Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

94. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, August 13, 1962, 10:32 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • GER—Martin J. Hillenbrand
  • SOV—W.O. Anderson
• USSR
  • Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
  • Counselor Georgi M. Kornienko

The Ambassador opened the conversation by stating that he had been instructed to convey to the Secretary the considered views of his government on the Secretary’s proposal that there be a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference to discuss the Berlin problem. Although he frequently referred to a Russian language text, he stipulated that the approach was “oral” in nature. He outlined the following position.

As the Secretary already is aware, the Soviet Government is prepared, as previously, to explore with the other interested governments all possibilities for settling the problems of West Berlin and Germany. However, the Soviet Government cannot agree to the proposal for a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference since it would give the appearance of negotiations which, in fact, would have no real chance of success. In fact, there has been no progress on resolving the key issue of withdrawing Western forces from West Berlin and terminating the occupation regime there; a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference is likely to delay settlement. Secretary Rusk himself at Geneva had commented to Foreign Minister Gromyko that he could not envisage what a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference would discuss. The desirability of ending the international arms race and easing tensions among states demands “drawing a line under World War II” and liquidating the occupation regime in West Berlin. For its part, the Soviet Government has earnestly sought to resolve the problem of West Berlin. Premier Khrushchev himself has made a number of compromise proposals: e.g., the recent one that certain UN forces be introduced into West Berlin. Unfortunately, the U.S. Government has shown no real interest in settling the West Berlin problem. The Soviet Government feels that “the American position” would put the Soviet Government in a position of settling the West Berlin problem in the absence of “our allies” who participated in World War II against Nazi Germany. This faces the USSR with the necessity to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. The Soviet Government feels it cannot remain inactive on the West Berlin problem because those who oppose an improvement in the international climate have been taking advantage of the absence of an agreement, as witness recent developments in West Berlin.

The Secretary stated that, first, he would like to correct an apparent misunderstanding. When discussing the possibility of a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva with Foreign Minister Gromyko, he did not state that he did not know what such a Conference would discuss. On the contrary, he had discussed this subject with specific reference to the statement of General Principles previously given to the Foreign Minister and had pointed out to the Foreign Minister that the General Principles indicated the line along which the U.S. thought Conference discussion might go. However, Soviet views thereon were desired and requested. The Secretary then expressed a hope that the Soviet Government will give further thought to steps which the four Commandants in Berlin might take to alleviate local tension. In this context, the Secretary alluded to recent press reports of incidents along the Berlin wall occasioned by strong emotions accompanying the anniversary of the building of the wall. Ambassador Dobrynin commented that the views of his Government on the situation in West Berlin along the wall were conveyed in his Government’s most recent note¹ and he had seen nothing but brief press reports of subsequent developments.

After referring briefly in a commendatory vein to the progress of the Soviet Union’s two men in space, the Secretary reverted to the subject of Berlin and said that he regretted the Soviet government had not reacted favorably to the proposal for a Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference. The proposal was not intended to be a means to delay agreement but was advanced in a sincere belief that, if acted upon, it would constitute a positive step. He assured the Ambassador that the Soviet Government’s views, as conveyed by the Ambassador, would be given careful study.

Note: Subsequent to the conversation reported above, Mr. Anderson obtained from Counselor Kornienko, on a personal and informal basis, a copy of the Russian language text from which Ambassador Dobrynin had read during his interview with the Secretary. An informal translation of the Russian text is attached.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8–1362. Secret; Limited Distribution; Eyes Only. Drafted by Anderson. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)
1. For text of the August 10 Soviet note, which protested new provocations in West Berlin against the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, see Department of State Bulletin, August 27, 1962, p. 320; for a response by the Department of State on the following day, see ibid., pp. 319–320.
2. Not printed.