41. Editorial Note
Late in the evening of May 4, 1961, Admiral Burke directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff Duty Officer to see that President Kennedy received immediately the text of a message from Tehran reporting that during a teachers strike in Iran, 50,000 demonstrators had clashed with Iranian Army and security forces and that a nationwide strike sponsored by the National Front was possible. General Clifton read the message at 10:50 p.m., but decided not to waken the President who had retired for the evening. Clifton informed Burke of this, said that if additional vital news came from Iran it would be shown to the President, and promised to show the original message to the President first thing in the morning. According to a memorandum by Clifton written at 11:40 p.m., he also informed Burke that “the President had been worried that things had been happening that he isn’t informed about, and that this looked fairly difficult, so he should be kept posted.” Clifton’s memorandum, the message from Tehran, and a subsequent message reporting which Iranian military units had been put on alert are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Iran, 5/1/61–5/14/61.
The following day, the Embassy in Tehran reported that Prime Minister Jafar Sharif Emami and his Cabinet had resigned. (Telegram 1366 from Tehran; Department of State, Central Files, 788.13/5–561) Later that day in Washington, Iran was discussed at a meeting of the National Security Council. Record of Action No. 2420 taken by the National Security Council at its 483d meeting on May 5 indicates that the National Security Council had: “Agreed that a Task Force should be established under the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the [Page 99] Council on May 19.” (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
After the meeting, Rusk sent a note to Talbot that reads: “At the NSC Meeting today the President expressed his concern, which we all share, about the potentially dangerous situation in Iran. He wondered whether we should not pull together a crisis-type task force to concentrate heavily upon it.” (Ibid., NEA/GTI Files: Lot 66 D 173, Task Force on Iran)
On May 6, the Embassy in Tehran reported that the Shah had appointed former Iranian Ambassador to the United States and a critic of his regime, Dr. Ali Amini, as Prime Minister and that Amini had reportedly demanded that the Shah accept the following conditions: 1) Amini’s right to name all Cabinet ministers except the Minister of War and possibly the Minister of Interior; 2) the dissolution of the Majlis; and 3) the establishment of a special court to handle corruption cases. (Telegram 1366 from Tehran; ibid., Central Files, 788.13/5–661)
On May 8, the Iran Task Force held its first meeting. Talbot served as Chairman with Ambassador Holmes as Deputy. State representatives included: Miner, Bowling, Miklos, Evan Wilson, Hilsman, Elwood, Springsteen, Baxter, Kerr, and Murnighan. William Bundy represented the Defense Department’s International Security Affairs Office. Other members were: Maurice Williams from the International Cooperation Administration; Kenneth Hansen, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget; William King from the U.S. Information Agency; John Leddy from the Treasury; and Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff. Names of the Central Intelligence Agency representatives are not included in Department of State files. The two main collections of documentation on the Iran Task Force in Department of State files are the collection kept by the Executive Secretariat in S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC—Position Paper, Iran—1961–1964, and those kept by the Iran Desk in NEA/GTI Files: Lot 66 D 173, Task Force on Iran.
According to the record of the Secretary’s staff meeting for May 8, Talbot reported that “the new Task Force on Iran, scheduled to produce a report for the NSC by next week, will hold its first meeting today. He said the new government in Iran is expected to be a stabilizing force and that the Task Force will concentrate on medium-range objectives rather than immediate crises.” (Ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147)
On May 9, the Embassy in Tehran reported that Amini had presented his new Cabinet to the Shah, the Shah had dissolved the Majlis and Senate, and Amini had banned most public meetings and demonstrations and met with teachers to discuss grievances. (Telegrams 1372 and 1374 from Tehran; ibid., Central Files, 788.00/5–961)