Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia⁰

Washington, March 14, 1963, 10:15 p.m.

582. Eyes only for Ambassadors Bunker, Hart, and Badeau. Following terms of reference for Bunker approved by President:¹

A. Riyadh

1. Ambassador Bunker should deliver President’s oral message to Faysal (separate telegram).²

2. He should seek to persuade Faysal to drop those of his “six points” which obviously are impossible of early acceptance by the UAR.

3. He should seek Faysal’s agreement to a simultaneous initiation by Saudi Arabia and the UAR of the process of disengagement from Yemen, with verification by impartial observers.

4. If despatch of a USAF air squadron is necessary to achievement of the foregoing, Ambassador Bunker has the authority to promise it.

5. Ambassador Bunker should make clear to Faysal that he plans to stop in Cairo for negotiations.

6. He should endeavor to assure that Faysal sends directly to the SYG an unconditional invitation to Dr. Bunche and that Faysal communicates to the SYG his willingness to cooperate in the disengagement process.

B. Cairo

Assuming success with Faysal

1. Explain eight-point program worked out with Faysal including fact despatch of air squadron to Saudi Arabia was price we had to pay.

2. Get Nasser’s agreement to desist from further bombing, indefinitely.

3. Confirm a date for initiation of simultaneous disengagement (withdrawal of initial unit by UAR).

4. Obtain UAR approval for neutral observation in Yemen of UAR troop departures.

5. Establish general understanding on phased troop withdrawal.

6. Seek to persuade Nasser to reaffirm publicly his intention to withdraw.

7. Ask Nasser to exercise his influence on Sallal to desist from further inflammatory speeches against neighboring countries and to reaffirm his desire to live at peace with his neighbors.

C. If necessary, Ambassador Bunker would return to Riyadh to work out further details.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/BUNKER. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Strong and Seelye; cleared by Talbot, McGhee, and Wallner in substance, and Komer; and approved by Davis. Also sent to Dhahran and repeated to Cairo.
1. The Department of State transmitted to the White House the terms of reference for Bunker’s return to the Near East, a status report on Bunker’s previous mission, and an appendix entitled “Proposals for Crown Prince Faysal” under cover of a March 14 memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy. (Ibid., POL US–YEMEN) Additional documentation is ibid., POL 27–14 YEMEN and POL 27–14 YEMEN/UN. A March 14 memorandum from Komer to the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State indicates that President Kennedy approved the terms of reference. The memorandum also indicates that the President desired that if planes were sent to Saudi Arabia (as described in the appendix) it should be described as a “training mission.” Kennedy would not approve paragraph B–3 of the terms of reference regarding rules of engagement until it became necessary, and Bunker and Hart should not discuss the rules of engagement with the Saudis. (Ibid., POL 7 US/BUNKER)
2. See Document 194.