Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

364. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, November 18, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Anticipated Special Problems in the US-Arab Relationship—Information Memorandum

1. I am increasingly troubled by the current and prospective draw down of the “money in the bank” with the Arabs which we have built up with considerable effort over the past several years and which is essential to help us meet serious problems just over the horizon.

2. Recent actions which have put us on what the moderate Takla of Lebanon calls a collision course with the Arabs include the following:

a. Rediscovery by the Arabs that they can obtain a Soviet veto of US-UK initiative on behalf of Israel (the Security Council action in which we sought to condemn the murderous actions of Syrians in the Almagor attack).

b. Arab reactions to our seeming to resile from the traditional formulation of support of Paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 194(III), which Israel wants to sweep under the rug and the Arabs cling to as the anchor of their position on the refugees.

c. Suspicions on the part of some Arabs that we have adopted others as our chosen instruments (Hussein’s belief we are supporting the Ba’ath and that it behooves him therefore to get closer to Nasser; Faysal’s conviction that we will back Nasser in any exploit; etc.)

d. Arab suspicions of Israel’s nuclear intentions and belief that our recent transfer of heavy water to Israel (although under full safeguards) may indicate a U.S. role therein.

e. The continuing aftermath of the Hawk transaction and generous ($25 million) credit given for it.

3. We cannot protect Israel’s security in the area without war or without driving the Arabs into the arms of the Soviets unless we keep fairly satisfactory relations with the Arabs. Nor can we be certain of protecting U.S. interests in the area, quite apart from Israel’s, if we drift into contretemps with the Arabs. A number of problems, present and pending, make it essential that we treat our Arab relations with great deftness at this stage. Principal among these are:

a. Jordan Waters: For a decade and more this has been foreseen as the critical Near Eastern problem likely to precipitate Arab-Israel war. We are committed to support Israel and therefore must be partisan. We are making every reasonable preparation to forestall military hostilities and/or a decisive break with the Arabs, but the issue is uncertain and the strains will be great at best.

b. U.S. Elections: The Israelis are taking, and will mount steadily increasing pressures to gain, advantage by the coming U.S. elections. The import will be especially in the military field in which the Arabs are most sensitive and the Soviets in best position to benefit from any U.S. moves that might result from domestic considerations. The Gruening-Farbstein amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, and reactions to it, are a portent.

c. Intra-Arab Conflicts: We have interests on all sides. To preserve these amid quick and violent change, we spend capital now in one Arab country, now in another, trying to maintain a balance. A misstep could lose a valuable position in one or give all common cause against us. These intra-Arab disputes are now at an all-time high (Nasser-vs-Baath-vs-Monarchies).

d. Arms: The arms competition between Israelis and Arabs has reached a new and highly dangerous threshold. We are preaching restraint and safeguards to both sides, yet Dimona goes critical by the end of this year and Israel is using nascent UAR missile development to move far and perhaps faster in the same field.

e. Yemen: Remains a knotty problem only likely to be untangled if we maintain maximum influence with all involved.

f. Refugees: We embark this month on our first significant shift away from indefinite relief (a 5% cut in contribution to relief shifted to education/vocational training). We will have until next fall’s UNGA session to pursue a political solution, necessitating full use of U.S. influence if there is to be a chance of success. If not, we begin disengagement, which was the fall-back purpose of our 3-year initiative. This alone would be cause for significant disruption of US-Arab relations.

g. Oil: We now face the most intensive pressures (from OPEC) for major contractual revisions that have ever been put forward in coordinated form.

0. Source: Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 229, POL-22 Incidents, Disputes, Arab-Israeli Dispute. Secret. Drafted by Crawford on November 16 and cleared by Jernegan and Davies.