afghanistan. Stated US does not desire enter bidding game against Soviets. Gave personal conviction that although Afghans have no intention of permitting Soviets take advantage Afghanistan, pressures may increase.

Daud repeated Afghan position that neutrality best policy for this country and that Afghan problems stemmed from area imbalance brought on by US military assistance to Pakistan stating in 1955. Hoped new administration would carefully study implications. Happy with Iranian cooperation and badly needs additional transit route but regards Pak route as vitally important. Said there no change RGA position on principle involved since Merchant mission.

Daud stressed Pushtunistan life and death issue. Pak pressures unbearable for Afghans and effects Pak policies extend far beyond Afghanistan. Reminded Bowles US arms being used by GOP contrary to stated US objectives and that it was these US weapons that had forced Afghanistan to go to Moscow for help after being refused US military help several years ago.

Bowles stressed US influence with GOP marginal and argued for gradual approach in resolving difficulties. US aid to GOP does not buy right to order GOP any more than Soviet aid to Afghanistan buy right to order RGA. Emphasized need for gradual reopening Pak route to meet needs presently beyond capacity Iranian routes. Daud agreed time heals many wounds but said Pak actions deliberately invite reaction and will continue do so regardless what government rules Afghanistan. “These problems cannot be solved by conceit or force.” Bowles repeated hope partial crack in door might be widened order help those who want help Afghanistan.

Warming up, Daud vigorously and pithily restated Afghan position: (1) RGA conceded no fault of it sown in current transit crisis which resulted from Pak action motivated by Ayub’s conceit; (2) prime consideration in current temporary partial border opening was appreciation American help and friendship and desire not require US undertake circuitous re-routing goods in Pakistan; (3) Afghanistan has access through Soviet and Iran and even allowing for initial problems in utilization, Iranian route is still cheaper than Pak route; (4) RGA position on principles has not changed; (5) RGA needs aid from US and asked information year ago re overall future magnitude but still no answer. Any case this question separate from issues of principle or national honor which are difficult if not impossible to compromise.

Shifting topic Bowles remarked RGA understands US objectives and US understands Afghan objectives and asked Daud’s view Soviet objectives here. Daud smilingly side stepped question admitting it difficult know basis Soviet objectives but so far Soviet behavior above reproach. Any event Afghanistan has not agreed nor would it agree accept Soviet programs based on objectives inconsistent Afghan independence. Daud again deplored fact military imbalance in area forced RGA devote considerable resources to military development which economically unproductive. While agreeing with Afghan motives and historical knowledge of Russians Bowles reminded Daud Soviet Russians today much more skillful, subtle and competent than Czarists a century ago.

In departing Bowles deliberately but casually suggested regional problems might be ultimately solved by containing them within larger framework as France and Germany had submerged their historic differences over Saar and Alsace under umbrella Common Market. Similarly common interests Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and even India might be linked in some common market and arms control agreement which could help reduce present tensions in this area. Without commenting in detail Daud responded with rather surprising sympathy and expressed hope future might make such development practicable.

Main part of discussion with Malikyar devoted Helmand Valley development with Malikyar stating Afghan desires complete projects underway, increase production in developed areas by introduction machinery, fertilizer industry more electric power and new settlers. Bowles agreed mechanization might be desirable in such a thinly populated area where according Malikyar farmers average 50 acres per family. In discussing Iranian transit routes Malikyar especially interested in Shahbehar route but acknowledged advantages Bandar Abbas route. Agreed with need for reopening traditional Pak route which Afghans do not want to lose. Other hand he referred to Pak pressure which suddenly destroyed normal relations. Bowles emphasized US cannot control Paks but can only offer moderating counsel.

Following brief discussion second five-year plan Bowles said US desirous help Afghanistan in its plan but does not desire simply enter into an escalating competition with Soviets. If US could be sure that Soviet presence in Afghanistan could be stabilized and not allowed to increase endlessly and that there would be genuine effort to establish businesslike relationships with Paks Bowles would personally be inclined recommend that US help Afghanistan to exercise its right of free choice. While there is a risk such statement might be misunderstood as pressure in support Pak position on transit, Bowles felt there was justification for advancing this rather strong medicine. Malikyar demurred and commented Afghanistan would never submit pressure, was devoted to raising standard living, had provided Embassy information re development plans and would appreciate help.

In talk with Yusuf second five-year plan outlined in terms major financing components with reiteration RGA desire for some indication magnitude future US aid. Bowles outlined criteria on which countries divided in categories for determining whether suitable for long term commitments or modified commitments or project-by-project approach. Relationship Iranian and Pak routes discussed along lines indicated previously. Bowles drew attention risks dependence on USSR and described present Soviet low gear but massive approach Afghanistan as unique in world. We are concerned Soviet may gradually gain dominant influence through increasing number of people, ultimately resulting in absorption Afghanistan. Yusuf nodded understandingly and strongly emphasized Afghan determination secure its independence and explained reasons for avoiding alliances.

Comment: Afghans accorded Bowles a notably friendly and warm reception. They listened to his description of US policies with great interest and were generally responsive in conversation. Apart from discussions of specific topics believe Bowles visit was deeply appreciated by RGA as evidence US interest in Afghanistan and its problems. In responding to Bowles remarks on Afghan-Pak questions including transit impasse, Afghan leaders were particularly cautious to avoid saying anything which might compromise their position. Nevertheless, I believe Bowles comments on importance of fully opening Pak route and on importance maintaining 3 practical routes including Pak route did not fall on deaf ears. In his talks he sowed several seeds but given stoniness of Afghan political soil I expect it will be a few weeks before we will be able to observe any sprouting.

Hannah

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 789.5/3-362. Secret. Repeated to Karachi, Tehran, and Manila for Bowles.
1. In telegram 527 from Kabul, March 2, Bowles reported on his meetings on February 28 with King Zahir, Foreign Minister Naim, and Minister of Commerce Sherzad. (Ibid., 123-Bowles, Chester) Bowles summarized his conversations in Kabul and his impressions of the situation in Afghanistan in airgram A-359 from Karachi, March 6. He emphasized what he saw as the danger that Afghanistan had become “the immediate target for a totally new experiment in Soviet expansionism.” (Ibid., 611.89/3-662)