Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

220. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Athens⁰

Washington, May 2, 1962, 11:55 p.m.

Tosec 31. Ref: ed Secto 7 from London and Tosec 30.¹ British Embassy note April 16 states US views given careful consideration but HMG nevertheless favors agreeing to Finnish request. Following is summary of long note² which includes certain strategic-technical assertions:

UK agrees Soviet control early warning facilities which Finns now have or are acquiring would give Soviet Union certain advantages, but UK also notes that acquisition such radar facilities and fighter aircraft not prohibited by Peace Treaty. Question therefore is to what extent acquisition of surface to air missiles, which are prohibited, would enhance advantages to Russians and disadvantages to NATO. While any increased sophistication of Finnish air defense system must be viewed with concern, UK of opinion that effect of acquisition even in worst case would be comparatively small. Furthermore UK understands Finns plan purchase some missiles from UK, thus providing opportunities for establishment useful contacts between UK and Finnish military which should help counterbalance Soviet-Finnish contacts.

Regarding central political question of preservation Finnish independence, Finnish case is simply that effective defense of Finnish neutrality no longer possible without up to date defensive equipment. Peace Treaty was signed at earlier stage of technological development defensive weapons and includes provision for modifications. If matter came up in UN many other governments might take view it unreasonable for co-signatories refuse modification.

Not possible give definite reply to question whether Finland would ignore a British refusal to agree to reinterpretation or amendment of Peace Treaty. Finns might drop their proposals if British concurrence not given and HMG now understands this is their intention. Political consequences British refusal would be serious. Such decision would seem unreasonable, would lead to loss Finnish confidence in West, and would cause inevitable decline in morale Finnish armed forces. Finnish Govt might however disregard UK refusal particularly in event Soviet pressure for consultation under 1948 Fenno-Soviet Agreement coupled with pressure to integrate Finnish defense system with that of Soviet Union. In UK opinion it would be easier for Finland to reject such demand if Finnish defenses already included some modern equipment and if she retained some confidence in West which would be gravely impaired by British refusal her present request.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5611/5–262. Secret. Drafted by Christensen and approved by Burdett. Secretary Rusk was in Athens to attend the NATO Ministerial Meeting May 4–6.
1. In ed Secto 7, May 1, Rusk reported that Lord Home wanted to settle the issue of supplying missiles to Finland at the NATO meeting and requested a full briefing on the issue. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2104) Tosec 30 to Athens, May 2, summarized the Department note of March 10. For summary of the note, see Document 218.
2. The full text of the note is in Department of State, Central Files, 760E.5612/4–1662.