50. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- Iranian Task Force Report
The thrust of this report is that we must vigorously support the new Amini government as the best, and perhaps last good chance of forestalling Iran’s slippery slide into chaos. The demonstrations in Teheran on 2–4 May have made not only the Shah but the State Department face up at last to this alarming trend.
All Task Force members agree that Amini’s moderate reformist program offers the only good alternative to an unpopular military dictatorship or a Mosadeqist revolution. Even the Shah claims to fervently support Amini for these reasons. Thus his advent provides an opportunity which we must seize.
However, the gut issue was how far we should really go in supporting Amini, and even risk the Shah’s displeasure by pressing him to do the same. The Embassy, and some State officers, felt that Amini might represent just another reformist interlude, and that the Shah would begin to undercut him (as he has previous prime ministers) once the Shah had recovered from his case of nerves. State has perennially been reluctant to press the Shah very hard, with the result that not much has been accomplished.
But the Task Force consensus is that with Iran now pretty far down the road to chaos, we had better do everything feasible to give the Amini “experiment” a fighting chance, helping to protect him against pressures from both the Shah and the left. This represents a significant change in policy.
The Task Force has come up with a pretty good action program to this end. It is oriented more toward economic needs and social reform than toward paying the Shah military baksheesh again (see pp. 1–5 of Report):
- a.
- Iran faces a “cash” crisis. Though it occurred largely through mismanagement, the Seven Year Plan Organization can’t pay its current bills. Hence a prompt cash grant of the $15 million earmarked for FY ‘62 budgetary support of Iranian forces is recommended. We should be [Page 119] prepared to grant an additional $5 million if Amini needs it to pay for politically essential salary increases, etc.
- b.
- In view of the urgency of the situation we must put aside the administrative obstacles which in the past have made us unable to disburse funds rapidly enough to meet Iranian needs.
- c.
- We should reorient our longer-range economic aid toward support of the Iranian Seven Year Plans (as proposed by Labouisse Task Force).
- d.
- We should back Amini’s reform program positively but discreetly, and in a way which “so far as possible” does not arouse the Shah’s active opposition; also seeking to forestall any military coup against Amini (e.g. from General Bakhtiar).
- e.
- We should hold for the moment to current levels of military aid and not join CENTO, while urgently examining other ways of reassuring the Shah about the external threat.
Presidential Action Recommended. The potential weakness of the action program is a certain ambiguity as to how vigorously we should support Amini. Hence, besides approving the Task Force proposals, I recommend that you:
- 1.
- Make unmistakably clear that we must do everything possible to insure the success of the Amini “experiment”, if necessary pushing both the Shah and Amini (and repeat this injunction to Ambassador Holmes).
- 2.
- Direct that we take special measures to advise both Amini and the Shah that we back Amini’s reform program (e.g. a Presidential letter or special mission), but that continued US support will be conditional on prompt and effective Iranian action to carry out these and related measures to resolve Iran’s basic political and economic problems.
- 3.
- Direct that the Task Force be kept in being (State was reluctant
to so recommend) as a follow-through mechanism, charged specifically
with:
- a.
- Assuring that its action program receives full inter-agency support.
- b.
- Contingency planning against possibility of Amini’s failure or ouster.
- c.
- Review of US role in CENTO, and other means of reassuring Iran against Soviet military threat (paras. 5 and 10 of Task Force Report). I would also recommend a review of MAP for Iran be added.
- d.
- Review of US contingency plans for intervention in case of Soviet attack (para. 11).