Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia⁰

Washington, January 4, 1963, 6:06 p.m.

575. Embtels 841, 844, 847.¹ Following conclusions represent consensus Dept and Intelligence community re present state of Yugoslav-Soviet relations in light recent developments surrounding Tito’s visit to USSR:

1) Yugoslavs are not prepared to surrender any part of their sovereignty or independence on bloc’s behalf;

2) Yugoslavia still considers itself member nonaligned group, and does not seem to be preparing to drop its policy of opposing all blocs;

3) Tito’s remarks on “decadence” in art, irresponsibility certain intellectuals, and necessity to expand “socialist agriculture” at expense private sector are not sufficiently clear or different from similar past statements to justify definite conclusion that an appreciable hardening of UCY line in internal affairs is in offing;

4) Increasing sharpness of Sino-Soviet dispute is a major factor in improvement Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

Soviet-Yugoslav ideological conflict has not been resolved. Measured against backdrop acute Sino-Soviet dispute, it appears to have been reduced to secondary importance in the interests of common anti-Chinese attitude. Such compromise likely to last as long as both sides find it convenient. In contrast to 1956, no agreement on inter-Party affairs announced, nor has there been any claim to agreement beyond field of general foreign policy where Yugoslavs previously admitted substantial identity or similarity of views with USSR. Neither Khrushchev nor Tito have made any effort to conceal existence of differences although in larger interest common anti-Chinese stance, both seemed to have agreed it serves interest both countries not to make these differences obstacles to increased cooperation. Contrary to Yugoslav hopes, neither Soviet credits nor associate status CEMA obtained; however, these subjects may still be under discussion by economic delegation apparently still in Moscow. In our analysis, from information gathered here from Intelligence and other sources, we see no clear-cut indication at this time that Tito–Khrushchev discussions have deflected Yugoslavia from its now long-established internal and foreign policies. Belgrade still appears to have high aspirations to a prominent role among non-aligned nations, and does not appear to have altered its hitherto staunch determination to preserve its independence and to refuse subordinate Yugoslav national interests to foreign alliances or other demands.

We tend to view Tito’s recent statements and actions within broader framework Sino-Soviet dispute. We believe that, for the time being at least, Soviet and Yugoslav leaders find their state interests better served by common anti-Chinese attitude. There seems little doubt that Soviet-Yugoslav relations have improved measurably, but this appears to have been largely at Soviet initiative. Khrushchev’s apparent acceptance Titoist theory all countries free to find own road to socialism represents important concession and one which could cause Moscow serious future trouble. Tito’s visit has undoubtedly accelerated already existing trend toward closer relations with the Communist states of Eastern Europe, including USSR. Warmth of Soviet reception, Tito’s inordinate ego, and his well-known desire for vindication among Eastern European bloc countries and communist parties elsewhere have led him to be more expansive and more imprecise in his public utterances than usual. Tito’s past bitter experiences with the Soviets, Yugoslav difficulties in 1955–1956 and again in 1957 in reaching accommodation with bloc raise possibility present warmer Soviet-Yugoslav relationship may not endure indefinitely.

We do not take too seriously Tito’s sputtering attacks on internal obstructions and recalcitrance. He has made similar threats on almost every important public occasion past decade and without visible after-effects. His recent remarks on this score did not depart substantially from lines of action proposed in Split last May and reiterated at UCY plenum in July.

We look forward to discussing this subject with you more in detail during your consultation period here next week.²

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 768.11/1–363. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Mudd; cleared in RSB, P, and SOV; and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Moscow.
1. Telegram 847 is printed as Document 144. Regarding telegrams 841 and 844, see footnote 2 thereto.
2. In telegram 864, January 5, Kennan responded that while his actions would be guided by the Department’s views, he continued to doubt the wisdom of the policy line. (Department of State, Central Files, 768.11/1–563)