363. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Quinn) to Secretary of Defense McNamara0
S-18, 895/P-3
Washington, November 18,
1963.
SUBJECT
- (U) Military Take-Over in Iraq1
- 1.
- The internal struggle between extremists and moderates of the Pan-Arab Socialist Baathist movement has provoked a military take-over in Iraq, seriously threatens Baathist control in Syria, and may lead to a resurgence of Nasser’s influence in the Arab world.
- 2.
- The Iraqi military, long dissatisfied with Baathist activities, were goaded into action by the intemperate actions of the National Guard, the tool of the extreme wing of the Baathist Party which stands for a rapid socialization of the country. The abortive 13 November revolt of the Guard aroused the armed forces and the fact that the Baathist international [Page 791] leadership appeared to support the extremists raised military fears that the Guard would try to take over control from the armed forces. President Arif, a lukewarm Baathist and a supporter of Nasser, took advantage of this discontent to rally the military and oust the civilian Baathist leadership. While many of the officers now in positions of authority are at least nominal Baathists, their relations with the Party will undoubtedly be strained and it appears unlikely that they will relinquish power in the immediate future. At the present time, Arif has been granted extraordinary powers by the National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC) which in effect is the ruling body in Iraq today. The reorganized NCRC includes Arif as Chairman and CinC and the top military leadership—Air Force Commander Tikriti as Deputy Commander in Chief, the Army Chief of Staff, Tahir Yahya, the division commanders, and other military leaders. One of the NCRC’s first acts was to dissolve the National Guard whose acts were branded as “unnational.” The tone of the new regime’s communiques reflect a pan-Arab rather than a Baathist tendency. While Arif has asserted that Iraq will adhere to Iraqi-Syrian “statements and commitments,” he also stated that Iraq will work with the other Arab states “particularly the UAR.” The Iraqi military take-over may therefore lead to better relations between Iraq and Egypt and slow down the moves toward bilateral Iraqi-Syrian relations. Arif can be expected to encourage closer ties with Egypt but his ultimate ability to maintain control is in some doubt since he is distrusted by many of the military leaders, partly because he is pro-Nasser.
- 3.
- Syria is jittery over the repercussions of the Iraqi developments. First reports from Damascus indicate that the Baathist extremist wing is in control but the current tension could lead to a coup attempt there by one or more of the many ambitious Syrian officers who aspire to personal power.
- 4.
- Egypt is remaining outwardly neutral but undoubtedly is satisfied with this obvious setback to the Baath which was posing a real challenge to Nasser’s claim to Arab leadership. Jordanian forces were on the alert prior to the Iraqi take-over but no additional reaction has been noted.
- 5.
- This information has been provided to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and to interested elements of the Joint Staff.
William W.
Quinn
Lieutenant General, USA
Lieutenant General, USA