Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

45. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Iran (Holmes) to the Shah of Iran⁰

Tehran, September 19, 1962.

The United States at the request of His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran has completed a study of matters pertaining to the defense of Iran. A military planning team representing the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff consulted with His Imperial Majesty and the Iranian military staff and made a study of the defensive terrain and of Iran’s military forces. Having considered all aspects of the defense of Iran, the team submitted a detailed report thereon.

This report together with the views expressed by His Imperial Majesty during his visit to the United States and in his subsequent letter to the President of the United States has been given full consideration at the highest levels in the Government of the United States. The resulting recommendations have been reflected in the development of a comprehensive and well-rounded multi-year program of military assistance to be provided to Iran by the Government of the United States. The basis for and general content of this program are outlined below.

Iran’s security involves military, economic and political aspects. The development of a defense concept for Iran takes into account the necessity for assuring military security within the broader context of the need for strengthened political unity and internal capacity to resist subversion, and the need for continued economic development accomplished in an orderly and efficient manner.

The concept for the defense of Iran must provide for all contingencies, insuring a balance of capabilities to meet each threat. It recognizes the capability of the United States and its allies to deter Soviet aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defeat it. It also takes into consideration the collective security arrangements embodied in the CENTO Treaty, on the agreement of March 5, 1959, between Iran and the United States¹ and takes into account Iran’s need for improved capability for self-defense in the event of aggression not envisaged by these agreements.

The concept further anticipates that Iran’s armed forces could be called upon to support other Iranian security forces, directly responsible for Iran’s internal security. Finally, it assumes that Iranian armed forces would participate in suitable civic action programs designed to contribute to the welfare of the Iranian people and to engender national recognition of and respect for the essential role of the armed forces in the preservation of Iran’s security.

The concept for the defense of Iran against external threats is based upon a forward strategy utilizing the national mountain barriers on the northern border. Military operations in support of such a strategy should be conceived and conducted in a manner visualizing the mutual support of ground, sea and air arms. Essential also to the implementation of such a strategy is the provision of an adequate measure of mobility to the ground force elements conducting the defense.

The concept for ground defense based upon this forward strategy contemplates making maximum use of terrain to achieve economy of force. It would be implemented by the provision of specially tailored frontier-type forces capable of effecting defense of border areas as a necessary contribution to deterrence, furnishing timely and accurate reporting of border incursions or threats thereof and carrying out the forward defense and delay along avenues of approach with emphasis on critical passes and defiles. Heavier units of divisional size, so located as to take maximum advantage of their mobility and firepower, would execute the defense in depth along main avenues of approach. These divisions and their supporting forces should be afforded sufficient mobility to permit rapid employment from more centralized locations to designated primary or alternate defense or delaying positions. Armor units would be disposed and employed so as to maximize their use along likely avenues of armored approach. To reinforce critical areas and to respond to contingency situations, including enemy airborne operations, maximum utilization of available airlift is envisioned.

Within the overall defense concept the mission of the Air Force would involve the execution of tactical air, air defense, and air transport operations including interdiction of key routes of ingress and the air defense of key target areas. The mission of the Navy would involve surveillance and reconnaissance, protection against infiltration, the conduct of mine warfare operations, and the protection of shore facilities including ports to assure vital logistical support through the Persian Gulf and the Shatt-Al-Arab.

The force structure designed for the Iranian armed forces should take into account not only the concept for defense, as set forth above, but also the capabilities of the forces and the equipment and resources which can be presumed to be available to these forces. The development of the force structure is influenced by the necessity to provide increased mobility to the divisional units and necessary support units charged with executing the defense, by the necessity for additional and more effective training efforts and for the provision of substantial numbers of highly skilled personnel needed for the maintenance and operation of increasingly complex materiel, and by the high cost of creating and maintaining an efficient modern armed forces. If due consideration is given these factors, the most effective Iranian military force which could be supported for the next five years is one limited to a total strength of approximately 160,000 personnel.

Within this total force there should be an army of seven infantry divisions of 10,000 personnel strength, each with necessary combat supporting units, a frontier force to provide visible defense, specially tailored and equipped totalling approximately 10,500 personnel, and necessary force-wide logistical support; an air force of approximately 12,000 personnel strength including eight tactical fighter squadrons, three transport squadrons, one tactical reconnaissance squadron, and one air defense wing including personnel necessary to man an aircraft control and warning system; and a navy of approximately 3,000 personnel, including two patrol frigates, four patrol boats and six minesweepers.

