Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

261. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Grant) to Acting Secretary of State Ball⁰

Washington, May 1, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Assurances to Israel on its Jordan Valley Water Development Program

The present conjunction of several considerations, both foreign and domestic, suggest the desirability of assuring Israel that the U.S. concedes Israel’s jurisdiction over Lake Tiberias and concurs in its right to take an equitable portion of the Jordan River Valley waters, using the lake as the point of diversion. United States assurances would be given in exchange for certain Israel commitments which are necessary to protect possible future water development programs of the Arabs. Shortly before his departure for Europe, the Secretary had an opportunity to explain the problem to the President.¹ Governor Stevenson is reported to be seeing the President on May 2 on this issue, among others.²

Considerations which have influenced the development of the proposed course of action include the following:

1. We believe Israel to be entitled to a fair share of the waters of the Jordan Valley and would not wish to permit obstruction of her plan to use the water.

2. We consider that the hostilities on and around Lake Tiberias in March between Israel and Syria were directly related to Israel’s plan to divert large quantities of water from the lake commencing in 1963. Israel is determined to carry through its plan, and the Arabs desire to prevent its implementation because of the increased capability Israel will achieve to settle immigrants in the Negev. It is likely that the Syrians in particular will continue to challenge by various means Israel’s diversion plan. Having once used the retaliatory raid (March 16–17) to deter Syria from hostile actions in any form, Israel is likely to do so again if Syria perpetrates new hostile acts. The fact that Syria defeated the Israel retaliatory raid is likely to lead Israel to use force on a much larger scale the next time, unless in the meantime Israel has received assurances that we will defend her right to divert the waters.

3. The principal purpose of the US–UK resolution of April 9, censuring Israel,³ was to find means of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and of reactivating the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC). We desire to support U.N. efforts in this direction. However, we believe that Israel will make no meaningful concessions while there is doubt as to her right to the waters of the lake. Thus, our assurances become necessary to achievement of a positive result from the censure of Israel on April 9.

4. As a result of the resolution of April 9, there is a certain bitterness in Israel which is reflected even more strongly in American sympathizers with Israel. We do not believe that the assurances we propose to give Israel will remove all unhappiness either in Israel or among its sympathizers here, but we do propose to try to employ the fact of our assurances to gain domestic Zionist support of U.N. efforts to strengthen its peace-keeping machinery in the area. A complication here is our increased economic assistance to the UAR and our plans for the future. This is bound to result in additional pressures on the U.S. Government to meet Israel’s needs. We believe it sound not to delay the assurances, subject of course to certain essential conditions.

5. We had hoped that Jordan would be able to make more progress than it has toward construction of a dam on the Yarmuk River under IBRD aegis. It now appears that our efforts in this direction will be insufficient to dampen Arab hostility to the Israel diversion plan. Hence, we believe we should waste no time in supporting Israel in marshaling international agreement to Israel’s right to the water since the case eventually must be expected to come to the Security Council. If the weight of the world commonly appears to be on the side of Israel, the Arabs will find more difficulty in creating serious trouble over the issue.

The Department proposes to deliver a note to the Israelis containing two assurances: (a) that we support their intention to divert a portion of the Jordan Valley water and are prepared to make our support clear to other governments, including the concerned Arab states; and (b) that Israel has jurisdiction over Lake Tiberias. The note in return would ask the Israelis to announce an intention to divert no more of the water than allocated to them by the Unified (Johnston) Plan, which was accepted at the technical level by the several riparians but failed of political agreement, and to agree to establishment of effective, impartial supervision of the use of the water, which also is an element of the Unified Plan.

The Department would anticipate a number of benefits to flow from this exchange of reciprocal assurances:

We would expect no difficulty in obtaining the support of major Western governments for such a position.

Conveyed, on the one hand, to the Israelis, that Government should be encouraged to act with both confidence and restraint as the critical date approaches. On the other hand, the Arabs would be left in no doubt as to the absence of Western support for any further recalcitrance on their part, but at the same time would have assurances that ultimate development of their share of the water was protected.

The Israelis would no longer have legitimate reasons, based in security requirements, for denying to the U.N. instrumentalities the additional facilities and prerogatives they require to improve their ability to arrest the threat of violence in incipient stages.

The Administration’s position vis-à-vis United States friends of Israel would be greatly improved. Not only could the Administration demonstrate a positive posture on the water controversy but could argue persuasively that Israel’s friends would have every reason to support the Administration’s efforts in the interests of both governments and to foster peace and stability in the Near East.

It was deemed necessary to obtain the concurrence of the White House to the foregoing. A note was drafted which it was proposed the Secretary would hand to Ambassador Harman before the latter’s current trip. However, protracted negotiations with the White House ensued and remain uncompleted, although differences have narrowed to the question of a U.S. definition of its official position towards Israel’s claim to Lake Tiberias. Three alternatives to our original proposal have been prepared for further discussion:⁴

A. Official Version 1 is the language originally agreed within the Department, including the Secretary.

B. Official Version 2 represents the results of negotiations with Mr. Feldman, who could not accept our language on sovereignty.

C. Official Version 3 was approved by the Secretary, but Mr. Feldman continues to refuse to accept the language on sovereignty.

D. Official Version 4 omits any reference to sovereignty, which would be dealt with in a separate Aide-Mémoire. Mr. Feldman is reported to find this procedure unacceptable.

E. The fifth version is Mr. Feldman’s. It is unacceptable to the Department.

As you are aware, the Secretary wishes to examine the text of an agreed note before it is transmitted.

0. Source: Department of State,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 229, Jordan Waters Memoranda. Secret. Drafted by Strong and Hamilton.
1. No record of the conversation has been found.
2. A memorandum by Special Assistant to the President Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., contained the following account of Stevenson’s discussion with President Kennedy on May 2 on Lake Tiberias: “The Ambassador said that he thought it would be a great mistake to send the proposed Lake Tiberias note to the Israeli Government. While he felt that we would come out on the Israeli side on the question, he argued that the present draft would throw away valuable bargaining power, and that we should stipulate certain conditions before we accept the Israeli position. Action: the President asked that the Ambassador get together with Mike Feldman and see whether they could agree on anything. Stevenson and Feldman subsequently agreed that it would be a mistake to send any note at this time. When the Israeli representative to the UN returns to New York in about two weeks, Feldman will go to New York and he and Stevenson will explore the matter together.” (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 1/62–5/62)
3. U.N. doc. S/5111.
4. Attached but not printed.