Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

262. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Grant) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee)⁰

Washington, May 3, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Contingencies in Iraq

Background:

Opposition to Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim of Iraq has had as its consistent objective his violent overthrow but has been frustrated by fear of his wide powers over all aspects of government, by his ubiquitous and overlapping intelligence networks and by his control of the Army. Nevertheless, as a leader Qasim is now disliked, hated and privately ridiculed by almost all sections of the Iraqi public, including apparently, growing segments of the Army.

Qasim is currently engaged in a military action, using troops, artillery and planes against Kurdish tribal insurgents (supported by the leftist Democratic Party of Kurdistan and by city Kurds) in the north and northeast of Iraq along the Turkish and Iranian borders.¹ This military campaign is politically damaging since Qasim has insisted that Iraq is a “brotherHood” of Arabs, Kurds and other minorities, and Kurdish resistance highlights Qasim’s estrangement from all Iraqis. Kurdish guerilla fighters are famously tough and elusive and the heavy strain on the Army has created discontent in the Iraqi forces.

There has never been a period since Qasim’s overthrow of the Hashemite Monarchy on July 14, 1958 that his own overthrow has not been plotted by dissident elements. An uprising was mounted against him by an Army officer in Mosul during March 1959 and in October of the same year he was shot by Ba’athist gunmen. There are current reports that a new Ba’athist attempt to overthrow him is being planned for April or May (see attached Intelligence Note).²

A successor regime to Qasim would probably fall somewhere in the Arab nationalist, neutralist, political spectrum. A successor government would probably be somewhat less anti-Western in its complexion and policy. However, it has been firm U.S. policy to avoid involvement in any way with opposition to Qasim, even with Iraqis who profess basic friendliness to the U.S.

While pressures on Qasim and the threat to his regime seem greater than at any time over the last two and half years, we do not underestimate his ability, demonstrated so often in the past, to extricate himself and somehow preserve his position. However, we note below some thoughts as to our possible courses of action in a period subsequent to Qasim’s disappearance from the scene. In each case the U.S. should consult closely with the U.K. and also undertake discussions with Turkey and Iran.

Possible Courses of U.S. Action Following Qasim’s Overthrow:

1. If the group assuming power is judged as representing Iraqis generally described as nationalist and appears to be in firm control, the U.S. should consider prompt recognition and should be prepared to respond promptly and favorably to overtures for assistance. We should discourage interference by any of Iraq’s neighbors if such interference is contemplated.

2. Should the group assuming power after an overthrow of Qasim be recognized as representing the Ba’ath Party (the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, an organization often rent by serious factional disputes), the U.S. would wish to delay recognition long enough to be satisfied there is no (or little) question that the group is actually in full control. In this situation also we should discourage interference by Iraq’s neighbors.

3. Should the Kurds in a period of prolonged confusion following Qasim’s disappearance from the scene withhold their support from a new government and make demands for autonomy within specified areas of Iraq, the U.S. should recognize the new government on the basis of the same criteria it would use were there no Kurdish complications involved, thus avoiding any appearance of support for Kurdish claims.

4. In the event of a protracted period of conflict involving struggle between Communist and non-Communist elements, we should consider in consultation with Iraq’s neighbors and with the U.K., how non-Communist elements could be assisted to prevail without open intervention by the U.S. or by any other Western power including Turkey and Iran. It would be desirable for a struggle to remain Arabized insofar as possible. Accordingly, it might be necessary to give covert support for anti-Communist elements in Iraq. It would be preferable that the U.A.R. know of and acquiesce in any such action.

5. Similarly, in the less-likely case of a successful sudden seizure of power by Communist elements in Iraq, we should consider how best to channel or encourage what would in all probability be a reaction of deep alarm by Iraq’s neighbors. We should be prepared to bring the issue before the United Nations Security Council as required, with a view to deterring active Soviet, and possibly other, intervention in whatever internal conflict might ensue in reaction to the Communist takeover.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.87/6–2062. Secret. Attached to the June 20 memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, Document 303.
1. Documentation relating to Kurdish insurgents in Iraq is in Department of State, Central File 787.001.
2. Not attached; identified as Intelligence Note of April 12, 1962.