The United States in recognition of the need for improvement of the patrol and escort capability of the Imperial Iranian Navy in the Persian Gulf proposes to furnish two patrol frigates. These frigates would replace the two obsolescent ships of this class now in service in the Iranian Navy.

To permit effective utilization and employment of fighter and transport aircraft now available and those planned for the Iranian Air Force, expansion of operative airfield capability and development of an aircraft control and warning system is visualized. Steps to provide for each of these capabilities are necessary for implementation of the concept for defense.

It is proposed that an airfield development program be undertaken giving consideration to the capability and radius of operation of existing and planned aircraft to accomplish assigned missions, while at the same time giving consideration to the resources which can be made available to construction requirements. The concept envisages three main operating bases consistent with permanent base maintenance and support requirements; the use of a forward operating base in northeast Iran with minimum essential facilities for extension of operating radius; and the utilization of existing commercial airfields as emergency forward operating bases. Within this concept one main operating base would be developed at Hamadan in addition to those now existing at Teheran and Dezful and a forward operating base would be constructed in Northeastern Iran at Mashed.

The United States proposes to contribute to the development of the aircraft control and warning system by construction of radar stations at Hamadan and Dezful. The development of the system would be facilitated by construction of a radar station within the CENTO early warning system at Mashed by the Government of the United Kingdom and subject to CENTO agreement thereto. The United States would also provide an adequate and reliable communications system linking all existing and proposed radar stations and the air defense operations center.

The United States’ proposal to undertake the airfield expansion and construction projects at Hamadan and Mashed and the aircraft control and warning radar stations at Hamadan and Dezful, as set forth above, anticipates that the Government of Iran will undertake to provide from its resources necessary ancillary facilities. This combined effort should vastly improve the operational effectiveness of the Imperial Iranian Air Force.

In furtherance of its intent to assist Iran in providing for its defense, the U.S. is prepared during the next five years to provide equipment and other support for Iranian forces as set forth in the attachment hereto. It is understood that provision of this support by the United States will be dependent (A) upon the transition of the Iranian armed forces over the next two or three year period to the agreed manpower level; (B) upon the demonstrated ability of the Iranian armed forces to absorb and effectively utilize and maintain existing and newly delivered equipment; and (C) upon maximum effective utilization of existing troop housing and support facilities.

Qualitative improvement in the Iranian armed forces, particularly in the army, is essential to effective implementation of the concept for defense set forth herein and for the effective utilization of equipment to be furnished. To this end procurement and training of long-term technicians, specialists, and non-commissioned officers in all areas should be accomplished on an accelerated basis; a personnel management system to assure full and appropriate utilization of skilled personnel should be established; a sound fiscal management system should be employed to assure effective utilization of resources; maintenance and logistic support capability should be broadened; and command structure and force organization should be tailored to the requirements of the force structure being developed. In accordance with the wishes of His Imperial Majesty the United States/ARMISH/MAAG is prepared to assist in the accomplishment of these improvements through the provision of detailed recommendations and guidance, as required.

This undertaking of the Government of the United States is, of course, subject to the approval by the United States Congress of annual appropriations of the necessary funds. The United States Government believes that the above force level and proposed equipment and supplies for the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces together with the qualitative improvements visualized would substantially improve the capability of the Iranian forces to carry out their missions.

The Government of the United States proposes that, if the program outlined above is acceptable in principle, that designated representatives of His Imperial Majesty and the Chief of ARMISH/MAAG undertake discussions for the purpose of arriving at the details of the program for the defense of Iran.

Summary of proposed deliveries of military equipment to Iran July 1, 1962 through June 30, 1967 (Note A).

[Here follows a detailed list of 13 types of military equipment and weaponry.]²

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 76 A 2, 6.111, 1962 Aide-Mire, Iran. Secret. Attached to the source text is a copy of a memorandum, dated September 19, to Holmes from Hussein Ala, Minister of the Court of the Shah of Iran, which conveyed the Iranian Government’s confirmation of the understanding reached orally that morning and agreement to the Five-Year Military Program presented in Holmes’ memorandum. Ala’s memorandum also affirmed Iranian desire that the United States provide three more tank battalions and two additional radar stations, and noted: “Should the international situation develop during the five-year period envisaged by the Program, in such manner as to pose threats to Iran not now foreseen, it is understood that the Program may be reviewed.”
1. TIAS 4189; 10 UST 314. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 1020-1022.
2. Another copy of this memorandum indicates that Holmes signed the document. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Iran 000.1–91.31 1963)2