Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

312. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting⁰

Washington, August 16, 1963, 3:30 p.m.

[Here follows a list of participants.]

Situation in the Yemen

General LeMay opened the meeting by stating that the JCS would like to begin the discussion of the Hard Surface deployment¹ with a briefing by Brigadier General Lucius Clay, USAF, Assistant Director, J-3. Mr. Johnson assented to this procedure and General Clay gave a round-up presentation covering (a) the purpose of the deployment (b) mission of the force (c) the stop-and-go circumstances leading up to the 5 July movement (d) the aircraft and personnel strength of the Unit (8 F-100, 2 RB-50, 2 C-130, several helicopters and 541 people) (e) the concept of deployment in terms of duration and the problems raised by an extension. He noted that the primary mission of the unit was political in nature and that the unit had little if any military effectiveness. At this point Admiral Griffin (CINCNELM) interjected the statement that the unit had completed all of its training mission with the Saudi Air Force and that there were no further qualified Saudi Air Force and that there were no further qualified Saudi pilots and support personnel to be trained. Accordingly, he felt that the unit should be redeployed and that a long-range training program should be undertaken by a training mission. He added that the unit, as presently deployed and constituted, does not have the capability to provide proper air defense or take any offensive action. He did not believe that the SAG understood the mission and purpose of the Hard Surface force and that this was resulting in serious doubts in the minds of the Saudis as to the credibility of the force. Further, development of an adequate air defense force would require deployment of additional aircraft and a change in the present rules of engagement. General Clay closed his briefing by stating that while the JCS were fully cognizant of the political significance of Hard Surface they saw only two practical options for the future from the military point of view: (a) a change in the unit mission to permit a real air defense capability—this would be too expensive in terms of men, resources and money; and (b) terminate the deployment and use other means to assist the Saudis such as more active training mission with long-term programs, dispatch of an Air Defense Survey Team and periodic rotational deployments of U.S. forces. General Clay emphasized that the JCS were strongly in favor of option (b).

General LeMay stated that the initial fears of the JCS had now been realized—the 8 F-100’s did not deter Egyptian bombing attacks and we are now over the barrel. We must do something positive or withdraw. The Saudis think we are there to protect them and we must clean up the situation or withdraw. Mr. Johnson replied that the purpose of the force had been described as training, that its deployment had heavy political overtones; i.e., to help persuade the SAG to cease its support of the Royalists and that the force had accomplished this aim. General LeMay asked if the SAG had not ceased supply support to the Royalists on the basis of their understanding that we would protect them. Mr. Johnson said that there was an apparent difference in the State and JCS estimates of the number, degree and intent of Egyptian bombing attacks. Mr. Grant pointed out that there were only three reported bombing attacks in the past couple of months. One of these reports had been disproved and a second reported attack may have been misdirected and in error since no target was involved. The third attack, which occurred several days ago, was on a point where UN observers had caught a Saudi supply convoy. It was not a substantial raid and there was no loss of life or serious injury. We have no indications that the Saudis are taking provocative action and there is some possibility that local Egyptian commanders have been taking matters into their own hands or that there have been errors in bombing. Mr. Grant stressed that Saudi supply activities do not have the blessing of the Crown Prince and that he desires to live up to the terms of the Agreement. However, some supplies do leak through without the knowledge of the Crown Prince. Mr. Johnson noted that we judge that the Hard Surface force has served as an effective deterrent.

Admiral Griffin pointed out that if the bombings continue, the Saudis will feel that we have been incapable of holding up our end of the bargain and we will lose considerable face. Mr. Johnson said that he agreed and that we are pleased with the results and performance of the Hard Surface force. He pointed out that the JCS might not be aware that we are working behind the scenes to get talks underway between the UAR and the Saudis and that we have obtained agreement in principle for the conduct of such talks. The place for the talks and the representatives to be present have been selected although some details remain to be worked out. Hopefully, if things go well we should begin to see some light within the next 30 days. However, we cannot promise that we will be able to pull out the Hard Surface force by 15 September.

Admiral Griffin said that he was concerned about possible miscalculations of the Saudi attitude toward the tenure of the Hard Surface deployment. Further, their understanding of the purpose of the deployment is not the same as ours. He questioned the belief that the Saudis know that the deployment is a temporary one. Ambassador Hart replied that the Saudis know it is not a permanent deployment, although the duration of the deployment was not covered in the Bunker talks. General LeMay asked if the Saudis expect the unit to stay. Ambassador Hart said that the Saudis do expect the unit to stay as long as the threat exists. He noted that the threat is of a special nature—a threat by Egypt against the SAG. The nature of this threat is such that any successful revolution in Saudi Arabia must be supported by Egyptian Armed Forces. If the early arms drop had been picked up by anti-Saudi forces and Radio Jidda had been taken over, further success of such a beach head would require direct support from Cairo. The presence of the U.S. air unit is a direct deterrent to Nasser and a clear indication that we would not permit the initiation of a Yemen-type situation in Saudi Arabia. The early deep air incursions and overflight of Saudi territory have ceased. These were deliberate provocations while the recent bombings were of the spill-over or erroneous type. The Saudis are concerned over the deterrent strength of the air unit. Bunker promised that we would deploy radar and they have accepted our failure to deploy such equipment. They understand that an effective air defense utilizing radar would require the cessation of civil air traffic. This would necessitate that they publicly acknowledge the existence of a fairly large-scale crisis. They are not prepared to take such an action and in fact the press plays down the situation.

