330. Despatch From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State0
No. 619
Athens, March 23,
1962.
REF
- Embdesp #604 of March 8, 19621
SUBJECT
- A Winter of Discontent: Some Implications of the Current Political Maneuvering in Greece
- 1.
- It is apparent that the Center Union’s campaign to nullify the results of the October 29, 1961, elections is turning into a broader and more fundamental attack on several of the governing institutions of Greece; what started four months ago as a disgruntled effort on the part of the defeated opposition to challenge the legitimacy of the elections, and therefore of the Caramanlis Government, is becoming an effort to challenge the legitimacy of certain Greek institutions, such as the Palace, the military leadership, and the internal security forces which, in the minds of the opposition, exerted undue influence on the conduct of the elections. To understand the significance of this challenge, and to estimate the lines of its probable development, it is useful to consider briefly the electoral debate itself and to see what, if anything, the opposition has proved by its campaign.
- 2.
- The general charge advanced by the Center Union against the Dovas Service Government is that the conduct of the elections was characterized by force and fraudulence (“via kai nothia” in the euphonic Greek phrase). The evidence adduced by the opposition to support the charge falls into two categories: (a) evidence designed to show that many voters, especially in the Athens area, were illegally registered, and that military voting registers were not made available to party repre-sentatives for inspection within the time specified by law; and (b) evidence of police pressure on individual voters in some provincial areas.
- 3.
- While the Center Union, for purposes of its campaign, has tended to lump the evidence together, and to draw from it extravagant conclusions about a “master plan” to rig the elections in favor of ERE, objective examination of the evidence makes clear that much of what the opposition has been talking about is not malfeasance but nonfeasance. That is, with respect to the civilian vote the opposition has proved numerous technical violations of the law, especially as it affects the registration of voters, but has failed notably to prove that the elections as a whole were rigged. Thus, despite all the time that the opposition has spent rooting through the registers, not a single case of double voting has so far been proved and the Government has been able to show that a number of illegally registered voters were in fact supporters of the opposition.
- 4.
- With respect to the military vote and the activities of the police and para-military TEA forces in the provinces the evidence, while scattered, is somewhat more persuasive. Numerous [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports tend to confirm that the Army high command bent every effort to deliver a heavy vote for Caramanlis and that General Kardamakis, the Chief of Staff of the Hellenic Army and a long-time associate of the Prime Minister, was deeply involved in the electioneering. The pre-electoral activities of TEA and the gendarmerie do not appear to have been so explicitly pro-ERE; the mission of the internal security forces was to hold down the vote of the extreme left. Nonetheless, in at least one instance, that of the Police Chief in Methoni, the Courts have found evidence of strong-arm methods employed against a non-Communist, and it is permissible to question the wisdom of allowing provincial constabulary to intervene in free elections even when motivated by anti-Communism.
- 5.
- The conclusions to be drawn from these observations are the following: (a) while there was no widespread adulteration of the civilian vote, the administration of the elections was poor and open to abuse by all parties; (b) the Army leadership was overly involved in the campaign and inadequate restraints were placed on the activities of the internal security forces in the pre-electoral period.
- 6.
- It is probable, as some Government spokesmen have said, that similar conclusions could have been drawn from any Greek election, including those conducted by the present opposition leaders. However, what was acceptable, or at any rate accepted, practice in 1951 or 1956 may not be so today. The Center Union, under the purple banner of Papandreou’s oratory, has ridden off in all directions and in so doing has created much confusion about the real issues raised by its attack on the election results. These issues do not, as the Center Union would have us believe, pose the question, “who should govern Greece?” They do, however, raise important questions about the way Greece should be governed.
- 7.
- If we accept this line of reasoning, it becomes easier to see why the Greek public’s response to the Center Union campaign has been mixed and why the campaign itself has shifted emphasis so markedly in recent weeks. There has from the beginning been a measure of reserve and skepticism in the public’s attitude toward the Center Union and especially toward its leadership. No serious observer of the Greek political scene believes that Papandreou and his ill-assorted coalition command as much popular confidence as Caramanlis, and once this is admitted the most extreme of the opposition charges become transparently ridiculous. Many people believe, however, that the Palace, the Army leadership and the internal security forces intervene too much in the political life of Greece, and that the sluggishness of government administration, its apparent unresponsiveness to individual needs, has created a potentially dangerous gap between the governing class and the governed.
- 8.
- For this reason public opinion, which was apathetic about the Center Union’s attack on the election results, has appeared more receptive to its attacks on the Palace. It explains why many intellectuals who have little or no use for the leadership of the Center Union nevertheless feel that in questioning the impartiality of the Army leadership and the gendarmerie the opposition is performing a useful service. Finally, it indicates how, almost without realizing what they are doing, the Center Union leaders find themselves conducting a very different campaign from the one they began four months ago. In recent weeks the implicit issues have simply become explicit.
