Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

392. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts⁰

Washington, December 23, 1963, 8:34 p.m.

1133. Ref: Deptel 1709 to USUN;¹ Deptel 3707 to London, rptd 475 to Jidda;² 2811 to Cairo;³ CA-6156.⁴ Ambassadors Hart and Badeau should meet soon with Faisal and Nasser respectively for purpose seeking their full cooperation described in reference messages. While each Ambassador may use discretion re nature and details of presentation to be made, should include points indicated for respective posts in “Recommended Course of Action” (Deptel 3707 to London). Ambassador Hart, however, may adjust in light of talk with Saqqaf as mentioned Jidda’s 641.⁵ Department suggests following approach:

A. For Cairo

1. Inappreciable UAR Withdrawals. We deplore failure UAR withdraw substantial number troops from Yemen after six months UNYOM presence. FYI. Best Department intelligence does not substantiate Spinelli report re substantial withdrawals UAR troops from Yemen. Our estimate is that troop drawdown is at most no more than a few thousand. End FYI. In absence satisfactory UAR performance, USG having increasing difficulties keeping Faisal—who has been fulfilling Bunker commitment—from resuming aid to royalists. Nevertheless, despite resultant lessened leverage now available to us, we will continue do all possible restrain Faisal. Substantial UAR withdrawals by January 4 would help immeasurably in this respect.

2. Requisite of UAR Cooperation in Development Coalition Regime. USG and UN placing increased emphasis on development coalition regime in Yemen and we urge Nasser in strongest terms to help and stimulate this process. Only through creation viable YARG can UAR be enabled withdraw bulk its troops from Yemen. Reports circulate suggesting UARG actively discouraging indigenous Yemeni efforts broaden base YARG. International community will expect all external parties to Yemen dispute to respect idea of Yemen self-determination.

3. Important USG Interests in Saudi Arabia. Nasser understands USG has important interests in Saudi Arabia and has pledged its support to reformist-minded Faisal regime. USG would not stand idly by if UAR should attack Saudi Arabia—whether or not UAR considers it has adequate provocation. In event SAG resumes shipments to Yemeni royalists, YARG and UARG should have recourse to UN or similar measures, and not spread conflict by attacks on Saudi Arabia.

4. UAR-SAG Detente. USG suggesting SAG agree send representative meet with UAR secretly for purpose clearing air between two countries. Immediate discontinuation UAR propaganda against Saudi Arabia appears key to bringing about such meeting.

5. Nasser Faces Serious Dilemma in Yemen. Unless UAR finds way to extricate itself, situation will increasingly take on aspect of occupation. Longer UAR remains there, more Yemeni opposition aroused against UAR presence and thus against YARG. Tribes in north have capability resist central government for many months even without Saudi assistance. Unless UAR now takes advantage opportunities presented, Yemen imbroglio can only go from bad to worse causing instability to entire Arab area and incidentally casting discredit on Arab nationalism and “revolution”. Spinelli mission currently offers best hope for UAR in Yemen and Nasser should not let this golden opportunity pass.

B. For Jidda

1. Continued USG Concern for Saudi Integrity. In delivering very confidential letter from President (Deptel 486),⁶ you should take special cognizance of President’s belief in bed-rock USG-SAG friendship and in fundamental mutuality of USG-SAG interests. (Letter should be closely held and under no circumstances publicly released.) Despite some recent differences over Yemen, should be recalled—as President emphasizes—that US undertook Yemen policy primarily as means protect Saudi Arabian integrity. USG public actions, as well as words, in support of basic integrity Saudi Arabia have deterred both military and subversive moves against the kingdom. USG intends continue this policy of support and prepared, if Faisal desires, make public statement on suitable occasion underscoring USG support for Saudi integrity and for progressive-minded Faisal regime.

2. Disadvantages of Faisal’s Re-involvement in Yemen. USG undertaking to stand by Faisal would be adversely affected by resumption Saudi aid to royalists, as Faisal already knows. USG cannot be placed in awkward position of appearing provide protective umbrella to indirect Saudi aggression in Yemen. Moreover, we strongly doubt resumption Saudi aid to royalists would force Nasser withdraw troops from Yemen. Instead, he would probably add to his commitment, rely even more heavily on Soviet assistance and increase pressure against Saudi Arabia. This could endanger stability of Saudi Arabia as was case last winter until disengagement agreement worked out. UAR-YAR might successfully obtain condemnation of Saudi Arabia’s actions by UN. On other hand, we would support Saudi complaint raised before UNSC in event occurence deliberate and unprovoked UAR aggression against Saudi territory.

