Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

44. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Tehran, September 19, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Five-Year Military Program for Iran

PARTICIPANTS

• His Imperial Majesty—The Shah
• Ambassador Julius C. Holmes
• Major General John C. Hayden, Chief, ARMISH/MAAG
• Brigadier General H.A. Twitchell, USA, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Shah held an audience with the above named U.S. representatives in his private office. The meeting began at 12:15 P.M. and terminated at 1:55 P.M.

Ambassador Holmes stated that he had requested the audience with His Imperial Majesty in order to discuss United States proposals concerning the Five-Year Military Program for Iran. There followed a discussion of the recent exchange between the Governments of Iran and the U.S.S.R. concerning Iran’s guarantee that there would be no foreign missile bases established in Iran. This portion of the discussion has been separately reported upon by the Ambassador.

The Ambassador pointed out that the report of the military planning team had been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, and had been given full consideration at the highest levels in the United States Government. He pointed out that the resulting recommendations have been reflected in the development of a comprehensive and well rounded multi-year program of military assistance to be provided by the United States.

Ambassador Holmes then explained that the proposed Military Assistance Program contained some important additions especially in the areas of airfields and AC&W. He indicated that the United States proposed to develop a main operating base at Hamadan and a forward operating base at Meshad. The former would have complete maintenance and operational facilities, and the latter would have the requisite operational and support facilities for rotational units. The Ambassador indicated that the United States planned to develop AC&W stations at Hamadan and Dezful, and to provide a communications system for the existing and proposed sites. He noted that development of the system would be facilitated by the construction of a radar station within the CENTO Early Warning System at Meshad by the Government of the United Kingdom subject to CENTO agreement.

Recalling the Washington discussions with the Secretary of Defense, the Ambassador reminded the Shah that the Defense Department had found it necessary as a matter of priority to delete the two frigates in order to provide adequate funds for the early warning system. However as the result of further study, the careful consideration given to His Imperial Majesty’s letter to the President and the extensive review which had been made of the subject at the highest levels within the United States Government, including the President, the frigates are now included in the program.

To this point in the discussion the Shah had been unresponsive and somewhat skeptical in his attitude. He reacted most favorably to the Ambassador’s comment on the inclusion of the frigates in the program and indicated the importance which he placed upon these two ships. From this point the discussion proceeded cordially and with clearly established rapport.

Turning to the overall force level ceiling, the Ambassador indicated that the United States had made a careful and detailed study of the matter and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Team along with ARMISH/MAAG had developed specifics in this regard. It is believed the total force level for all services should not exceed 160,000. The Shah asked if it were feasible to apply this level for all forces rather than just the Army. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative, indicating that there should be an Air Force of approximately 12,000 and a Navy of 3,000 with the remaining 145,000 being the strength of the Army.

The Shah then queried as to whether the Ambassador had any details concerning the proposed program. Ambassador Holmes provided the memorandum which had been prepared.¹ The Shah read the entire memorandum in a careful and deliberate manner. Upon completion he said he had some questions concerning his request for additional tanks, vehicles, aircraft and an Early Warning System.

Referring to his request for additional tanks, the Shah indicated that he believed there should be three additional battalions. General Hayden in reply explained that it was visualized the tank battalions would be under the command of the Army Commander, rather than Division Commanders and the tanks would be employed along favorable tank approaches grouped where necessary to give adequate strength. The Shah asked for details concerning the proposed employment of armor particularly in the northeast and northwest sectors. The proposed deployment and force structure was then discussed in considerable detail. During the course of the discussion the Shah indicated:

a. Concurrence with the concept that the battalions should be under the Army Commander or grouped into a special force,

b. Concurrence with the need to make maximum effective use of existing troop housing and recognition that this factor affected the deployments in certain cases, and

c. That it would be militarily desirable to have three additional tank battalions if resources either Iranian or United States should become available.

Referring to his request for additional vehicles, the Shah asked whether the numbers proposed would provide the requisite mobility. General Hayden indicated that, considering those now on hand and those being programmed, approximately 75% of TO&E requirements would be met. The Shah replied that this seemed too low, especially for the units which would be operational at the outset. General Hayden pointed out that it was planned to allocate the vehicles according to an operational priority assuring a higher percentage of authorization to combat units. It was pointed out to the Shah that the forces faced major problems in increasing their standards of maintenance. The number of vehicles proposed was considered by United States authorities to be the maximum number which the Iranians could absorb in the time frame envisaged.

The Shah in commenting on the Army’s force structure and proposed strength questioned whether it was compatible with CENTO strategy and concepts. General Twitchell indicated that the proposal had been discussed with General Porter, the United States Representative to the CENTO Permanent Military Deputies Group, in considerable detail and that it was believed the concept of frontier forces and mountain units would provide for a more effective defense posture. This would permit the tailoring of units to perform the highly specialized tasks in connection with forward defense of the border areas, and the location of the divisional units so as to take maximum advantage of their mobility and firepower. It was pointed out also that the concept should provide for a more effective defense posture and use of resources than previously had been the case.

In response to a question by the Shah regarding the parachute battalion, General Hayden indicated that it was planned to have two battalions located at Shiraz, one of which would be the unit currently stationed in Teheran. The battalions would be specially organized, trained and equipped. He further explained that based on existing and programmed equipment, he anticipated no difficulties in this regard.

The Shah then asked about the proposed AC&W system. He expressed concern over the need for a station in the north between Babolsar and Meshad and for a station at Zahedan. General Twitchell explained that from an operational point of view priority had been given to Hamadan, Dezful and Meshad. Ambassador Holmes, referring to the CENTO plan, indicated the British were in no position to give any commitment beyond three stations. The Shah mentioned he would have to talk with them on this matter. He then expressed concern that a gap in the northern coverage would expose Teheran to attack.

