Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

393. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM-1003–63

Washington, December 24, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Withdrawal of Hard Surface Forces from Saudi Arabia (S)

1. The continued presence of Hard Surface forces in Saudi Arabia remains a source of concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This small and operationally incomplete force of 8 F-100’s and 3 KB-50’s lacks the radar, communications, and munitions necessary to perform an effective air defense function. As constituted, it is incapable of effective self-defense against United Arab Republic (UAR) forces available in Yemen. The announced Hard Surface mission to train Saudi Arabian Air Force pilots was completed last September. The Saudi government believes this force is in place to provide effective air defense of their nation, including the villages on the Yemen border.

2. The stabilizing effect the Air Force unit has had on the Saudi government is recognized, and it undoubtedly has restrained the activities of the UAR to some degree. The withdrawal of the UN mission on 4 January 1964, however, may well introduce a new phase of the UAR-Saudi activity on the Yemen border which could readily spread throughout Saudi Arabia. Ambassador Hart has indicated that, unless the UAR ceases its interference in Yemen, Hard Surface alone will not be sufficient inducement to restrain Saudi Arabia from resuming support to Royalist forces. In this eventuality, UAR reaction, at least to the extent of attacking Saudi supply points, can be expected. With Hard Surface in place, the United States will be forced to respond militarily or risk loss of credibility of its military power, not only in the Middle East, but world-wide. If Hard Surface is withdrawn after Faisal resumes aid to the Royalists, it will be a clear signal to the UAR that the United States has withdrawn its support of Saudi Arabia and an invitation for further UAR aggression. In either case, then, the United States may well be faced with black and white choices either of hostilities with the UAR or of abandonment of Saudi Arabia. Although the immediate withdrawal of Hard Surface could be interpreted as US abandonment of the disengagement formula, this risk is clearly minor in relation to the greater risk and inflexibility resulting from maintaining Hard Surface in place, particularly because of the proven failure to influence withdrawal of UAR forces from Yemen. Nevertheless, the Department of State has indicated desire to extend Hard Surface until 31 January 1964. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Hard Surface should be withdrawn, and, if a military deterrent is required in the area, it should be replaced by other appropriate military forces.

3. Current contingency planning for the phased introduction of military force into the Saudi Arabia area is provided in CINCSTRIKE OPLAN 531–6. Forces provided in this plan are:

a. One Carrier Task Force from the 6th Fleet.

b. Naval forces from MIDEASTFOR (AVP, 2DD).

c. Two Tactical Fighter Squadrons, one composite reconnaissance element, one aerial refueling element, and service and support units as required.

The foregoing plan provides for progressive actions as follows:

• Phase I: Naval Operations will be conducted in the Red Sea (MIDEASTFOR) and eastern Mediterranean (carrier task force) as show of force and visible evidence of a US capability to retaliate quickly and effectively against the UAR (Egypt). Tactical fighters based in Saudi Arabia will provide air cover for US naval elements in the Red Sea and defend US and Saudi forces against attack.
• Phase II: Establish a blockade of UAR shipping supporting the aggression.
• Phase III: Strike military targets and bases in the UAR and Yemen from which the aggression is being projected. Interdict and destroy UAR shipping supporting the aggression.

4. A further illustration of the magnitude of military effort required internally for minimum essential air defense of Saudi Arabia—without offensive capability to strike targets outside of Saudi Arabia—is provided by the recent “Air Defense Study.” In this detailed examination, the study group determined, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, that the force requirement included:

a. Three 12 UE squadrons of F-5 or F-104H aircraft (one each stationed at Jidda, Dhahran, and Riyadh).

b. Three battalions of Hawks (one each stationed at Jidda, Dhahran, and Riyadh).

c. Three heavy permanent radars and one mobile radar.

5. If our foreign policy requires a military presence in or near Saudi Arabia, a more efficient and militarily acceptable solution is the periodic dispatch of a Composite Air Strike Force, the movement of selected elements of the 6th Fleet into the immediate area, or both. As you know, any of these forces, or combinations, can be dispatched to the area in a matter of hours. In order to avoid the impression that our withdrawal represents an abandonment of Saudi Arabia, a public announcement should be made that US forces will periodically exercise in Saudi Arabia. Thereafter, it is recommended that any military presence required in or near Saudi Arabia be provided by one, or both, of the foregoing options, utilizing regularly constituted and supported military forces.

6. A proposed letter to the Secretary of State is attached recommending an early solution.¹

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, Saudi Arabia 1963. Secret. In a December 24 covering memorandum to McNamara (CM-1094–63), General Taylor advised that he had learned after JCSM-1003–63 had been prepared that the decision had already been made to extend Hard Surface deployment to Saudi Arabia until January 31, 1964. He noted that while the memorandum printed here had been overtaken by events, he still considered the reasoning contained in it to be valid and worthy of transmittal to the Secretary of State.
1. Attached but not printed.