3. Preferable for SAG Concentrate on Modernization Program and Development Own Defense Capability. Best course for Faisal in strengthening his country—and preserving his regime—against Nasserist danger is avoid exposing Saudi military and other weaknesses to undue stresses. Should concentrate his energies on course already charted in direction: (1) improving SAG military capability to defend itself, (2) strengthening fabric Saudi society. Progress made on these two fronts will reduce threats posed by Nasser both in Peninsula and throughout Arab world. Re (1), USG has completed survey Saudi air defense needs which prepared help SAG in fulfilling. If he wishes, Ambassador may deliver summary survey report at this time. Re (2), would be pity if accomplishments thus far, which have attracted outside admiration and recognition, were dissipated by diversion of funds into fruitless outside adventure.

4. Favorable Saudi Position Vis-à-Vis Yemen. Faisal should take note his excellent vantage point vis-à-vis Yemen. Saudi Arabia is secure. YAR is in effect wooing him. Indications are Yemeni leaders and people would take stiffer attitude toward UAR if assured friendly Saudi posture. Yemenis are increasingly disillusioned with UAR presence. Yemen represents considerable drain on UAR resources.

We believe in Faisal’s interests establish contact with YAR leaders and not be bound to only one group in Yemen. If Faisal extends hand of friendship to Yemenis, not impossible YARG leaders themselves will publicly request UAR to withdraw from Yemen.

5. USG Supports Coalition Effort While Continuing Press for UAR Withdrawals. We continuing to press UAR on withdrawals and have indicated we cannot provide any additional aid until UAR reduces economic drain caused by its Yemeni adventure. Meanwhile, USG placing emphasis on Yemeni coalition effort. Latter appears offer most effective means get UAR troops out and restore measure stability in Yemen. USG fully supports Spinelli initiative and notes Yemeni leaders now understand that national reconciliation and reconstruction will be facilitated if Yemenis settle their problems themselves. Rising Yemeni disillusionment and discontent should hasten Nasser’s acceptance of representative regime. We pushing Nasser hard to cooperate fully, showing him this in his best interests. Meanwhile, hope Faisal sees way clear give coalition effort his support.

6. UAR-SAG Detente. USG again urges Faisal appoint high-level Saudi meet quietly with UAR representative for purpose exploring possibilities of SAG-UAR detente. Modus vivendi between two countries, even if only minimal, could be instrumental in attaining objectives which all parties seek of leaving Yemen to Yemenis.

7. Question of Hard Surface. Hard Surface brought to Saudi Arabia for temporary period as outgrowth Bunker Agreement. During some six months’ tenure has served both as training mission and as public manifestation USG support for Saudi integrity. Represents only one example of military measure USG can take and must shortly be withdrawn. USG has other forces available in area for deployment at moment’s notice in lieu of Hard Surface. USG also prepared to assist in developing and broadening SAG military capabilities. In addition to assisting in Saudi air defense needs we prepared support Saudi requests for conventional military materiel. In this context Secretary McNamara also has indicated that he would like to discuss mutual Saudi-US military matters in Washington with MODA Prince Sultan some time shortly after withdrawal of Hard Surface. Furthermore, USG informing Nasser we stand behind Faisal regime and would not stand idly by if Nasser should carry “battle” into Saudi Arabia. Therefore, we wish set at rest any apprehensions Faisal might have over prospective withdrawal Hard Surface early in 1964. FYI. Leave to your discretion whether mention January 31 target date but must be clearly understood HS must be withdrawn on that date. Also Faisal must clearly understand Hard Surface or other military support cannot serve as umbrella for resumption of Saudi aid to Yemeni royalists. End FYI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Seelye on December 21; cleared by Davies, Bunte, Robinson, Stoddart, Jernegan, Buffum, and McKesson; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Jidda and Cairo and repeated to Taiz, London, Dhahran, USUN, POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA and by pouch to Amman, Tel Aviv, Kuwait, Aden, Baghdad, Beirut, and Damascus.
1. Document 388.
2. Telegram 3707 to London, December 16, reported that Jernegan had briefed British Embassy officials in Washington regarding the tentative plan of action on Yemen (see Document 385). (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN)
3. Not printed. (Ibid.)
4. Dated December 17. (Ibid.)
5. Dated December 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 YEMEN/UN)
6. Document 389.