Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

385. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs⁰

Washington, December 11, 1963.

APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION REGARDING YEMEN

Another turning point in our Yemen policy is approaching. The UAR has not pulled out a substantial number of troops as it is committed to do under the Bunker agreement. The UN Observer Mission (UNYOM) will not be extended after its terminal date of January 4, although a UN presence will continue. If Prince Faisal should carry out his threat to resume covert aid to the royalists after January 4, we could be faced with a major crisis in our relations with both Saudi Arabia and the UAR.

Background. Our concern throughout has been not Yemen itself but keeping the civil war from escalating into a Saudi-UAR fracas. In such a conflict the Saudis would look impotent (even if they did not collapse), and they would try every way to drag us in. So to protect our oil interests in Saudi Arabia we have tried to convince Faisal of the folly of his taking on Nasser. We also want to avoid wrecking our relations with the UAR and the attendant risk of a possible US-UAR military confrontation. We do not want to risk reversing the substantial decline in Soviet penetration of the Middle East by leaving the Soviets as the UAR’s only outside contact.

The disengagement scheme, which Ambassador Bunker developed with the UAR and Saudis, and then with the UN, had a sweetener for Faisal. We sent a squadron of eight US jets (Hard Surface) as a symbol of our support (though we did so only after the Saudis agreed to halt aid to the Royalists). We thus bought nearly a year of time in which we have kept the two sides apart.

Our dilemma. But the disengagement scheme has stalled, and the UNYOM buffer probably cannot be again extended in its original form: (1) With 30,000 troops still in Yemen Nasser has not lived up to commitment for phased withdrawal—he has the bear by the tail and can’t let go; (2) Faisal, who is under increasing criticism from the Saudi royal family, feels he cannot afford to stick to the bargain any longer and also sees a chance to get at Nasser through us; (3) U Thant is in no position to press for a continuing full-blown UN presence. (He will, however, probably be amenable to a continuing UN political presence whose prime task will be to seek reconciliation of the various factions in Yemen.)

Our aim is to keep the Yemen affair from blowing up before some kind of political compromise can be patched up (which both the Saudis and UAR can accept). We (and UN) have been trying to promote a broader-based coalition regime, still under UAR influence (so UAR troops would leave) but independent enough that Saudis and UK could live with it. However, it may take months for such a regime to emerge.

While buying time to work out such a compromise, we want to continue protecting Saudi Arabia from the consequences of a direct confrontation with Nasser which would almost certainly develop if Faisal resumed aid to the royalists. Convincing Faisal that this is in his interest has led to a growing crisis of confidence between us. With his Arab sense of honor and a long-standing grudge against Nasser, he feels strongly that because he carried out his disengagement pledges, while Nasser did not, we should now join him against Nasser. We must persuade Faisal to follow our advice.

The Stakes. What Faisal wants would mean abandoning, over so minor an issue as Yemen, the gradual influence over certain UAR policies we feel we achieved under President Kennedy. So long as the UAR does not trespass on our vital interests, the limited understanding we have achieved is of real value in our area wide policy. To break openly with Nasser now over Yemen would: (a) increase the danger of an Arab-Israeli explosion; (b) destroy our ability to get anywhere on Arab refugee or Arab-Israeli arms control issues; (c) nullify our influence with the key Arab state just when the Jordan Waters issue is heating up, and (d) cause the UAR to turn more to the Soviets, as it did when it alleged we reneged on the Aswan Dam.

Role of Hard Surface. We also want to avoid getting our small US deterrent force (8 jet fighters) unnecessarily involved in an inter-Arab war. We have consistently warned Faisal that we will not allow them to be used as an umbrella for resuming aid to the royalists. Our reasoning has been that this might cause the UAR to resume bombing the supply points inside Saudi Arabia, which in turn would lead to Saudi appeals for help. With our planes there, we would either have to respond or look like paper tigers to both sides.

But if we now pull out the squadron, the risk goes up too. Hard Surface is a symbol of our intentions to both sides. Nasser could conceivably also take its withdrawal as a signal that he can bomb Saudi Arabia at will. We would seem to be deserting our Saudi friends. If we flatly warn Nasser not to resume bombing, but he nevertheless does so, we must either react strongly or look like paper tigers in this case too.

