Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

394. Memorandum for the Record⁰

LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 27, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Discussions with President Johnson at the Johnson Ranch on Friday, December 27th

[Here follow items 1–3 on other matters.]

4. I did not review the Israeli nuclear inspection with the President. This should be put on a later agenda.¹

[Here follows item 5 on an unrelated matter.]

6. The President asked for a detailed briefing on the Yemen and how the situation evolved. I explained the background of the establishment of the Yemen Republic under Sallal and our recognition of that Republic at the urging of Nasser. I indicated that the British had not recognized the Yemen Republic and were critical of us for doing so. I told the President that the Yemen for a long period of time—hundreds of years—had been governed by a chief chosen on an understanding among tribal leaders and sheiks, the most recent being Badr. This government was overthrown by revolution and the new government was immediately supported by Nasser. However, when Nasser moved in troops in substantial numbers, military officers who overthrew the Imam became discouraged. A great many of them defected and returned to their old tribal leaders; others became neutral. As a result, Nasser was required to send in increasing numbers of troops and his forces now totalled 30,000 to 32,000. This is about one-third of his total armed forces. The costs to Nasser of the Yemeni operation are very high. They are estimated at about $50 to $75 million dollars. The situation now was difficult because the only military forces sustaining the Yemen Republic Government were the Nasser forces and the Egyptians were really running the country with the Yemen political authorities acting in a subservient position and with little authority. As a result, dissension was growing among the Yemen Government officials who resented the control and authority exercised by the UAR presence.

7. I then said that Ambassador Bunker had completed a rather effective negotiation last summer under which Faisal would cease supplying arms to the royalists, who had retired to the north into the hills, providing the UAR withdrew its troops. Nasser had agreed to withdraw 5,000 troops; however, to date he had withdrawn only 1,000 to 1,200. The initial withdrawals were to have taken place prior to November 4th, at which time the authority of the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) would come to a halt. After some considerable negotiations the UNYOM was extended until January 4th. The problem now was whether Faisal and Nasser would agree to further extension. If they did not it was highly probable that Faisal would again start to supply arms to the royalists, and that Nasser would escalate military activities against the royalists and into Saudi Arabia. I pointed out that this was an extremely critical matter, not because of the importance of Yemen, but because of our entire relationship with the Saudi Arabian Government and the importance of Saudi oil reserves to our national interest. The President asked what should be done and I said that every effort should be made to extend the January 4th date in the hopes that with the passage of time the Yemen resentment to UAR occupation would increase to a point where the UAR would be forced to withdraw increasing numbers of troops and the threat to Faisal would thus be relieved.

[Here follows item 8 on an unrelated matter.]

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80 B 01285A, Box 7, DCI Files, DCI (McCone) Memos for the Record, Meetings with the President. Secret. Drafted by McCone on December 29. A handwritten note in the margin reads: “Noted by DCI & NE.”
1. In telegram 642, December 5, the Embassy in Tel Aviv transmitted the text of a letter from the Israeli Foreign Ministry inviting U.S. representatives to visit the Dimona reactor on any date between January 10 and 15, 1964. (Department of State, Central Files, AE 11–2 ISR)