223. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State0
589. Foreign Minister Merikoski asked me call this afternoon and received me in presence Director of Political Affairs, Max Jakobson. Merikoski remarked that he had just received report Ambassador Seppala’s conversation May 28 with Secretary Rusk1 regarding Finns desire reinterpret peace treaty to permit modernization their armed forces. He stated that in light Seppala’s report he would again like take up matter and proceeded reiterate points put forward by him on May 25 (points 1 to 4 Embassy’s telegram 578).2
He placed special emphasis on circumstance that initiative this matter came from Finnish side, pointing out that question had been raised by Finnish President when he visited London in spring of 1961. He contended that degree modernization was unimportant since Finns can afford only minimum number of expensive modern weapons and argued that principal importance would be psychological. He described it as tonic for Finnish armed forces and entire Finnish nation and indicated that Western refusal permit modification would have serious depressing effect on them.
From remarks by Merikoski and Jakobson I have impression that Seppala made full and apparently to them depressing report and that report was essentially in agreement with summary contained Department’s telegram 355.3 In course conversation they expressed concern over length time it was taking Great Britain and its friends make up their minds about Finnish request and asked whether I could indicate any explanation of this circumstance which they found most puzzling.
I told them I had no instructions and did not know what ultimate decision on matter might be. After making certain they understood I was merely thinking out loud in effort help them, I expressed opinion that delay might be partly result of bad timing. I reminded them that between initial discussion, when President Kekkonen visited London in spring 1961, and this spring there had occurred the incidents that began with Soviet note of October 30 [and] included President’s trip to [Page 460] Novosibirsk. These incidents had demonstrated to world ability of Russians to shake up Finland and had not in eyes of free world strengthened Finnish position, but rather had made evident degree to which Soviets are able disturb normal Finnish life and developments. Although Soviets had not proceeded carry out what free world and Finns themselves admittedly had recognized as possible military threat to Finnish independence, this threat still hung over Finland. Although Finnish Government had apparently thought it necessary, probably in effort reassure Finnish people after shock of October 30, present Novosibirsk as success, it may be merely stay of execution in light these developments timing renewal their request unfortunate. Foreign Minister himself then remarked perhaps matter might have been more effectively pushed some months earlier or some months later.
Without endeavoring counter my opinion that Novosibirsk was not “success” it has been publicly represented as being, both Merikoski and Jakobson asserted that events following October 30 had made no difference in Finland’s policy or in its determination maintain its neutrality and independence. They invited comment and implied that Soviet note and Novosibirsk should have no influence on any decisions regarding Finnish rearmament. I replied that Soviet demonstration of ability shake Finnish nation was fact of foreign policy even though Finland’s friends might still be convinced of Finnish desire maintain independence and neutrality. They also asked whether I knew of any actions by their government that might indicate change in Finnish policy. I referred to open change in attitude toward forthcoming Communist Youth Festival indicated by statement by Prime Minister Miettunen (Embassy’s telegram 526).4 They contended that this change was minor matter that had nothing to do with Novosibirsk, but obviously did not find their own argument very convincing.
In course remarks regarding timing request treaty reinterpretation, Foreign Minister and Jakobson stated that one reason for pressing matter now was desire at time of budgetary difficulty take advantage available Soviet commercial credits that can also be used for weapons purchase. I remarked that British apparently had understanding that British missiles would also be purchased. They said that this understanding was correct.
Despite my frank remarks about October 30–Novosibirsk period, conversation was cordial and sympathetic in tone. Both Finnish officials (Jakobson later privately) reiterated thanks for frank expressions of opinion. They left impression that they themselves feel timing their case [Page 461] is unfortunate and understand difficulties involved in matter, but, that nonetheless they desperately desire decision in Finland’s favor for what they regard as vital political and psychological reasons.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5/6–462. Secret. Repeated to London.↩
- See Document 222.↩
- Telegram 578 from Helsinki, May 25, reported on Jakobson’s presentation of the Finnish position on the legality of its effort to obtain missiles. (Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5/5–2562)↩
- See the source note, Document 222.↩
- Telegram 526, April 12, reported on Gufler’s discussion with Karjalainen on the World Youth Festival. (Department of State, Central Files, 800.46/4–1262)↩