Office of the Historian

51. Record of Action No. 2427, Taken at the 484th Meeting of the National Security Council0

Washington, May 19, 1961.

U.S. Policy Toward Iran (NSC Action No. 2420;1 Report of the Task Force on Iran dated May 15, 1961, entitled “A Review of Problems in Iran and Recommendations for the National Security Council”)2

a. Discussed the report of the Task Force on Iran, dated May 15, and revised the report’s recommendations to read as follows:3

“II. Recommendations for Immediate Action

1.
That the U.S. make a major effort to back the new Government in Iran as the best instrument in sight for promoting orderly political, economic and social evolution in Iran, and for averting serious and damaging political developments.
2.
That to this end the U.S. encourage Amini positively but discreetly in any serious efforts to solve Iran’s immediate political and economic problems and to construct a broad political synthesis. This encouragement should be given in such a manner to avoid so far as possible arousing the Shah’s active opposition. The U.S. should be prepared to tolerate certain seemingly anti-American actions by Amini which do not really damage any major American interest.
3.
That the U.S. should not favor any military coup against the Amini Regime.
4.
That the U.S. reorient its foreign aid program in Iran to put more emphasis on long-range economic developments as envisaged in the report of the Presidential Task Force on Foreign Economic Assistance, and in addition:
a.
Inform the Government of Iran immediately of our intention to make a cash grant of $15 million payable as soon as required by the Iranians.
b.
Be prepared to make an additional $5 million grant of FY 1962 funds to the Government of Iran for general budgetary purposes if, at a later date, the situation in Iran requires such action.
c.
Modify U.S. executive procedures in order to assure the timely flow of development loan funds.
5.
That the Departments of State and Defense, as a means of providing more substantial assurance to Iran and in an attempt to reduce Iranian pressure for military assistance, urgently examine:
a.
The feasibility and political-military implications of deploying earmarked U.S. forces to locations that would permit more rapid assist-ance to Iran in the event of Soviet or Soviet-supported attack;
b.
The desirability of informing the Government of Iran more specifically of U.S. unilateral plans for military action in Iran’s support of any deployments determined to be feasible.

III. Recommendations for Further Action

The actions proposed above can do no more than help the new Iranian regime to grapple with the country’s more urgent problems. These actions will have meaning only to the extent that the government moves effectively on political, economic, social, psychological, and military issues. We too must have a follow-through program for long-range developments to strengthen the fabric of Iranian society. To this end, the Task Force recommends further:

6.
That the U.S., while supporting the Monarchy as the symbol of unity and a stabilizing influence in Iran, more actively encourage the Shah to move toward a more constitutional role.
7.
That the U.S. encourage the formation and growth of broadly based political parties in Iran.
8.
That the U.S., in keeping before responsible Iranian officials the risks which may be involved in an Iranian rapprochement with the Soviet Union, avoid giving the impression that the continuance of present tensions between Iran and the USSR is a U.S. goal.
9.
That the U.S. continue for the present to support currently existing Iranian military forces up to the approximate level of 200,000 men. In this connection, we should adhere to those aspects of the 1958 Presidential letter to the Shah4 stressing the operational proficiency of existing forces but deferring consideration of the activation of additional units.
10.
That the Departments of State and Defense comprehensively study the potentialities of advancing U.S. interest through CENTO.
11.

That the U.S. make no present decision whether or how it would react militarily to Soviet attack on Iran, but as a means for identifying the key military and political considerations in reaching such a decision illustrative military plans should be developed for such action on the basis of at least the following alternatives: (a) the prompt introduction of [Page 122] U.S. conventional forces in a strength up to two divisions, and (b) the prompt deployment of nuclear striking power so that it could be brought to bear in the Soviet border areas of Iran. The military planning called for by this paragraph, and the joint State/Defense study called for under paragraph 5-a above, should include an assessment of the effect of such deployments or other action on the general war posture of the U.S., weighing such effects against an estimate of the likeliHood that Soviet action against Iran would in fact lead to a general war on many fronts.”

b. Agreed that NSC 6010, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,”5 is no longer applicable and is to be considered as having been replaced by the above actions.

c. Noted that the Task Force would remain in being for such follow-through action on the above directive as its chairman deems appropriate.

  1. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95. Secret. Approved by the President on May 24. A list of participants at the NSC meeting, which was on the last page of the Records of Action taken at the meeting, and the other actions taken at the meeting (2426 and 2428) are not printed. The President presided at the meeting and Assistant Secretary Talbot and Ambassador Holmes attended for the Department of State.↩
  2. See Document 41.↩
  3. See footnote 2, Document 49.↩
  4. The text of the recommendations for immediate action was sent to the Embassy in Tehran in telegram 1293, May 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/5–2961)↩
  5. Dated July 19, 1958; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. XII, pp. 575–576.↩
  6. Dated July 6, 1960; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. XII, pp. 680–688.↩