253. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Ambassador to the United Arab Republic
(Badeau)0
Washington, May 20,
1963.
Dear Mr. Ambassador: The rising concern here and
abroad as regards the long-range security situation in the Middle East has
occasioned us to take a new look at our policies to insure that they are
consistent with our commitments and long-range interest in the area. I
believe I need not elaborate on the reasons for concern such as the
Arab-Israel arms race, the Israel Dimona reactor and its potentialities for
possible weapons production within a few years, the entry of the UAR into ground-to-ground rocket production,
the massive UAR military intervention in
Yemen, the reference to liberation of Palestine in the Arab Unity
Proclamation of April 17, the recent riots in Jordan and the incessant
UAR propaganda against Jordan and Saudi
Arabia. It is perhaps possible for detached observers to examine the nuances
of each of these situations separately and to reach a judgment that they
constitute no immediate peril. Such a judgment, however, may well be viewed
as rather facile in face of the long run security threat which the combined
picture presents, especially to those immediately concerned, and to
Americans who share their concern. No equation relating to the balance of
power in the area is complete without taking into account both the deep
psychological factors in Israel and what American public opinion will
support at home.
Thus, in order to maintain the essentials of the constructive action program
which has been charted in recent years, the President feels it important to
give serious consideration to Israel’s strong desire for a more specific
security guarantee. He believes it is only through allaying Israel fears
about the long-range threat to its existence that leverage to forestall
possible Israel preventive warfare and to prevent proliferation of nuclear
weapons can be maintained. He further believes that such a guarantee would
be helpful in removing any margin for error by the Arabs about US
intentions. Moreover, it is conceivable that by obliging the Arabs to make a
more realistic reexamination of their own situation in light of the present
power structure of the area, we might well lead them toward a more
conciliatory policy albeit this is perhaps a debatable point.
[Page 546]
The precise nature of the agreement including quid pro quos to be negotiated
with Israel is being studied in the Department and specific plans will be
made known to you as they unfold. It is sufficient to say now that major
objectives will be to obtain firm assurances from Israel that it will (a)
refrain from initiatives to violate the peace, [2–1/2
lines of source text not declassified] (d) cooperate more fully
with United Nations peacekeeping machinery, (e) desist from propaganda and
activities designed to disrupt our relations with the Arabs, and (f) adopt a
more cooperative attitude toward a serious effort to solve the refugee
problem and other underlying causes of tension.
The President is fully cognizant of the problem that we face with the Arabs
on this score. Although nothing is being given to the Israelis other than
what they already have in substance, and although we hope to obtain in
return concessions from Israel that will have positive benefits for the
Arabs, we recognize that psychologically the Arabs are bound to react
unfavorably and that our missions in the Arab world are likely to be faced
with difficult problems. However, we hope that after the initial impact, the
Arabs will settle down to a tacit, if not overt, understanding of what the
United States is trying to do.
We recognize that politically the Arabs cannot accept the same type of
agreement that we shall be negotiating with Israel, but we are nevertheless
prepared to give them whatever we offer Israel and, should that not prove to
be something they want, the firmest assurances of support—as clearly
demonstrated in 1956—for their own security and integrity. We propose also
to continue with our existing economic assistance programs. We might also
give some consideration, in light of expected improvements of Israel’s sense
of security, to a more liberal attitude in regard to sales of conventional
armaments than heretofore, depending upon the degree of moderation and
restraint the Arabs display and their cooperation toward bringing about the
limitations on nuclear and sophisticated weapons which we seek.
I enclose, merely as a stimulant to your consideration, an outline of
tentative thoughts regarding the agreement and its implications. This
outline, I would caution, is, indeed, tentative and by no means represents
the final word. I would greatly appreciate your giving this outline the
benefit of your full study and appraisal.
Since the President wants to move ahead expeditiously, I would appreciate
hearing from you soonest. In view of the delicacy of the matter, we wish for
the present to keep communications closely controlled and I would thus
recommend that all correspondence be by “For Talbot
[Page 547]
from Ambassador” personal letter unless, of course,
factors of urgency should require a “For Talbot” telegram.1
With best personal regards.
Sincerely yours,
P.S. Perhaps by the time you have received this letter you will have
received instructions to present a letter from President Kennedy to President Nasser for the purpose of alerting him
in a general way (not with specific reference to an Israel security
guarantee) that new U.S. initiative to allay Israel concern and security
guarantee negotiations together and approach both the UAR and Israel even-handedly. [sic] If the
UAR refuses to go along on arms
limitation we would then be obliged to revert to a unilateral security
guarantee for Israel, the latter, however, to retain the quid pro quos
mentioned earlier.
