Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

49. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM-335–61

Washington, May 17, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Presidential Task Force for Iran Recommendations (S)¹

1. In view of the strategic importance of Iran the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur generally with the political and economic recommendations which are designed to bolster the present Western-oriented government; in addition, the recommendation to continue for the present to support currently existing Iranian military forces up to the approximate level of 200,000 men is sound.

2. With regard to other recommendations of a military nature, specifically, paragraphs II.5, III.10, and III.11, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are ready to cooperate wholeheartedly in these proposed studies. However, it should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for military reasons, have gone on record recommending the United States join CENTO. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it timely to advise you that the present approved contingency plan for Iran (CINCNELMOPLAN 215–60) is based, in part, on the assumption that should US forces become overtly engaged with the armed forces of the USSR, general war will exist and general war plans will be invoked. Viewed in the context of the foregoing assumption, recommendations II.5a, and III.11 might be construed as major revisions of current military policy. Such a connotation is misleading without a detailed supporting military study. In the absence of such a study at the present time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to withhold concurrence in so much of the recommendation in paragraph III.11 as pertains to the size and nature of the force to be employed. Subject to the foregoing remarks, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the recommendations of the Presidential Task Force for Iran.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that all further studies and examinations of military concepts, plans and actions relating to strengths, types of forces and possible deployment, recommended by the Task Force for Iran, be undertaken with full participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that in the future provisions be made for their timely participation in the formulation of Task Force positions on policy papers such as this and the one now under development by the Korean Task Force.²

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Iran 61. Top Secret. Drafted by R.H.B. Wade of the Office of International Security Affairs. (Memorandum from W. Bundy to McNamara, May 18; ibid., OSD Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Iran 000.1—1961)
1. The Iran Task Force draft report, dated May 15, contains the original draft of the Task Force’s recommendations. See Supplement, the compilation on Iran. A notebook in Department of State, NEA/GTI Files: Lot 66 D 173, contains preliminary drafts and commentaries on them. The text of the original draft recommendations was also sent to Secretary Rusk (who was in Geneva for the Conference on Laos) in Tosec 142, May 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/5–1661) The Task Force’s recommendations were discussed at the meeting of the National Security Council on May 19 and are included in the Record of Action for the meeting (see Document 51).
2. McNamara forwarded Lemnitzer’s memorandum to McGeorge Bundy on May 15 for distribution to NSC members under cover of a memorandum that proposed alternate language for recommendation III.11. The Department of Defense revisions appear in the text of the recommendations printed in Document 51. A copy of McNamara’s memorandum is in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC—Position Paper, Iran—1961–1964. See also Supplement, the compilation on Iran.