Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia⁰

Washington, March 14, 1963, 11 p.m.

583. Eyes only for Ambassadors Bunker and Hart and Badeau. President approved following oral message for delivery by Bunker to Faysal:¹

“I much appreciate your reception of my emissary, Ambassador Bunker, and your agreement in principle to our suggestions.

But one problem disturbs me as much as it does you. The proposals you have made for UAR disengagement could not, in our judgment, be successfully negotiated, certainly not within the short time we feel remains in which to avert a broadening of the conflict. Events in Iraq and Syria obviously have established a new atmosphere in the Arab world which can only give new confidence to your opponents and bring new pressures on your Government. The Egyptian offensive in Yemen seems to us on the eve of success. Our intelligence confirms your remarks that revolutionary ideas are abroad in your country. This situation can be corrected if action is taken now. The longer the current impasse goes on, the less chance there is that corrective action will be effective.

Therefore, frankly I think it is emphatically in your interest that the disengagement process begin. I urge that you accept our eight points without conditions or reservations and that you agree to let Ambassador Bunker try to work out with Nasser an arrangement whereby, on a date to be mutually agreed, you will suspend aid to the royalists at the same time the UAR will begin its withdrawal by moving a unit out of Yemen. Both suspension, on your side, and withdrawal, on the UAR side, would be verified by impartial observers. Such undertakings, made to the Secretary General would in our opinion preserve your honor. In this case I would of course be prepared to send the air squadron as Ambassador Bunker has informed you. Nasser has assured me, and I intend to press him hard on it, that after your cessation of support to the royalists the UAR force shall be withdrawn by phases and expeditiously. I believe that these actions are those best calculated to permit graceful disengagement from a difficult situation and to permit Saudi Arabia, with our help, to meet the gathering threats to its interests.

As you know, we have already taken a number of actions, including naval and other demonstrations and warnings to Nasser, designed to underline our interest in the integrity of Saudi Arabia. I must say in all candor, however, that continuation of Saudi involvement in the Yemen, which invites attack from the outside, makes it extremely difficult for me to take further such actions. In sum, we want to help you, but you must make it possible for us to do so.

Please accept all my best wishes. I look forward to hearing from you shortly through Ambassador Bunker.” End of oral message.

FYI, President desires that, without retreating in any way from letter or spirit of previous undertakings to Faysal, all concerned seek to avoid giving impression of open-ended US commitment to defend Saudi Arabia under any or all circumstances, or for indefinite long term period. We are prepared to send squadron under terms offered, but we want to avoid future misunderstandings and to preserve US freedom of action.

While recognizing that question may have to be faced at future date, the President also wants you to avoid any discussion with the Saudis at this point on the possible rules of engagement under which our squadron would operate. In particular, if asked by the Saudis whether our aircraft would shoot down UAR intruders, you should state that you are not authorized to discuss this question, since instructions for squadron are being worked out in Washington. End FYI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/BUNKER. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Komer and Strong; cleared by McGhee, Wallner, Talbot (in substance); and approved by Davis. Also sent to Dhahran and repeated to Cairo.
1. The original version of the oral message was drafted in the Department of State and sent to Bundy under cover of a March 14 memorandum from Brubeck. A handwritten correction on the second page indicates a change made in the White House. (Ibid.) A March 14 memorandum from Komer informed the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State that President Kennedy personally approved the message. (Ibid.)