Enclosure3
FRAMEWORK AND TACTICS FOR NEGOTIATIONS
The U.S. has decided to allay Israel’s concerns for its security and to
seek an arms limitation in the Near East. Courses of action to avoid
damage to U.S. fundamental interests in the area include adequate quid
pro quo from Israel and demonstration of continued evenhandedness in
overall U.S. policy in the area.
I. U.S. Purpose
- A.
- To provide a greater degree of security assurance for Israel and
its Arab neighbors vis-á-vis each other
- B.
- To secure an arms limitation in the Near East (Minimum: nuclear
weapons and offensive missiles)
- C.
- To preserve fundamental interests of U.S. in area
II. Fundamental U.S. Interests in
Area
- A.
- Denial to Soviets
- B.
- Communications—commercial and strategic—access and transit;
overflight; Suez Canal
- C.
- Petroleum—on which prosperity and economic strength U.K. and Western Europe depend
- D.
- Containment of Arab-Israel hostility
- E.
- Preventing proliferation nuclear weapons
- F.
- Reasonable degree of rapport with Arab world as well as with
Israel
III. Arab Attitudes
- A.
- General
- 1.
- Suspicious of U.S. intentions; however, evenhanded policy
beginning produce results (greater willingness accommodate
U.S. on difficult issues)
- 2.
- Deep-seated resentment of Israel; however, more signs of
passive acceptance Israel’s existence so long as issues not
publicly agitated
- 3.
-
Fear of Israel’s military strength
a. Particularly nuclear weapons—if development appears
imminent, UAR might feel
obliged launch air attack
- B.
- UAR Attitudes
- 1.
- Egypt more prepared than other Arab states take long range
view (often willing negotiate issues) so long as long range
UAR interests advanced
or at least not prejudiced
- 2.
- Egyptians regard selves as natural leaders Arab world and
obliged respond any threat Arab goals
- 3.
- Desire cooperate with U.S. created by economic assistance
and U.S. world leadership role; but must avoid appearing be
tool of U.S.
- 4.
- UAR considers that number
of strains recently placed on US-UAR relations, viz:
- a.
- Attacks on UAR in
Congress and U.S. press
- b.
- Declaration of direct or implied unilateral
support and favor for Israel
- c.
- UAR impatience at
delays in fulfilling economic aid commitments
- d.
- UAR claim that
alarms over arms, Germans, and rockets
exaggerated
- e.
- U.S. military measures support Saudi Arabia and
Jordan
- f.
- Suspicion U.S. has hand in current frustration in
Syria and Iraq
- 5.
- Lack of confidence in constancy of U.S. policy toward
UAR
- 6.
- UAR readiness to deal with
Soviets
IV. Israeli Attitudes
- A.
- Considers present moment most propitious for all-out campaign
achieve principal foreign policy objectives
- 1.
- U.S. Presidential election in 1964
- 2.
- Psychological—impact German scientist and weapons charges
against UAR; threat of
Nasserist encirclement and call for Palestine
liberation
- 3.
- Military—confident of present military superiority
- 4.
- Economic—large, fluid foreign exchange reserves and year
or more of stocks food and other supplies
- B.
- Fears are for longer term potential of Arabs—however, Israeli
public concerned by recent area developments—fears will be played up
by government
- C.
- Determined maintain own freedom of action
- D.
- Believes Arab world can be depended on react unhelpfully to U.S.
initiatives re area tensions
- E.
- Mistrustful of U.S. interests in Arab world and hopeful accomplish
change in U.S. posture impartiality
V. What Israel Seeks From the United
States
- A.
- Primary
- 1.
- Special, public guarantee of Israel’s security
- 2.
- Joint military planning and regular intelligence
exchange
- 3.
- Access to U.S. weaponry (short of nuclears)
- 4.
- Discontinuance of U.S. support to the UAR
- 5.
- Demilitarization of West Bank of Jordan under UN in event of change of
situation in Jordan
- 6.
- U.S. commitment to use military force to maintain status
quo in Jordan
- 7.
- Public U.S. stand against Arab belligerency
- 8.
- Sustained high level of economic aid
- B.
-
Secondary
U.S. support of “direct negotiations” resolution in UN; disavowal of UN resolutions on refugees; greater
U.S. support for anti-Nasser forces in Near East; U.S.
identification with and assistance to Israel’s aid programs,
particularly in Africa; prevent Western participation in UAR weapons programs; USG support
for special Israel ties with Europe.
VI. Range of Possible Dangers to U.S.
Interests From Security Assurance to Israel Alone—will depend on
character U.S. approach, Israeli public posture, and possible
Israeli concessions. US-Israel military coordination or change in
arms policy would accentuate risks.
- A.
- Soviet counter-guarantee
- B.
- Public hostility throughout Arab world
- C.
- Consistent opposition U.S. initiative in UN and other bodies
- D.
- Weakening heretofore friendly regimes in Arab world—Lebanon,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait (incidentally, will tend rally Arabs
around Nasser)
- E.