At this point the Ambassador asked that Colonel E.J. Broussard be admitted to the audience in order that discussions concerning the Air Program could be taken advantage of. Colonel Broussard explained that a gap would exist and would require a station in the Sharbat area. This would provide overlap coverage at 20,000’ along the entire northern border. Without this station an intruder could enter Iran from the north and would probably escape detection until picked up by the Babolsar radar which provides coverage to just south of Teheran. The Shah then inquired as to the exact location of the site required in the Sharbat area. It was pointed out that this would require a detailed on-site survey by a Radar Siting Team to insure that the best possible coverage would be obtained, but that preliminary studies indicated that location in the Sharbat area could best provide contiguous coverage. The Shah then inquired into the compatibility of the planned U.S. radars and those already provided by the United Kingdom. The response indicated that they were compatible in operational characteristics and that there would be no problem in linking all stations into a single system with the communications net the United States will provide. The only difference would be in the maintenance field where United Kingdom and United States training would be required to assure proper maintenance on the equipment provided by each country. He then asked if the proposed AC&W system would link up with that of Pakistan. The reply was that it would not since a gap would exist from approximately 180 nautical miles south of the Meshad site to the Pakistan border. He then concluded that a site between Babolsar and Meshad and one in the Zahedan area would be militarily desirable. It was agreed that such was the case.

The Shah then turned to the subject of the F-5A and asked if this was considered a good fighter aircraft for his country. An affirmative answer was given and a detailed explanation of the advantages of the F-5A as they pertain to Iran was provided. This explanation included the ease of operation and maintenance, twin engine reliability, ability to use existing civil airfields as emergency forward operating bases, anticipated low pilot and aircraft attrition rates, radius of action under varying conditions, ordnance carrying capability, and low cost of operation. It was pointed out that this fighter should permit the IIAF to reach and maintain a high level of effectiveness much more rapidly and safely then would be possible with other supersonic fighters. He then inquired into the availability of the F-110s. He was informed that the F-110 is a very expensive and sophisticated aircraft and that it is not planned for any MAP countries at this time. The current and planned production will be used to fill USAF requirements. After a brief discussion of the size, capability, and complexity of the F-110, the Shah concluded that the possibility of obtaining this fighter would be very remote. It was agreed that this was the situation. He then asked if 8 squadrons of fighters were adequate to defend Iran against the air threat from Iraq or Afghanistan. He was advised that this was considered an adequate force as it should be expected that the Imperial Iranian Air Force could reach a high state of operational effectiveness with the F-5A. The Shah mentioned the number of Soviet aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan but did not pursue the subject further. He stated that he had heard that Greece and Turkey had refused the F-5A and wanted to know if this were true. He was informed that there was nothing to indicate that either Greece or Turkey had refused to accept the F-5A. He was informed further that Greece and Turkey each would receive two squadrons of F-104G aircraft to carry out a NATO commitment but that the balance of the fighter modernization would be accomplished with the F-5A.

The Ambassador emphasized that this represented the first time that the United States had proposed a Five-Year Program for military assistance for any country. This represents a significant improvement in planning and programming and should assist both Iran and the United States in their mutual defense efforts. The Shah received this comment with considerable satisfaction.

Ambassador Holmes indicated that in addition to the proposed Military Assistance Program that the Five-Year Program was predicated on the accomplishment of qualitative improvements in the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, particularly the Army. The Shah acknowledged this need and made specific comment in regard to actions that are to be taken in the administrative fields particularly in connection with personnel.

General Hayden informed His Majesty that the Personnel Mobile Training Team had just finished their assignment and that he would present His Imperial Majesty a copy of their report at his next audience.

The Shah stated the plan as presented to him was accepted with the following understanding:

First, the military desirability of providing three additional tank battalions is noted and it is understood that consideration may be given to providing them in the future should the requisite resources be found from either American or Iranian resources. Second, it would be desirable from a military point of view to have two radar stations, one between Babolsar and Meshad and one in the Zahedan area if means may be found in the future, from whatever sources to provide them. Third, should the international situation develop during the five year period envisaged by the plan, in such a manner as to pose threats to Iran not now foreseen, the plan may be subject to review. He requested Ambassador Holmes to prepare a memorandum to this effect for his signature and stated he wanted to conclude the agreement prior to his departure on Friday.² Ambassador Holmes replied that the paper would be prepared immediately and provided the Shah later today.

This concluded the audience.³

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Iran, 1962. Secret. Drafted by General Twitchell on September 20. The conversation was held at the Shah’s Summer Palace.
1. Document 45.
2. The memorandum was subsequently signed by Minister of the Court Hussein Ala; see the source note, Document 45.
3. Ambassador Holmes’ account of this meeting was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 430 from Tehran, September 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.5/9-2262) On September 24, Komer sent it to President Kennedy under cover of a memorandum that reads in part: “The Shah bought, but not without indicating he’d be back at us later for certain things he asked for and we didn’t give him, i.e. two more radar stations and three tank battalions. For some reason Holmes did not come back at Shah along the lines of the rather explicit instructions we sent him (Tab B [Document 43]) following Mac Bundy’s phone talk with you. In fact, he seems to have finessed it, once he got his frigates. So we can expect more pleas from Pahlavi all too soon.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Iran) Included in an October 5 report from Kaysen to Bundy is the following passage on Iran: “The President read Komer’s note and the attached cables. He has made no comment. The question of what to do to follow up on what is obviously failure of Holmes to carry out his instruction remains open.” (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Carl Kaysen)