260. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State0
1577. For Cleveland and Talbot from Johnson. There follows summary report by Johnson on his Syrian visit.
“He and Moe met once with Foreign Minister on 25 April; present also Oustouani, Secretary General Foreign Office, Ambassador Daoudi and Hamwi, relatively junior Foreign Ministry official newly assigned to Palestine Affairs probably being trained to take charge at staff level. [Page 650] Daoudi due to leave soon for India as Ambassador but had participated in drafting in Cairo of Arab League Resolution on Johnson’s Mission later adopted in Riyadh. Daoudi evidently still regarded as expert on refugee question but extent of his involvement in policy consideration of Johnson’s suggestions somewhat doubtful. That evening Johnson and Moe had long informal talk with Daoudi at hotel at latter’s suggestion. Johnson and Moe paid courtesy call on Prime Minister 24th and then met about one and half hours with Oustouani, Foreign Minister having clearly indicated previous day he did not wish participation in further session.
There appeared, somewhat surprisingly, to be better communication with Syrians than with Lebanese, although meeting with Foreign Minister conducted through English-Arabic interpreter. Syrians had evidently made decision to receive Johnson with full courtesy and state their position frankly, but they apparently did not wish to be drawn into detailed discussion, presumably because they are a new government and feeling their way in both internal and external policy.
Johnson had fairly good opportunity to outline to Foreign Minister his ideas along lines of his WP51 and to elaborate them quite extensively with Oustouani and Daoudi. Main points from Syrian side were: (A) Insistence that only parties involved in implementation of paragraph 11 are Israel and the refugees; (B) Firm adherence to Riyadh Resolution with stress on point that Israel must accept repatriation in principle as envisaged paragraph 11; (C) Clear indication that for them, at least, this requirement from Israel is in large part though not solely for internal political reasons, since agreement to any scheme not embodying this would lay them open to charges by refugees and other malcontents in Syria that they were agreeing to thinly disguised compensation and resettlement only; this evidently basis for statement by Oustouani that Syria very desirous to see refugee problem solved; (D) Clear indication that idea of starting with an initial number of 20,000 would probably not be favorably received as it might be misinterpreted by refugees as whittling away their rights; Daoudi thought, however, that by starting with a scheme applicable in principle to all refugees, it might in fact be possible to begin operation with small annual quotas, justified on administrative grounds; (E) Frequent statement that Syria would cooperate fully in a reasonable scheme to ascertain refugees’ real wishes without pressure; and (F) Clear indication that Syria would be foolish to attack Israel.”