215. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State0
449. Re Deptel 280.1 Agree with reasoning of British Ambassador Helsinki. Finnish military is firmly anti-Communist in sentiment. It needs modern arms to make it even defensively effective and to maintain its self-confidence.
Do not agree with British Ambassador Moscow. Evidence indicates initiative for reinterpretation of treaty arms limitations came from Finns. Finns have long been anxious secure modification arms limitations in order build military establishment which they could convincingly assert has capacity prevent use Finnish territory against USSR without need of Soviet aid envisioned by Finno-Soviet mutual assist-ance treaty. Finns have regarded Soviets as principal obstacle to modification arms limitations and have several times sounded them out on matter. First Soviet resort to mutual assistance treaty in October 30 note increased Finns anxiety and, we believe, shocked them into approaching Soviets again on revision of limitations.
Do not agree Finnish arms build-up would tend suggest Finnish concurrence in Soviet thesis USSR threatened by West Germany via Finland. Finnish effort to clear way for build-up preceded development Soviet thesis. Finland seeking status like that of neutral Sweden which continually developing modern armed force without it being suggested they doing so because of West German threat.
Possible Soviet pressure for incorporation of Finnish and Soviet early warning systems unrelated to modification arms limitations, since early warning systems not covered by peace treaty.
Hope British will permit guided missiles to which Soviets have given consent, but believe it in Finns own interest to approach all treaty signatories to secure proper legal waiver of limitations as British desire President (Embtel 441).2 Formal amendment of treaty would help bind Soviets and thus place obstacle in their way should they later desire reverse position or engage in wider reinterpretation feared by British Ambassador Moscow. It would also help establish precedent for [Page 448] consultation with UK and other signatories if Finland desires further modifications.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/2–2462. Secret. Repeated to London, Stockholm, and Moscow.↩
- Telegram 280 to Helsinki, February 21, reported on discussions with the British Embassy in which the British representatives explained their rationale for reinterpretation of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty with Finland. (Ibid., 660E.611/2–2162)↩
- Document 214.↩