Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

59. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in New York⁰

Washington, September 27, 1962, 8:03 p.m.

Tosec 43. Pass Talbot from Grant. Repeating separately Cairo Embtel 510¹ containing “word of advice” from UAR that USG avoid supporting Prince Hassan or acceding to Saudi advice to intervene in Yemen. Dept uncertain degree UAR influence on new regime or whether regime has and can maintain effective control,² but we should reply in following vein at Ali Sabri level or higher:

Begin proposed message to Cairo:

USG does not plan interfere Yemeni affairs on behalf Prince Hassan or any other Yemeni faction. US recognition of a new Yemeni government must await further information permitting assessment of popular acquiescence in and effectiveness of government’s control and evidence of government’s willingness and ability to respect international obligations.

Nature of relationship between new Yemeni government and UAR is not a matter for US concern. We wish UAR understand, however, USG has vital interest in maintenance security in Persian Gulf area, which dependent continuation UK position in Aden area. USG could not accept campaign mounted from Yemen against this position. In fact UK position in Aden and Persian Gulf directly promotes UAR interest in security of Kuwait. US thus looks to UAR to exert influence with new Yemeni regime to insure that efforts directed at internal stability and development rather than at external adventures. End proposed message.

We believe foregoing more profitable line of action than attempt manipulate Yemeni internal situation which possibly would fail or at least would entail being drawn too deeply into unpredictable Yemeni affairs. In our view, heart of problem is not in Sana’a but in Cairo and we are only Western power possessing possible capability of influencing situation there. Foregoing approach, while tending to shore up flank of UK position, would leave UK free to deal with Yemeni situation as deems best suited its interests. Suggest consultation with Lord Home.³

Request comments London,⁴ Cairo,⁵ Jidda.⁶

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/9-2762. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Barrow; cleared by Killgore, Breisky, Strong, Holloway, and Hewitt; and approved by Grant. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, and London.
1. In telegram 510 from Cairo, September 27, Badeau reported that Presidential Adviser Anwar Sadat had raised the subject of Yemen during a meeting. Noting that the Yemeni coup leaders believed that the United States had been supporting Prince Hassan, Sadat offered the United States a “word of advice” that it would be a grave mistake for the United States to back Hassan, because most of Yemen’s intelligentsia supported the coup and the republic. (Ibid.)
2. An Intelligence Note from Hilsman to the Acting Secretary on September 27, entitled “Turmoil in Prospect in the Yemen,” noted that UAR involvement in Yemen was suspected and that the UAR strongly supported the new regime. The note predicted: “If the UAR is clearly seen to be directing affairs in the Yemen, conservative internal resistance to the new regime will increase. The UK, Saudi Arabia, and the Bloc will be disposed to oppose UAR control over the Yemen.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Yemen, 8/61–9/62)
3. Telegram 335 to Cairo, September 29, instructed Badeau to deliver the message and informed him: “Secretary discussed Yemen situation with Lord Home and during course conversation indicated we considering sending message, without showing him text. In response to Secretary’s query, Home indicated such a message would be useful.” (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/9–2962)
4. In telegram 1311, September 28, the Embassy in London affirmed its agreement with the action and line proposed in this telegram. (Ibid., 786H.00/9–2862)
5. See Document 63.
6. In telegram 209 from Jidda, September 28, the Embassy advised that while the Saudi Government would welcome a cautionary word by the United States to the UAR regarding Yemen, the proposed message would not reassure the Saudis, who would view it as giving Nasser a free hand in Yemen up to the point where his actions infringed on British interests. The Embassy recommended inclusion of language affirming importance to the free world of stability in Yemen. (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/9–2862)