250. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
Here at last is State’s scenario for handling Israeli demands.1 Though I’ve prodded them unmercifully, and delay is partly sheer bureaucracy, I’ll plead: (a) they’ve found it hard to adjust to the prospect of a commitment we’ve avoided for fifteen years; (b) this problem is [Page 541] incredibly ramified; and (c) the situation in the area is much calmer (though Israeli pressure is no less).
[1 paragraph (6–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
State proposes in effect entering into a quiet negotiation with the Israelis, conditioned upon their agreement to (a) call off their pressure campaign; (b) preserve secrecy; (c) agree not to move to West Bank while we’re talking; and (d) cooperate in nuclear inspection. This is a tall order, but a good opening bid.
The negotiations are envisaged as lasting several months, and ending up either in a UAR-Israel arms limitation agreement plus security guarantee, or in a nuclear limitation security arrangement with Israel alone.
The form of guarantee envisaged (Tab C)2 is an executive agreement or Presidential letter rather than a treaty, essentially to avoid Congressional problems. It of course falls far short of demands in BG’s latest letter, especially BG’s clear idea that alliance means US arms aid.
Tab D is the proposed interim letter to Nasser calming him down.3 I think it falls far short of what’s needed and will try a redo.
This whole problem area is so fraught with risk that we ought to make haste as slowly as we can. If we can get the Israelis to lay off public agitation in return for opening a private dialogue this should buy us time to feel out what they’ll accept and what we can get in return. Given the Hawk/refugee episode of last year, we want to avoid giving if possible before we’ve taped down the quid pro quos.4
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Israel, 5/15/63–5/16/63. Top Secret.↩
- The scenario, Tab A to this memorandum, was transmitted to Bundy on May 11 under cover of a memorandum from Brubeck indicating that Komer had requested the memorandum on behalf of the President. Tab B is presumably a 7-page document, “Framework and Tactics for Negotiations.” It was transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy on May 16. For text, see the enclosure to Document 253.↩
- Tab C, a memorandum entitled “Possible United States-Israel Security Assurance,” was transmitted under cover of the May 16 memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy.↩
- Tab D is a draft letter from Kennedy to Nasser; for the text as transmitted on May 27, see Document 257.↩
- Between 5 and 5:45 p.m. on May 17, Rusk, Harriman, Talbot, Grant, McGeorge Bundy, and Komer met with President Kennedy at the White House to discuss Near East questions. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Books) No record of the meeting has been found. A memorandum from Komer to Kennedy written prior to the meeting argued in support of Department of State proposals for an arms control initiative, noting that the United States could not give Israel a security guarantee unless it renounced nuclear weapons, and Israel would not do that unless Nasser renounced nuclear weapons. (Ibid., President’s Office Files, Countries, Israel) A “Talking Point” memorandum prepared for Rusk is in Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 5, Memos to Secretary and through S/S.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