One alternative would be to take a much harder line toward Nasser at this point, including either (a) ceasing US aid to the UAR—mostly PL-480 food; or withdrawing our recognition of the Yemeni Republic (YAR). But we estimate that neither course would succeed in forcing withdrawal of UAR troops from Yemen or a favorable change in Nasserist policies. On the contrary, such actions against the nation which has half the population of the entire area would increase Nasser’s prestige at our expense, sharply set back our relations with the majority of other Arab states, and enhance the Soviet position in the area.

Withdrawal of US recognition from the YAR, as suggested by Senator Hickenlooper as well as by some senior US oil executives, would require us to close our diplomatic and AID mission in Yemen and withdraw completely from the country. It would certainly constitute a slap in the face to Nasser but would accomplish none of our objectives.

So the preferred alternative remains that of working to keep the Yemen war damped down, while seeking to reduce Egyptian influence in the Yemen to a level tolerable to Faisal and the British without disrupting our relations with the UAR in the process. Given time, this can be achieved. The Egyptians are increasingly unpopular in the Yemen, among the republicans as well as others. The Yemen operation, while possibly not as costly as we had estimated earlier, nevertheless is straining Egyptian capabilities. We have given Egypt a clear signal that no new aid commitments can be expected until the Yemen situation improves; this will further strain the Egyptian economy and strengthen the voices of Nasser’s economic advisers vis-a-vis his military commanders. Further dragging out of the Yemen imbroglio will also erode still more Nasser’s already depreciated prestige in the area.

Recommended Policy Decisions. In the coming weeks we believe we should, therefore:

1. Support the continuation of a UN political presence in Yemen as it has evolved (but financed by the UN) with continued emphasis on UN Representative Spinelli’s efforts to bring about a broader-based Yemen regime, while agreeing to the termination of UNYOM.

2. Use all resources at our disposal to persuade Faisal that it is in his and our best interests that Saudi aid to the royalists not be resumed, including:

a. The extension of Hard Surface in Saudi Arabia by another month (until January 31, 1964). While informing Faisal of this, we would also stress that:

1) Under no circumstances can Hard Surface serve as an umbrella for the resumption of Saudi aid to the Yemeni royalists.

2) Hard Surface is only one tangible manifestation of USG support for Saudi Arabia and must soon be withdrawn.

3) The USG has other forces available in the area.

b. The dispatch of a Presidential message reaffirming USG support for Saudi Arabia’s integrity and once again requesting his support of our Yemen policies (see attached draft).

c. The dispatch of instructions to Ambassador Hart to inform Faisal that USG would support a complaint raised by Saudi Arabia before the UN Security Council should deliberate and unprovoked UAR aggression against Saudi territory occur.

d. Public reaffirmation, if Faisal wishes, of USG support for Saudi integrity.

3. Continue to press Nasser:

a. To withdraw his troops from Yemen while recognizing that expeditious UAR troop withdrawals cannot be expected until a viable republican regime is created in Yemen;

b. To support actively the development of a broader-based regime in Yemen;

c. To refrain from attacks on Saudi Arabia.

4. Promote the restoration of diplomatic relations between the UAR and Saudi Arabia as an important step toward reaching an accommodation over Yemen. Do whatever is possible to bring about direct contact between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Republican leaders.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Jernegan transmitted this paper to Rusk on December 10 together with a draft letter from President Johnson to Crown Prince Faysal and a recommendation that both be sent to President Johnson. Jernegan noted that the Department of Defense reserved its position on the paper because of a question concerning the composition of Hard Surface, if it were to be continued. Sisco, Padelford, Symmes, and Robinson concurred in the paper. (Ibid.) The paper printed here and the draft letter to Faysal were sent to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Rusk to the President. In it, Rusk stated that the paper represented the consensus of the NSC Standing Group at its December 6 meeting, and that the report and the letter were drafted in consultation with a member of the White House staff. Records of the Standing Group meeting are ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265.

   McGeorge Bundy and Komer forwarded Rusk’s memorandum and its attachments to President Johnson on December 11, under cover of a memorandum that reads in part: “We face a minor crisis over Yemen shortly, because UAR failure to withdraw enough troops from Yemen will probably lead to the demise of the UN observer force. The Saudis did carry out their engagement not to supply the royalist side, so now want us to come down on their side. But we doubt that further US pressure would get Nasser to play ball; more likely it would have the opposite effect. So State recommends that we keep trying to make disengagement work, keep the Saudis and UAR apart, and promote a compromise regime in Yemen acceptable to both. As an incentive to Faysal not to resume aid to the royalists, we’d agree to keep our small jet fighter force there for another month or so.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, Bundy, Chron Dec. 63)