311. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara0
JCSM-623–63
Washington, August 15,
1963.
SUBJECT
- US Assistance for Iraq (U)
- 1.
- Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-25321/63, dated 2 August 1963, subject as above.1
- 2.
- The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on US Arms Policy for Iraq, as contained in JCSM-197–63, dated 9 March 1963, I were predicated on the belief that subsequent developments would confirm the anticommunist nature of the government which came to power in Iraq on 8 February 1963. Subsequent events have verified that the policy of the Iraqi Government is to decrease its dependence on Soviet support and to control local communist elements. Moreover, the USSR, by supporting an attempt to bring the Kurdish question before the United Nations, has openly demonstrated its support for Kurdish rebel elements, to the further detriment of Soviet-Iraqi relations. There are also a few indications that the Soviets may be deliberately lagging in deliveries of military assistance to Iraq.
- 3.
- Another development which could prove favorable to US interests is the ascendancy of the Baath party in Iraq and Syria, and the conflict of Baath and Nasserist ambitions in the Arab world. Identification of Syria with the anticommunist policies of Iraq would be helpful in reducing Soviet influence in the Middle East, and continued disunity between [Page 674] Nasser and Iraq/Syria could ease pressures on the monarchies of the Arab peninsula, as well as on Israel and the regional members of CENTO.
- 4.
- Although the Iraqi Government has announced its intention to pursue a neutralist course between the Communist Bloc and the West, the foregoing developments indicate that there is a good possibility for eventual displacement of communist influence and, more remotely, for open alignment of Iraq and Syria with the West. It is recognized that care must be exercised to avoid arousing Arab suspicions of US intentions, upsetting the balance of military power in the Middle East, or otherwise acting to the detriment of US interests in pursuing unrealistic short-term goals in Iraq and Syria. Nevertheless, US arms policy in Iraq should be pursued with the ultimate objective of having Iraq, and hopefully Syria, look to the West as the primary source for necessary armaments.
- 5.
- The most immediate military arms requirements facing the Iraqi armed
forces stem from government efforts to suppress the Kurdish revolt, and
from Iraq’s need to be in a position to assist the Syrian Government, if
required.
- a.
- As a long-term goal, the United States should continue efforts to promote assimilation of the Kurds within national boundaries, and granting of a measure of local self-government in predominately Kurdish regions. However, prolongation of the conflict in Iraq engenders instability, and provides an opportunity for communist exploitation of the Kurdish problem in Iraq and in neighboring countries. A firm Iraqi military position, coupled with a willingness to accommodate to legitimate Kurdish grievances, appears to be the most promising avenue for an early end to hostilities and advancement of internal stability in Iraq. To this end, the United States should give favorable consideration to reasonable Iraqi requests for equipment and seek to use resultant influence to urge moderation on the Iraqi Government.
- b.
- As was pointed out in paragraph 3, above, an Iraqi capability to provide assistance to the government of Syria in quelling possible major uprisings could also be advantageous for the United States.
- 6.
- Although normal Iraqi income should permit absorption of defense costs without undue impact on the economy, a requirement for large cash payments on equipment deliverable in the near future from all Western sources could have an unsettling effect, particularly when compounded by costs of operations against the Kurds. The stability of the Iraqi Government in the short term could be aided, therefore, by acceding to reasonable Iraqi requests for credit.
- 7.
- Except for the need for ameliorating present restrictions on extension
of credit, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the currently
approved US Arms Policy for Iraq is sufficiently flexible to permit a
positive application in pursuance of US objectives in the Middle East.
With the foregoing in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
[Page 675]
- a.
- The United States respond favorably to Iraqi requests which fall within the approved US Arms Policy for Iraq, and which are available from US sources.
- b.
- Deliveries of approved items be made as rapidly as possible consistent with availabilities and priority being accorded MAP recipients.
- c.
- Equipment be furnished on a sales basis, but credit terms be arranged as may be appropriate to avoid an adverse impact on the Iraqi economy in the short term.
- d.
- Consultations be undertaken with other potential suppliers of arms among Free World nations to encourage adoption of policies similar to those of the United States.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
John M. Reynolds
Major General, USAF
Vice Director, Joint Staff
Major General, USAF
Vice Director, Joint Staff