Mr. Johnson said that he understood the concerns of General LeMay and Admiral Griffin and he asked if we will be able to withdraw the force eventually without creating further misunderstandings. Admiral Griffin said that he did not think that our overflights had been very valuable and that the U.S. Commander on the spot shared this view. In fact the people in the street have reacted with fear to the overflights. Thus, it appears that the flights are counter-productive. However, the military are in no position to determine the effect of the overflights on the UAR. The UAR does not have any radar but it does have a lot of agents who report. Ambassador Hart said that in his opinion withdrawal of the unit would lead to misunderstandings which would have serious political repercussions. However, as soon as the Egyptian threat disappears, we should be able to approach the Crown Prince and tell him that while the unit is leaving, we are establishing a solid program of cooperation. The timing of the withdrawal of the unit must be linked directly with Egyptian withdrawal, otherwise we will invite Nasser to break his agreements. Admiral Griffin said that on this basis the unit might have to stay in Saudi Arabia forever. Ambassador Hart said that this is not so, that when disengagement occurs the unit can be withdrawn. Admiral Griffin said that he did not see why the air unit was a necessary element in getting our message to Nasser. Ambassador Hart said that the unit is necessary because Nasser understands force, not words.

Mr. Grant noted that the UN had reported a net withdrawal of 4,500 Egyptian forces and that the Egyptians had just informed us that they would withdraw 3,000 more troops in September. Admiral Griffin said that this would leave 25,000 Egyptian troops in the Yemen. Mr. Grant said that it would leave the Egyptians with 3/4 of their initial force and that the easing up of Royalist activity has permitted UAR withdrawals. In the next couple of weeks Nasser will be faced with tough decisions. While we are not out of the woods, things are moving as we expected even if more slowly than we had hoped. The talks in New York can help and they should assist in removing outside pressures. The Yemenis may make some concessions to the tribes and this should be helpful. Admiral Griffin asked what is the assessment of the probability of agreement as a result of the New York talks. Mr. Grant said that as long as Nasser has international pressures on him (U Thant is good in this connection) and knows that he cannot hurt the Saudis in Saudi Arabia, he has to look for some type of settlement. The presence of the air unit gives reasonable assurance that Nasser will not strike out at Saudi Arabia. The Crown Prince knows that the continuation of the presence of the unit is based on his agreement to cease supply to the Royalists. If we withdraw the squadron, he will begin to take supply action again. If we keep up pressure, a settlement is possible. Further, Cairo cannot expect a stooge government to hold up for long. The Yemenis are different from any other Arabs and cannot be treated, or expected to react, in the traditional manner.

Admiral Griffin said that he was not talking about taking the unit out now, but 30 days from now. If the unit is to stay, plans must be made for personnel and supply actions. Mr. Grant said that he thought that plans should be based on withdrawal no sooner than 60 days from now. We should have a better idea of the future following the talks in New York which should occur before the end of the month. Ambassador Hart said that he felt that Nasser’s dilemma was becoming more and more acute. He may have to settle for a synthesis as a solution to the makeup of the Yemeni Government. The possibility of a stooge type of government appears remote. The result will probably be a very Yemeni type of arrangement with some form of a republic with the Imam established as a religious figure. The leadership potential among the pro-Imam group is poor.

General Hamlett asked how we protect our prestige if the Egyptians intrude into Saudi airspace and just what we would do. Mr. Johnson said that the Egyptians have not done this and that this possibility is the specific problem we face when we moved into Saudi Arabia. He said he could not answer the question, but he did wonder just what would cause Nasser to take such an action. Mr. Grant said that a cable was being dispatched today to Cairo instructing the Embassy to hit the Egyptians hard on meeting their obligations. This should be of some help and if this message is not heeded then if clear-cut violations occur we will go directly to Nasser. Nasser knows that we are pretty well aware of his activities and he is aware that if he proceeds with overt action against Saudi Arabia, he will be going against the US and the UN. Ambassador Hart noted that the President’s prestige is on the line and that we must be in a position to react if necessary to Egyptian attacks. General LeMay then replied that:

(a) The Hard Surface force will be retained in Saudi Arabia for an additional 60 days;

(b) Plans will be prepared for withdrawal of the force at the end of the 60-day period (15 October 1963);

(c) Plans will be developed for rotation or replacement of the force, should further extension of the withdrawal date be required.

General LeMay concluded by stating that “we are bleeding from our wounds” and that deployment of eight aircraft wrecks one squadron. Mr. Johnson replied that these eight aircraft are probably better utilized than any other eight U.S. aircraft anywhere in the world.²

0. Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328. Secret. Drafted by Colonel W.B. Robinson (G/PM). A typed note on the source text indicates that the memorandum is a Department of State draft not cleared with the Department of Defense. The meeting was held at the Pentagon.

   A Department of State briefing memorandum from Grant to Johnson (G), August 15, is ibid., Central Files, DEF 6–3 US. A Department of Defense talking paper is attached to a memorandum from Strickland to Sloan, August 16, in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 7275, Hard Surface—March thru Aug. 63—Volume I.

1. In an August 7 letter to Sloan (DOD/ISA), Talbot proposed that serious consideration be given to extending the tenure of Hard Surface in Saudi Arabia beyond September 15 should political circumstances at the time require such action. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–3 US)
2. The Department of State reported on the decisions reached at this meeting in telegram 158 to Jidda, August 23. (Ibid.) The JCS transmitted the results of the meeting to CINCNELM in JCS telegram 2135, DTG 191802Z Aug 63. (Ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 116, Gen. Truce. Cease-fire, Armistice (Bunker Mission & UN Effort) Other than tels) Both telegrams emphasized the political nature of the decision. On August 22, Sloan informed Talbot in writing of the Department of Defense’s agreement that Hard Surface forces would remain in Saudi Arabia for 60 days dating from August 16. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 6–3 US) Additional documentation is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, Arabia 1963.