- Reduced U.S. diplomatic effectiveness generally, including
circumscribed ability deal usefully with Arab-Israel issues (e.g.
refugees, border violations, boycott, discrimination)
- F.
- Harassment oil companies and other U.S. commercial interests
(nationalization not out of question)
- G.
- Closer Soviet-Arab military cooperation—in degree commensurate to
alarm we may engender on part of Arabs (e.g., in extreme, we could
not rule out Castro-type base
arrangements)
VII. Quid pro Quos From
Israel—required to protect U.S. interests in area
- A.
- Minimum requirements during negotiations
- 1.
- No publicity which will create problem for Nasser during
negotiations
- 2.
- Termination of campaign against U.S. policy, including aid
to UAR
- 3.
- Commitment of no movement of forces outside Israel (e.g.,
into West Bank)
- 4.
- Cooperation in U.S. or IAEA inspections of nuclear
installations
- B.
-
Requirements in exchange for security assurance
[1 paragraph (1–1/2 lines of source text) not
declassified]
- 2.
- No territorial expansion
- 3.
- No cross-border military action
- 4.
- Cooperation with U.S. on UNTSO, refugee problem, Jordan waters
- C.
- Continuing Israel respect for international agreements previously
entered into (e.g., General Armistice Agreement)
VIII. Steps—Essential that
blanket of secrecy be put over entire operation at least through end
June 1963
- A.
- Presidential letter to Nasser (immediately) to note:
- 1.
- Mounting pressure against U.S. policy aid to UAR
- 2.
- Possible danger of preemptive attack by Israel
- 3.
- Israel’s intent and capability develop nuclear
weapons
- 4.
- Set stage for Ambassador’s detailed discussions
- B.
- Bearing in mind that success of current initiatives depends
heavily on absolute secrecy at least of early steps, conduct
campaign on Hill with view
- 1.
- Quieting debate and agitation of Near East issues
- 2.
- Achieving and maintaining necessary flexibility in aid
program for UAR and other
Arab states
- C.
- Initiate and continue parallel steps calculated preserve adequate
negotiating atmosphere in UAR and
minimize reaction in Arab states (See IX below)
- D.
- Approach to Israel Government to establish conditions for
negotiation (see VII A above—utilize reply to Ben-Gurion’s May 14 letter to
President)
- E.
- Ambassador (or special emissary) to initiate discussions in Cairo
(with Nasser—early June) and
Tel Aviv re arms limitation associated with security assurances to
be offered both parties
- F.
- Receive and evaluate reactions; include follow-up discussions by
ambassadors, particularly in Cairo, as necessary for clarifications
(conclude by July 15)
- G.
- Second Round—discussions Cairo and Tel Aviv (July 15–30) beginning
negotiations re arms limitation and related security
assurances
- H.
- If no progress discernible in six months (by February 1964)
through fault of UAR, revert to
unilateral discussions with Israel for a security guarantee (timing
must take into account status of Jordan Waters problem)
- I.
- If no progress on arms limitation discernible through fault of
Israel after six months (assuming some progress with UAR) apply additional pressure on
Israel
- J.
- By June 1964, have either a UAR-Israel arms limitation arrangement and security
assurance or unilateral arms limitation and security assurance for
Israel
IX. Parallel Steps To Minimize
Reaction in Arab States
- A.
- UAR
- 1.
- Be more responsive on economic assistance to UAR, taking initiative with
UAR if necessary
- a.
- Complete action on long pending commitments (e.g.,
ExIm and AID loans
related Kaissouni mission)
- b.
- Talk up possible consortium
- c.
- Give some reassurance re possible development
loans FY 64 (increase
planning level)
- 2.
- Conclude Investment Guarantee Agreement and actively
encourage American private investment moves to extent
feasible (e.g., Sears Roebuck project)
- 3.
- Seek damping of Congressional attacks on UAR and U.S. policy
- 4.
- Maintain secrecy on contacts with Nasser
- B.
- Other Arab States
- 1.
- Public declaration by President of our good intentions
toward the Arabs
- 2.
- Demonstrate continuation evenhanded policy on other
aspects Arab-US-Israel relationship—e.g., in handling Jordan
Waters issues and refugee problem
- 3.
- Continue refugee initiative—seek Israel cooperation
- 4.
- Maintain posture that we do not object to Arab Unity
(subject to our criteria)
- 5.
- Seek damping of Congressional criticism Arab states and
institutions
- 6.
- Avoid over-identification U.S. with Israel’s minor
initiatives (e.g., Israel’s third country programs, ties
with European regional organizations, etc.)
- 7.
- Continue special measures support Saudi Arabia and
Jordan
- 8.
- Maintain and foster aid and other economic relations with
Syria and Iraq
