218. Circular Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom0
1548. Ref: Deptel 4659 to London.1 Comments from field re amendment Finnish Peace Treaty were most helpful. Our conclusions set forth in note handed British Embassy March 10 in reply its note March 22 supporting amendment Finnish Peace Treaty.
Summary follows:
Subject has undergone serious study within US Government and views of Defense Department and Joint Chiefs have been obtained on military aspects. Central question is whether Finland’s independence and freedom action will be enhanced or reduced by action taken on Finnish request acquire modern guided weapons system either through Treaty reinterpretation or amendment. Question also arises whether strategic position USSR will be advanced by readier Soviet access to Finnish early warning system and air defense capabilities. In Department’s view either tacit or formal acquiescence in Finnish request could very well weaken Finland’s position and offer USSR strategic advantages.
Finnish authorities both political and military assert that if Finland better armed it could be argued Article 2 of 1948 Fenno-Soviet Treaty need not be invoked since Finland would be capable taking care of its own defense and maintaining its neutrality. This viewpoint rests on two premises of dubious validity: first, Soviet motives for note October 30 were of purely military nature, and second that Finnish defenses could be strengthened to point of reassuring Soviets re their allegations of aggressive intent of West Germany and its allies.
There ample evidence that provision such highly sophisticated equipment as presently envisaged would require considerable assist-ance to Finnish military by Soviet technicians. Such system would not only be readily adaptable for joint use but also increase dependence of Finnish armed forces on USSR. Finns would accordingly be forced into closer military relationship with USSR with resulting opportunities for greater Soviet influence over Finnish armed forces.
Opportunities for development useful contacts between British and Finnish military not present to same extent in terms British equipment [Page 452] in which Finns have expressed firm interest. Radar to be purchased by Finns from United Kingdom together with modern air defense weapons from USSR would give Finland beginning of highly sophisticated air defense weapons system control of which would be tempting political and military objective to USSR. USSR would have opportunity extend its air defense system several hundred miles westward to detriment NATO. While Finnish military authorities would probably resist such Soviet endeavors Finnish political leadership would be determining factor. Events since October 30 do not provide grounds for confidence in willingness or ability present Finnish leadership withstand dangerous accommodations with USSR. No assurance modern air defense weapons on Finnish soil would not be used against West.
Possibility Finns may in any case purchase Soviet missiles in breach of Peace Treaty cannot be excluded. However such step in complete disregard views friendly Treaty signators would be drastic and would demonstrate that Finnish independence and national will had already become seriously compromised and weakened. This in itself would justify decision not proceed favorably on Finnish request.
Department therefore believes reinterpretation or revision Peace Treaty would not be in best interest of West and accordingly hopes UK will reexamine matter in light foregoing views.
Full text being pouched.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.611/3–1062. Secret. Drafted by Owen, cleared in draft by Burdett, and approved by Rewinkel. Repeated to Helsinki, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, Moscow, Paris Topol, and Ottawa.↩
- Telegram 4659, March 2, summarized a March 2 note from the British Embassy urging U.S. support for the sale of missiles to Finland. (Ibid., 660E.611/2–2762)↩
- Neither printed. (Ibid., 033.60E41/3–262 and 760E.5612/3–1062, respectively)↩