222. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Finland’s Interest in Acquiring Guided Missile Weapons
PARTICIPANTS
- Richard R. Seppala, Ambassador of Finland
- The Secretary
- Mr. Keld Christensen, Officer in Charge, Northern European Affairs, BNA
Ambassador Seppala opened the conversation by reading the text of a memorandum giving the considerations which prompted the Finnish Government to seek a reinterpretation of the Finnish Peace Treaty in order to acquire guided missile weapons (a copy of the memorandum is attached).1
Ambassador Seppala commented that Finland had available for military purchases a Soviet credit of some 12 billion Finnmarks, of which only a quarter, or 3 billion Finnmarks, would be used for the purchase of Soviet guided missiles. The Finns would, the Ambassador said, pay the full price, and the quantity of missiles acquired would accordingly be relatively small. The purchase of guided missiles from the USSR was initiated by the Finnish Defense Forces; the Soviets have not tried to sell such weapons to Finland and there has been no collaboration between the Finns and the Soviets in this matter. Missiles would, the Ambassador continued, also be purchased from the United Kingdom, provided funds were allocated in the next budget. The Ambassador [Page 457] said the entire matter was of the greatest importance in order for Finland to be able to defend its own frontiers and its neutrality. Without such weapons, he said, Finland would be a military vacuum in time of war, or during periods threatening wars; such vacuums were invariably filled. The Ambassador expressed the hope that the U.S. Government would take an understanding view of Finland’s desires and interests.
The Secretary asked what kind of missiles the Finns were interested in acquiring. Ambassador Seppala replied that it was his understanding that air defense missiles would be purchased from the Soviet Union, and anti-tank missiles from the United Kingdom. However, he repeated that the current budget did not have an allocation for the purchase of British missiles. The Ambassador then went on to explain the origin of the Soviet commercial credit, and the difficulties the Finns had encountered in making use of it.
The Secretary asked Ambassador Seppala at whom the Finns expected to shoot their missiles. Ambassador Seppala explained that it was important for Finland to be able to defend its neutrality so that, under existing treaty arrangements, the Soviets could not say that the Finns could not defend themselves. The Ambassador commented briefly on the 1948 Finnish Treaty with the Soviet Union.
The Secretary then asked if the Ambassador could explain why the Soviets were interested in selling the Finns guided missile weapons. The Ambassador replied that the Soviets had agreed to sell war materials to Finland, but that the Finns had taken the initiative to acquire guided missile weapons. However, it was difficult, he continued, to say what the Soviet motives were. The Ambassador reiterated that it was important for Finland to be able to say that it was able to defend itself and maintain its treaty obligations.
The Secretary said it was difficult to understand, and in his own mind he wondered, why the Soviets would be willing to sell such weapons to Finland unless they were convinced they would be shooting in only one direction. The Ambassador replied that, on behalf of Finland, he could say definitely that Finland would not shoot the weapons unless Finnish soil was molested. He alluded again to Finnish obligations under the 1948 Treaty.
The Secretary asked the Ambassador to comment on whether Finland was as independent and neutral today as at the time of President Kekkonen’s visit to the United States last October. The Secretary noted that the Soviet Union had made certain requests of Finland at that time. The Ambassador replied, “Yes, absolutely.” The Ambassador then went on to talk briefly about Finnish-Soviet trade balances, and Finland’s need to maintain a posture which was not unfriendly to the USSR. He [Page 458] said, with respect to the Helsinki World Youth Festival2 for example, the Finnish Government had been obliged to bend in the direction of Soviet interests; Finnish policy had not, however, changed.
The Secretary said that when the USSR presented its note to Finland last October the problem seemed to be a matter of great urgency and importance. Yet, after Finnish officials visited the Soviet Union, the public results seemed very meager. Why, the Secretary asked, had the Soviets been willing to settle for so little publicly when the matter had originally seemed so important? Ambassador Seppala replied that the Soviets had achieved their objectives of shaking up the Scandinavians in a matter which was related at the time to the Berlin situation. Finland was an area of maneuver for the Soviets. It is also well to remember, he said, that Finland is bound by treaty arrangements which place very narrow limits on Finnish policy. Kekkonen apparently persuaded Khrushchev to lift his demands on Finland. Admittedly, he said, the affair had helped re-elect Kekkonen President of Finland. It was difficult, he said, to understand Soviet motives.
The Secretary said the Finns were proposing to acquire sophisticated guided weapons from two sides. Such weapons contained highly classified information. As yet such classified information had not crossed the curtain. There was, therefore, the problem of technical security. In addition to this technical problem there was the political question of how all this related to the neutrality of Finland, and why the Soviets would agree unless they were persuaded the weapons would shoot in only one direction.
The Secretary said that we would give thought and study to the Finnish views, and indicated we were consulting with the British in the matter. He thought the revision of the Treaty was a matter of some substance, not only now, but also for the future. He said he had merely been asking questions and not giving any answers.