Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

249. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, May 16, 1963.

McGB:

We’ve agreed to put State’s reply (Tab 1) to NSAM 228¹ on the 21 May Standing Group agenda. This seems the best way of getting action. But we need a set of issues to focus discussion, so I’ve drafted one (Tab 2)² for you to send out pronto.

I held up action on this one till I could needle BOB into commenting (Tab 3),³ since they initiated this exercise.

There has been, as BOB points out, a de facto change in our policy toward Iran since the big Iran Task Force exercise in May 1961. Then we were pushing for support of a reformist Amini cabinet, an integrated Iranian development plan, and movement toward a political consensus involving reversion of the Shah toward a constitutional role. But Amini fell and the Shah finally decided to carry through his own political and social revolution, epitomized by extensive land reform. Our current policy is to live with this and attempt to mold it, i.e. support the Shah’s reform program and work through him rather than attempting to circumscribe his role.

BOB thinks we should look at alternatives to the above basic policy, largely because it is bearish over the Shah’s ability to carry through with an effective revolution, e.g. because of his failure to push ahead with a major development program. I’m less inclined to argue this issue; I see no other realistic alternative to backing the Shah’s reforms (which have already proceeded too far to turn back), but attempting to guide it into more effective channels (which incidentally would include the greater stress on planned development BOB favors).

Thus the real issue to me is one of tactics. Here I fully agree with BOB that the tactics recommended by State and the Embassy are essentially passive rather than active, typified by Holmes’ view that we should avoid situations in which we would have … “to draw a balance between the good and the bad” (Tehran’s A-618)⁴ or in which we might be “held responsible for successes or failures” (Tehran 873).⁵ This passive approach is also typified by pp. 5–7 of State’s paper under the glorious title of “The Pitfalls of Direct Involvement.” We are directly involved in Iran; we will be blamed just as much if the Shah’s revolution fails with us sitting on the sidelines as if it fails with us in there pitching. We just can’t afford 19th Century diplomacy in Iran.

So I’ve developed a series of questions for SG designed to prod State/AID/DOD to prod Holmes to get moving. For once, we may be riding with success in Iran. But it won’t be a success for long unless we can convince the Shah to do the minimum essential to consolidate his revolution. And for once it won’t require a lot of dollar pump-priming or military baksheesh from us. What is really needed is some tough talk and persistent needling.

RWK

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 228. Secret. Copies were sent to Kenneth Hansen and Bromley Smith.
1. Tab 1 is Document 218. NSAM No. 228 is Document 192.
2. Tab 2 is a draft memorandum from Bundy to the Standing Group, not printed.
3. Tab 3 is a May 7 memorandum from Hansen to Komer on “State Reply to NSAM 228,” not printed.
4. Airgram 618 from Tehran, April 4, transmitted a report on U.S. policy and assistance programs for Iran prepared by the Country Team. (Department of State, Central Files, POL IRAN-US)
5. Telegram 873 from Tehran, April 12, conveyed Embassy and AID comments about Iran’s financial situation. (Ibid., AID (US) IRAN)