Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

148. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, January 10, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Relations with Yugoslavia

Mr. Secretary:

1. I have given careful thought to the discussion we had yesterday evening,¹ and especially to the suggestion that the m.f.n. matter might be allowed to lie over until after Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade. I should like to make my position on this clear.

2. I consider that the m.f.n. issue should not be linked in any way to the ups and downs of Yugoslav policy and of Tito’s statements. The denial of m.f.n. to Yugoslavia was a senseless, destructive action. It was justified neither by the circumstances of the moment at which it was decided by Congress, nor by the circumstances of the present moment. It poisons our entire relationship with the Yugoslavs; no effective constructive action can be taken by either side so long as this restriction remains on the books. It is up to us to get it removed at the earliest possible moment. I hope that the President will see fit to make it known publicly in the very near future that he is asking the Congress to remove it, and I urge that he do so. In so doing, he should make it clear that this has nothing to do with Yugoslav actions or statements of the moment; that the denial of m.f.n. was itself not in the national interest; and that he cannot take responsibility for handling effectively our relations with this country, which plays so crucial a role in relationships within the communist bloc, unless he can have free hand to guide our economic policy in essential respects as the situation may require. He should emphasize that it is essential to him to have this freedom not just in the present situation but in any conceivable situation.

3. Should the President be disinclined to ask at this time for the removal of the m.f.n. restriction, then I should like it understood that I am firmly opposed to our undertaking any active diplomatic steps vis-à-vis the Yugoslavs—both now and so long as this situation prevails. This applies to the effort to put pressure on Tito recommended in my recent telegrams. It applies to any other variants of the idea of attempting to communicate with the Yugoslavs in the coming period concerning the state of our mutual relations. So long as the President has not called, clearly and publicly, for a removal of the m.f.n. restriction, any initiative of this sort would be bound to be misunderstood. It would also be quite inappropriate, in this case, to attempt to implement the ideas of the long airgram I submitted at the beginning of December.

4. This is a very late and crucial moment in our relations with the Yugoslavs. If no initiative is taken by us in the m.f.n. matter, we must expect early retaliatory action by the Yugoslavs, which will inflame tempers here and will probably cause the situation to become wholly out of hand. I should not expect, in this case, for example, to see our USIS libraries last the winter; and I am sure this would not be the only means found to harass us.

5. Should the President at this time make the request for removal of m.f.n., and in such way that it would be clear to the Yugoslav leaders that he is doing all in his power to achieve the elimination of this restriction, then I continue to favor the use of whatever other cards we have in our hands with a view to putting pressure on Tito and embarrassing him in his effort to lead his country along an anti-Western, anti-liberal, and exclusively pro-Soviet course. But I do not consider that the decision whether or not the President should take this action, or when, should be permitted to become a matter of discussion, or bargaining, with the Yugoslavs. We made the mistake, it is up to us to correct it.

6. I can see no more suitable way for the President to ask for the removal of the m.f.n. restriction than in the State of the Union message. Should he wish to broaden this into a request for authority to dispose of his own discretion over m.f.n. matters in the case of all bloc countries, avoiding a specific mention of Yugoslavia, I would consider this wholly justifiable from standpoint of the national interest, and no less acceptable from the standpoint of our relations with Yugoslavia.²

George F. Kennan

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.68/1–1063. Confidential. Drafted by Kennan who was in the United States for consultations.
1. No record of this conversation has been found. According to a memorandum by Vedeler, January 10, this memorandum by Kennan was a result of Kennan’s meeting with Rusk “in which the question of postponement of MFN action until after Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade was raised by the Secretary.” (Memorandum by Vedeler, January 10; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Yugoslavia)
2. A memorandum attached to the source text from Swank to Tyler noted: “As you know, the Secretary saw Ambassador Kennan Wednesday evening, and we think it likely that the subject of the attached memorandum was discussed by them. Since the recommendation in paragraph 6 is now overtaken, we are returning the memorandum to you in the thought that you may wish to raise with the Secretary in another manner any unresolved points concerning our future course of action with respect to the MFN issue.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.68/1–1063)