Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

216. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

Washington, February 24, 1962, 4 p.m.

1473. Deptel 280 to Helsinki rptd 4486 London, 1942 Moscow, 445 Stockhom.¹ According British Embassy HMG prepared to seek agreement in principle of Western cosignatories to formal amendment 1947 Finnish Peace Treaty and to early start in Finnish reequipment with defensive guided weapons in anticipation amendment of Treaty. British state that since Soviets have said they are willing to stretch Treaty provisions, Finns consider they would be open to pressure under 1948 Pact if they did not take steps to modernize their defenses. FonOff satisfied there is real urgency in meeting Finnish request. FonOff requests US views urgently.

In US view question of amendment Finnish Treaty would seem to affect entire NATO alliance and Sweden. Would Soviets permit Finns acquire non-Soviet guided missile air defense weapons? Weapons systems could be of such sophistication as to require intimate and close relations between Finnish and Soviet military technicians and authorities. Would Soviet control of Finnish air defense system, or joint use of facilities (which cannot be ruled out) be of serious disadvantage to West? What effect would this have on Swedish military posture? Modern air defense system in Finland could be military asset of value to USSR and tempting political objective. It could be argued, particularly in light of Kekkonen’s expressions of “understanding” of Soviet worries over rearmed Finns that Finnish request constitutes tacit recognition that threat from FRG and her allies exists.

We are apprehensive that overall effect amendment of treaty might be to facilitate military satellization of Finland by Soviets.

We would hope FonOff would give long and careful thought to Finnish request and consider whether subject should be discussed in NAC.

London should inform FonOff that we have reservations proposed course of action as indicated above and wish clarification several obscurities before definitive reply can be made. We are studying matter urgently and desire information on following:

1. Reasons for urgency. Difficult to see why FonOff believes necessary make decisions quickly on matter such importance not only to British and ourselves but also to our NATO allies and Sweden. Understand Finnish negotiations with Soviets for arms still continuing; Finnish interest in urgent decision may suggest intent immediately to acquire Soviet guided missile weapons system.

2. Basis for assertion that USSR willing to stretch provisions of Treaty. Has FonOff learned this only from Finns or directly from Soviets?

3. Procedures for amendment of Treaty. Article 22 of Treaty states that military provisions may be modified by agreement between Allied and Associated Powers (US is not signatory) and Finland or by Agreement between UN Security Council and Finland.

4. What would be reaction NATO members, especially Germany and also Sweden?

5. Are Finns relating amendment of treaty and purchase of British equipment, e.g. frigate.

6. Would UK envisage supplying sophisticated weapons, involving security classification?

7. Would UK plan tie-in sale of missiles to sale of other equipment such as radar?

Request views all addressees.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.611/2–2462. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and Christensen and cleared by BNA, RA, Kitchen, and the Department of Defense. Repeated to Helsinki, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Moscow, Paris Topol, Ottawa, and Reykjavik.
1. See footnote 1, Document 215.