Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

63. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State⁰

Cairo, October 1, 1962, 2 p.m.

538. Deptels 323 and 335.¹ Called on Vice President Saadat September 30 and delivered substance reference telegrams. Saadat’s official response expressed gratification USG not supporting Hassan or any other Yemeni and concern that phrase “respect for Yemen’s sovereignty” sounded suspiciously like ultimatum. On latter, Saadat stated UAR had no intention of seeking unity with Yemen or any other Arab country, citing Syrian debacle as sad lesson not to be repeated.

Unofficially Saadat held long conversation regarding Yemeni affairs and US position. Expressed great concern lest USG fail to “develop its own position” but be misled into acting as tool for British aggressive interests. Whatever announced British attitude re Yemen might be, he said, Britain would privately twist situation to further its own policies which might include support of Hassan or other Monarchical factions.

In response I stated US Government was approaching Yemen situation in light of its own national interests in Near East, which I carefully outlined. Tranquility in Persian Gulf, including maintenance of Kuwait independence against Iraq military threat, necessitated in our opinion support general British position and we would be deeply concerned if new Yemen Government undertook campaign against Aden protectorate and British flank. I urged that internal progress in Yemen most urgent task of regime and most likely to rally international respect and support.

Saadat stated that UAR, whatever its position re British, had warned Yemen Junta along same lines and considered it highly inadvisable for them to mix in any way in current British difficulties in southern peninsula. He then inquired as to whether USG non support of Hassan would include dissuading Saudi Arabia from such support. In answer I stated US non support meant refraining from both direct and indirect action, but wrong to assume that we were in position to prevent Saud from following what might appear to him to be his natural interests. Saadat then lightly dismissed effectiveness of any Saudi action and returned to urge USG not unwittingly be twisted around British finger.

Saadat requested I keep in close touch with him on situation and promised to give me further information as received.

Comment: From other and completely reliable sources we know Saadat has had some UAR responsibility for liaison with Yemen coup. Immediately after my return from call, “Foreign Minister” Ayni of new Yemenite Government telephoned at Saadat’s request to meet with me this morning.²

Badeau

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files 786H.00/10-162. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Jidda and London.
1. Telegram 323 to Cairo was sent for action to USUN as Tosec 43, Document 59. Regarding telegram 335, see footnote 3 thereto.
2. On October 1 in New York, Foreign Minister Fawzi told Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Stevenson that his government was anxious that there be no outside intervention in Yemen. Fawzi indicated that both the United States and the United Kingdom were susceptible to such accusations, particularly given the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia. He also accepted Rusk’s view that the UAR could also be so accused. (Telegram 123 to Jidda, October 2; Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/10-262) A record of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 69 from USUN, October 1. (Ibid., 700.5611/10-162) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on the United Arab Republic.