Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations⁰

Washington, November 16, 1963, 6:07 p.m.

1440. Ref: urtel 2105.¹ Palestine Refugee Item.² (This instruction subject to clearance by Secretary Monday)

1. Dept has reassessed situation in SPC on PalRef item in light reaction to our resolution, Arab resolution, and Israeli direct negotiations res. In determining what our next step should be, we are motivated primarily by desire to assure that outcome will, to maximum extent possible, leave door open to further quiet talks with Israelis and Arabs on refugee question, reduce Arab antagonism and suspicion which have been aroused by PCC report, and keep to minimum difficulties with GOI.

2. We believe it necessary to consider political situation which will evolve as result our attitude in UNRWA item in context whole range of near eastern questions we will be facing during coming year. These include following:

a. Highly adverse impact among Arabs which will result when we announce at pledging conference 5% reduction in relief component of our contribution to UNRWA;

b. Complications in our relations with Arabs as result of Gruening amendment;

c. Significant exacerbation of our relations with Arabs which must be anticipated over coming months when we side with Israel at the time of diversion of Jordan waters.

3. We are also concerned at possible outcome of GA consideration UNRWA item this year if we continue to stand on our present position, which is to seek adoption of our resolution in present form while opposing both Arab resolution and Israeli resolution. According to our estimate, it is probable but not certain that our resolution would receive 2/3 majority in present form, that Arab draft would certainly receive 2/3 majority and that Israeli draft would be defeated. Such a situation is not desirable. At best this would mean adoption of our resolution and Arab resolution with certainty that we would be exposed to charges of abandoning our traditional support of paragraph 11. Adoption of Arab resolution and defeat of Israeli resolution would certainly be blamed on us by Israel. Moreover, such situation would leave Israel in worst possible position because Assembly, for first time in years, would have opted for outright Arab position, defeated Israeli effort and damaged US relations with Arabs which would reduce our ability help Israel and moderate anticipated difficulties of next few months.

4. We agree with you that our stand on para 11 issue cannot be blurred as last year. Taking all above into account, we conclude that best course for US is to seek way of assuring passage our own resolution, in manner which reestablishes our bona fides on paragraph 11, and results in agreement by Arabs and Israelis not to press their resolutions to a vote. We think best chance of achieving all these objectives is to amend our present draft, replacing present operative paragraph 4 with following language:

“Renews its request to the Palestine Conciliation Commission to continue its endeavors to find a way to achieve progress on the Palestine Arab Refugee problem pursuant to paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III).”

5. Accordingly, at appropriate time after Israeli resolution is tabled, you should go to the Israeli delegation and tell them of our intention to amend our resolution as indicated above. Suggest you draw on foregoing and following additional points as appropriate to show Israel why we believe this course of action is in Israel’s interest as well as our own:

a. It designed to prevent adoption of a purely Arab resolution;

b. It seeks to sidetrack Arab property rights proposal as well as several other objectionable features which Israelis have emphasized to us;

c. You may emphasize our considered judgment that Israeli resolution for direct negotiations would be defeated and that this in combination with adoption of Arab resolution would represent a major defeat for Israeli objectives. You should continue reiterate our belief that Israelis should look to other factors rather than hold US responsible for diminution of support in GA on UN res. (See Deptel 1378)³

d. To Israeli admonitions that this course of action will mean end of talks as far as Israel is concerned, you should discreetly remind them that solution of refugee problem is above all to Israeli interests and that US Government in best position to protect Israeli interests in any negotiations. In addition, you may assure Israelis that in order to ease any problem adoption our resolution may cause for them, US would seek to view future talks with Israelis as extension of talks already begun last year and would conduct them on same basis. Important to distinguish between practical solution and symbolism. If settlement eventually reached on basis limited repatriation and massive resettlement, Israelis would achieved major victory even though Arabs permitted retain face-saving symbolism.

You should, of course, make perfectly clear to Israelis that our willingness to revise our resolution is based on expectation of commitment not to put Arab res to a vote. Fact that Pakistanis, as one of sponsors, has already indicated desire for one res should be helpful. It ought to be possible to get present sponsor to put some pressure on Arabs.

For Tel Aviv: Upon receipt flash instruction you should explain our intentions to GOI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, REF PAL. Confidential. Drafted by Buffum, Campbell, and Sisco; cleared by Talbot and Jernegan; and approved by Cleveland. Sent to Tel Aviv and repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Ankara, London, and Paris.
1. Dated November 16. (Ibid., REF PAL 3)
2. Between November 4 and 21, the U.N. General Assembly’s Special Political Committee discussed the annual report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA covering the period July 1962–June 1963. (U.N. Doc. A/5513) On November 7, the Department of State, in telegram 1350, transmitted to USUN for consultation with other delegations the text of a U.S. draft resolution that, among other points, reiterated a request contained in General Assembly Resolution 1856 (XVI) that referenced paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) and asked the Commission to continue to seek progress on the Palestine Arab refugee question. (Ibid., REF 3 UNRWA) On November 12, Ambassador Harman telephoned Cleveland to present Israel’s objections to the U.S. draft resolution. (Telegram 1398 to USUN, November 12; Department of State, Central Files, REF PAL 3)
3. Dated November 9. (Ibid., REF 3 UNRWA)