Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic⁰

Washington, March 18, 1963, 12:13 p.m.

1958. Eyes only for Ambassadors Bunker, Badeau and Hart. Following text of oral message from President to President Nasser to be delivered by Bunker:

“The President has asked me to give you his personal greetings and to express his appreciation for your willingness to receive me. He has asked me to give a full account of my mission in Saudi Arabia and to talk over with you in complete frankness the best means of dealing with the present situation in Yemen.

“The President has instructed me to tell you that his principal concern in this affair has been to support the integrity and honor of all of the parties involved while carrying out his responsibility to his own people to protect vital American interests. Thus if the United States has shown concern for the integrity of Saudi Arabia it has also demonstrated concern for the integrity of the Yemen Arab Republic. If it has shown concern for the security of Aden, it has also demonstrated understanding and respect for the position of the United Arab Republic.

“To all parties and on all occasions the President has urged moderation, restraint and statesmanship and it is to your own sense of statesmanship that he again appeals. In this modern world all nations are interdependent. Few actions, or reactions, between nations can be insulated against international repercussions.

“It is the President’s hope that you will explore with me in all frankness the avenues for containing the Yemen conflict and bringing it to an early close.”¹

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/BUNKER. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Strong and Barrow on March 16; cleared by Grant and McGhee (in substance), Komer, and Brubeck; and approved by Brubeck. Also sent to Dhahran.
1. On March 18, Ali Sabri summoned Badeau to inform him that Nasser had decided that Bunker’s visit to Cairo would not be desirable. Sabri assured Badeau that Nasser did not want his action to be interpreted as a desire to inhibit disengagement diplomacy or as a lack of cooperation with President Kennedy’s efforts. Rather, Nasser felt that Bunker’s visit would make him vulnerable to charges of being pro-American at a time when he was seeking to curtail Communist influence in his country. (Telegram 1508 from Cairo, March 18; ibid.) Consequently, Bunker traveled directly to Beirut after visiting Saudi Arabia, before returning to the United States. Additional documentation is ibid., POL 26 YEMEN and POL 27 SAUD–UAR.