Office of the Historian

46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic0

Washington, September 19, 1962, 11:31 p.m.

292. Following based on uncleared memcon:1

Secretary told Kaissouni September 18 that while US intends sign multi-year agreement soon, we prefer not take action on any large scale agreements pending completion Congressional action on AID appropriation.2 Secretary suggested that if Kaissouni’s plans would keep him in US perhaps until early October we would hope sign here. Otherwise signature could be shortly after his return Cairo. Kaissouni indicated intention remain until after first October. (Consultations third countries still in progress.) Meanwhile, we plan sign stabilization loan amendment either September 20 or 25 for $10 million with disbursement contingent conclusion matching arrangements. With reported signature German agreement September 17, $9 million would be available immediately while matching final $1 million allowed through December 31.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B43/9-1962. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Duncan; cleared by Gaud, Strong, Little, and Swank; and approved by Grant.↩
  2. Rusk’s conversation with Kaissouni on September 18, which began at 10:15 a.m., was recorded in five memoranda of conversation: 1) Cairo Economic Conference (ibid., 398.00-CA/9-1862); 2) Multi-Year PL 480 (ibid., 611.86B41/9-1862); 3) Pending Economic Assistance Requests (ibid., 811.0086B/9-1862); 4) UAR Accession to GATT (ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330); and 5) Preservation of Nubian Monuments (ibid.). A briefing memorandum from Talbot to Rusk sent prior to this meeting is ibid., Central Files, 611.86B/9-1762. Additional documentation relating to Kaissouni’s visit is ibid., 811.0086B/9-1162.↩
  3. On September 16, Bundy advised Kennedy that the Department of State, in order to reduce the likelihood that Nasser would react violently when the Hawk deal with Israel was officially announced or that he would prematurely attack the Johnson Plan, proposed that Kaissouni be informed during his visit that the United States was prepared to sign an agreement giving the UAR the final $10 million stabilization credit and sign as soon as the aid bill became law the 3-year P.L. 480 agreement with the UAR. Bundy advised delaying the announcement of the latter so as not to affect passage of the aid bill. Bundy added that Feldman saw no undue complication on the domestic political front from these moves. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, 9/62–12/62)↩