196. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State0
847. Policy. Following more detailed account my meeting with Faysal Riyadh March 17:1
[Page 430]After presentation warm greetings from President I reported my talks with UN SYG and Bunche and reviewed complications in getting Bunche to Saudi Arabia as mediator. (I decided postpone effort obtain clearcut Faysal invitation to Bunche until second meeting.) I indicated urgency of prompt action to prevent escalation had determined President send me for purpose carrying out next phase mediation effort. UN SYG had concurred and we fully expected UN to maintain key role. If Faysal agreed, I would proceed to Cairo following my talk with him. I then delivered President’s oral message with minor modifications and slightly softened phraseology. Faysal listened attentively and when finished, stated he detected in message attempt at intimidating him into accepting set conditions. Took exception to President’s references to “new atmosphere in Arab world giving new confidence to your opponents” and existence “revolutionary ideas” in Saudi Arabia. Characterized USG estimate events in and around Saudi Arabia as faulty at best; adding “I regret to say these reports of trouble within country can usually be traced to American sources” at worse represented attempt intimidate him. Intimidation had opposite than desired effect on him. He would die gladly for freedom and honor.
I assured Faysal intimidation furthest from President’s mind. On contrary, our frank and forthright account of developing situation as we saw it based on warm friendship, and best interests Saudi Arabia. I spoke with candor and frankness only possible between good friends. Risks involved in escalation of Yemen conflict necessitate prompt commencement disengagement. For this reason President appreciates Faysal’s acceptance salient points in USG proposals. Re Faysal’s additional points, President considers them essentially procedural detail which would fall into place logically after beginning disengagement. Faysal contended these not details but basic points. Discussion then turned to these points, particularly points two and three which concerned Faysal most. Re point four, Faysal reconciled himself to presence UAR military training mission in Yemen (though insisted should be small) following my exposition dangers YAR turning to Soviets. Re point two, conceded if UAR were attacked by Royalists, could be expected defend themselves. Re point three, I indicated would require time consuming negotiation and, in any case, as with point two, act of withdrawal would take care of this. Essential problem is proceed with disengagement and thus not only satisfy Faysal’s points but allow him same time reap substantial advantages. Faysal’s private assurance to suspend aid, permitting Nasser begin troop drawdown, would enable USG, backed fully by President, (1) place full weight its influence on UAR carry out disengagement; (2) USG, most powerful nation in world, come unequivocally and effectively to defense Saudi Arabia by bringing in air unit, and through moral force US military power which had effectively served as deterrent many [Page 431] parts of world and I was confident would deter further incursions on Saudi soil; and (3) enable USG initiate an expanded air defense training program giving Saudi Arabia, in time, its own military deterence. I depicted our offer in nature two-pronged program to buttress Saudi Arabia: (1) an effective means of getting UAR troops out of Yemen and thus alleviating pressures on SAG flowing from substantial UAR presence in Yemen; and (2) military shield against possibility future UAR incursions, including dramatic notice-serving to UAR or anyone else USG stands ready protect Saudi Arabia with full force its vast military resources.
I emphasized course we propose consonant with preservation Faysal’s honor and dignity; wholly antithetical USG interests impair Faysal’s honor and dignity. USG has linked itself closely with Faysal regime in its dedication internal development and last thing President wishes is sullying Faysal’s honor.
Faysal expressed deep appreciation warm sentiments but again called attention USG “inactivity” in face UAR attacks. Stated SAG has ability defend itself if necessary (possibly Faysal had reference to calling in mercenaries) and reiterated freedom and dignity paramount importance. Faysal alleged he would not continue rule Saudi Arabia if people do not want him; claimed he does not seek power and would not be displeased if someone else took over reins of government. He asked me inform President he motivated by honor and conviction, and when elects course of action, pursues this course steadfastly. He repeated his confidence and trust in the President.
I repeated again “we want to help you but you must make it possible for us to help. We cannot assist you while you are helping those trying overthrow government we recognize, but the minute you suspend assistance we will be at your side.”
Faysal agreed present situation fraught with urgency and repeated Nasser wished to “crush him.”
Comment: In spite some periods of tension talks ended on warm and friendly note. I said I proposed to move rapidly, that with Faysal’s permission I would proceed Cairo, endeavor secure from Nasser definite time beginning withdrawal and time limit phasing out process and return Riyadh. I was confident we could then work out rapid disengagement and that details with which he concerned would fall into place. Faysal replied he would welcome my going to Cairo, hoped I would have success and would welcome my return there at any time.
In subsequent talks with Saqqaf on plane Riyadh–Jidda he expressed satisfaction with talks, said important thing was to get disengagement started quickly and all other matters would fall into place. He asked me also to try to get on my own initiative some gesture friendly approach by Nasser to Faysal, who formerly friend and supporter [Page 432] Nasser and deeply hurt by latter’s attacks. Admitted Nasser had reason for hostility toward King but definitely not toward Faysal, who anxious restore former friendly relations but could not make first move. I pressed Faysal relinquish all “six points” to extent I deemed advisable, believing further pressure would be counter-productive. If we can secure definite commitment from Nasser re withdrawal believe one or two more talks with Faysal will secure his agreement suspend aid basis “eight points” presented to him, but Arab pride and his own appraisal of situation had not quite brought him to point. Believe he realizes his ever increasingly isolated position but unwilling yet acknowledge and desirous receiving best possible terms in order not have to acknowledge complete defeat to Royalists.