- 9.
- Greece, it is often said, is in mid-passage, but the phrase is usually used to describe a stage in the country’s economic development. It is less widely understood that Greece is also in mid-passage socially and politically. Methods of administration appropriate to the conditions of prewar Greece; habits of thought suitable to the period of the Bandit War; royal prerogatives which survived in the atmosphere of an earlier and less enlightened time; these are a few of the anachronisms whose continued existence vexes the public and will trouble the Government [Page 635] until they are resolved. These are real issues, as opposed to the synthetic ones which the Center Union introduced at the beginning of its campaign. The apathetic response of the Greek public to Papandreou’s attempt to discredit the elections (which the public correctly identified as political opportunism) has, in effect, forced the Center Union leadership to change the focus of its attack.
- 10.
- In these somewhat changed circumstances the danger to Caramanlis does not appear to be especially serious at the moment. The immediate threat was diminished as soon as it became clear that a majority of the Greek public were extremely skeptical about the most violent and politically-motivated of Papandreou’s charges. When the Prime Minister was able to ascertain that public confidence in the Government had not been shaken, his position became simpler and his principal concern one of holding together the versatile but high-strung group of men who compose his present cabinet. So far, he has managed to do this with consummate skill. Ministers whose personal loyalty he has reason to doubt—Finance Minister Theotokis and Interior Minister Rallis, in particular—have been those to whom he has assigned responsibility for conducting the Government’s defense in Parliament. This strategy has enabled the Prime Minister to avoid direct participation in the election debate and has forced ministers of untested reliability to commit themselves publicly on a subject they might have preferred to finesse. The total effect has probably been to strengthen the cohesiveness of the Government and to lessen the danger that it can be brought down from within, as it was in 1958.
- 11.
- The Prime Minister’s success in holding together his cabinet also strengthens his position with the Palace. An important objective of the Center Union has been to convince the Royal Family and, to a lesser extent, the American Embassy that the Caramanlis Government is “irregular” and therefore a source of political instability in Greece. When the opposition leaders call for a “transitional” government they are appealing to the Palace to replace Caramanlis with some compromise candidate whom they would support until new elections were held. Given the well-known lack of personal rapport between Caramanlis and the Palace, the Center Union reasons that this scheme might be acceptable to the Royal Family if they become convinced (a) that the Prime Minister was not giving them adequate protection from political attack, and (b) that a compromise candidate of their own choice would receive widespread bipartisan support in Parliament. In such a situation the likeliest candidate would be Theotokis, who enjoys close personal relations with the Royal Family, is well regarded by backbenchers of both Government and center opposition, and has no great affection for Caramanlis. Other, more remote possibilities would be Rallis, Minister of Coordination Papaligouras, or Minister of Commerce Pipinelis. It is [Page 636] perfectly clear, however, that this strategy has little chance of succeeding as long as Caramanlis remains in full command of his cabinet and his party. In recent events, there is no sign that his grip is relaxing or that rumored anxieties of the Royal Family are being exploited to his political disadvantage.
- 12.
- Indeed, at present it is the Center Union leaders who seem to be in trouble. Papandreou has become enmeshed in a tiresome debate with ex-Liberal members of the cabinet about who is entitled to wear the mantle of the elder Venizelos; the Center Union rank-and-file are deeply divided on how to phrase their criticism of the military leadership and an open letter which the party recently addressed to the Armed Forces, denouncing their present leaders as “unworthy”, was revised so often that its eventual release was anticlimactic; lastly, at a time when public interest is centered on Princess Sophie’s dowry, the financing of the Queen’s Fund and other matters involving the Royal Family, the Center Union finds itself half in, half out of Parliament and created a further impression of confusion by rushing off to Crete on March 18 for a mass rally on the elections.
- 13.
- Assuming that public confidence in Caramanlis remains unshaken, we are justified in concluding that the Government will ride out the present agitation. In its fumbling way, the Center Union has found in the Palace and in some questionable political activities of the military and internal security forces valid issues with which to attack Caramanlis. Its confused handling of these issues, however, provided the Prime Minister with the time he needs to fashion at least temporary solutions to the most pressing of his problems. It is to be hoped that he will do more than that. Basic reforms are long overdue in Greece’s internal security legislation, in the way the country conducts its elections and in the way the Royal Family comport themselves. The changing character of the election debate has clearly demonstrated that it is in these areas that the Greek public is looking for effective action from the Government.
For the Ambassador:
H.
Daniel Brewster
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs