Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic⁰

Washington, August 9, 1963, 5:16 p.m.

586. Eyes only Chiefs of Mission.

1. View UAR position favoring US rather than Lebanese mediation, request Embassy Beirut abandon discussions with Takla. Should he approach Embassy suggest he defer any further action until Embassy advises him further.

2. Both UARG and SAG should be advised USG agreeable play third party role in arranging meeting and that USG has certain suggestions regarding objectives of talks as cited below. We do not wish however to be involved in substance except to extent we might be helpful in dealing with problems arising out of talks.

3. USUN should endeavor locate Riad (Department assumes Cairo’s 345¹ refers to UAR-UN Ambassador Mahmoud Riad not Mohammed Riad) and ascertain if he would be willing meet Saudi representative which we hope will be Deputy Foreign Minister Saqqaf in Rome on or about August 16. (We prefer this be discussed only with Riad and not any other UAR rep.)

4. Embassy Jidda should approach Saqqaf in same vein. View necessity secrecy be kept, Department suggests Riad and Saqqaf meet in hotel of their choice rather than in official establishment and that to extent possible their respective diplomatic missions in Rome not be involved.²

5. For purposes effective channel of communication only, Department plans detail officer knowledgeable of Yemen problem to Embassy Rome. Name will be communicated to parties later. Officer will not take part in SAG-UAR conversations but would be available during Rome talks to convey to USG any information parties might wish to pass to USG or in turn to seek USG views on problems which arise. Officer also prepared be helpful to parties, if desired, in arranging times and places of meetings in Rome.

6. Whereas parties themselves best able determine appropriate agenda for talks, Department believes parties might wish give consideration to following as most important objectives:

a. Parties should agree that whatever their differences in political and social outlook they should abide by “live and let live” policy toward each other.

b. Parties should agree taper off their propaganda warfare against each other.

c. Each party should reassure the other of intention to abide faithfully by Bunker agreement and to implement it in all its details as expeditiously as possible.

d. Parties should agree that Yemen is an Arab problem that ought to be resolved by Arabs themselves with a minimum of outside intervention. Interests of Yemenis themselves should have highest priority in discussions of future political framework of YAR.

e. Saudis might agree in principle to acceptance of republican form of government in Yemen and to exert their influence to extent possible toward removal from Yemen of Imam Badr.

f. UAR might agree to discuss with Saudis a recomposition of the republican regime to broaden base of representation.

g. Saudis might agree that if more moderate and representative government in Yemen is installed they would consider early recognition and establishment of friendly relations therewith.

h. Irrespective of extent of agreement of points (e) through (g) above, parties should agree to keep dialogue going and to have further contacts as necessary.

7. Embassy Jidda should caution Saudis against being over ambitious regarding settling all details re composition of YAR in this initial talk, since if Saudis press too hard in endeavoring promote Yemenis over whom they have influence UAR may suspect attempt undermine republican regime in this fashion.

8. Embassy Cairo should caution UAR not to adopt posture of victor talking to vanquished but rather of statesmen seeking genuine political solution to a complex problem. Both parties should refrain from recrimination over past grievances.

9. Department believes happiest possible outcome of Yemen conflict would be an Arab solution to an Arab problem which would redound to high credit of both in world public opinion. Parties should therefore direct efforts toward securing this highly worthwhile prize rather than scoring debating points over each other.

For London:

Dept hopes Eilts can be detailed to Embassy Rome for duration of proposed talks both because of his familiarity with previous US diplomatic activity in Yemen problem and because of his knowledge of Yemen internal affairs. If there any reason Eilts cannot be available for this purpose Embassy London should inform Department soonest.

For all addressees:

View necessity utmost secrecy contents this telegram should be entrusted minimum number officials on “need to know” basis.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SAUD-UAR. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Barrow; cleared by Buffum, Symmes, Johnson, and Davis (S/S); and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Beirut, Jidda, London, and USUN and repeated to Taiz and Rome.
1. See Document 299.
2. On August 13, the Embassy in Jidda conveyed Faysal’s reply to the U.S. initiative, including his agreement in principle for Saudi Arabia to hold discussions with the UAR. (Telegram 180 from Jidda; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 SAUD-UAR)