Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

80. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, July 20, 1962.

SUBJECT

• NATO Contingency Planning for Berlin (BERCON/MARCON Plans) and the Conceptual Framework of Poodle Blanket

During yesterday’s discussions of Berlin contingency planning (BERCON/MARCON Plans), General Gray (JCS) made a statement to the effect that the State Department considered it necessary to have a pause—about 60 days—before the West would respond militarily to Soviet interference with Western access to Berlin. Unfortunately, General Gray did not make clear the context in which he was speaking, nor did he define precisely what he meant by the pause or the reasons for it.

The fact is that the period between Soviet/GDR blockage of access to Berlin and the outbreak of hostilities—Phase II in the conceptual framework spelled out in NSAM 109 (“Poodle Blanket”)¹—is not a pause at all. It is a time during which most intensive diplomatic efforts—backstopped by appropriate military and economic measures—will be made to avoid the outbreak of hostilities and reach a political rather than a military solution to the Berlin problem. It is the period during which the West will bring into play a progressive series of moves, designed to impress the Kremlin with its determination to protect its position, but yet providing the Soviet leadership with the opportunity to modify its behavior in time to avert a clash beyond the level of no return. This may take 60 days; it may take several months. At this juncture it is clearly impossible to estimate the period with any kind of precision. However, the consensus is that unless the Soviets either by miscalculation or deliberate decision resort to force to impose their solution on Berlin, the odds are in favor of a longer rather than a shorter Phase II. And as Secretary McNamara indicated, there is no difference of view on this score between the Departments of State and Defense.

“Poodle Blanket”, you will remember, divides Berlin planning into four phases:

(a) Phase I—the period in which there is Soviet and GDR interference with access to Berlin, but this interference falls short of definitive blockage;

(b) Phase II—when there is significant blockage of one or more means of access to Berlin and the Allies take a variety of noncombatant measures to protect their vital interests—the basic right of access to and the Western presence in Berlin;

(c) Phase III—the beginning of non-nuclear military action to deal with the problem; and

(d) Phase IV—the onset of nuclear military action.

In essence, then, Phases I and II are noncombatant, while Phases III and IV are combatant periods, so that the critical point in the Allied effort to end Soviet/GDR interference with the exercise of basic Allied rights in Berlin is just prior to Phase III.

The underlying assumption in all this is that the Soviets, as we, wish to avoid general war. This of course will not stop the Soviets from pressing on for their objectives in Berlin. Nor does it mean that we will not have to face up to periodic increase in tensions, with varying degrees of heat. But unless there is a radical shift in Soviet policy, or miscalculation by the Soviet leadership, the critical point in the Berlin exercise will be reached just short of Phase III.

For all practical purposes, we are now in Phase I. Intermittently, since the end of the 1948–1949 blockade, both German and Allied access, in the air and on the ground, have been subjected to Communist harassment of one sort or other. Over the years, however, we and the Soviets have found methods for dealing with these harassments sometimes by facing each other down as during the air corridor harassments of last spring; more often by patient and protracted negotiations, such as the efforts which finally produced the existing Autobahn identification procedures.

The Soviet tacticians at some time may consider it necessary for the Kremlin to strike a more threatening and aggressive pose in Berlin and interrupt Allied and/or German traffic to Berlin, all or in part. This in effect is Phase II. And present planning for this Phase envisages intensified diplomatic efforts and maneuvers, backstopped by a NATO military build-up and the imposition of economic countermeasures ranging from limited restrictions up to and including a total embargo on trade with the Soviet Union and its Satellites.

The most difficult and critical problem in the exercise is communicating our position and intentions to the Soviet leadership to induce, persuade, or compel it to agree or acquiesce, and to provide it with the means to do either gracefully.

By the same token, the Soviet response to our move will be determined largely by what they believe our purposes to be, our ability to achieve these purposes, and our resolve and capability to assume the risks in raising the threshhold. This in fact is the rationale for the graduated increases in commitments of force—to demonstrate clearly our readiness to assume the necessary risks of war.

This brings us back to the time requirement affecting the duration of Phase II. Time is needed for the NATO military build-up—which is intended to bring pressure to bear on the Soviets as well as prepare NATO for a possible Phase III. The build-up itself is likely to have a deterrent effect, and time is needed to measure its impact on Kremlin thinking. And clearly, as tension mounts or the possibility of war increases, both we and the Soviets will be under increasing pressures from all sides to attempt to find a peaceful solution to the problem. This will take a variety of forms, including possibly a UN involvement, and can go on for some time. At this juncture, two months would appear to be a most conservative estimate. The probability is that this exercise will be of much longer duration. Phase II is really intended to induce the Soviets to agree to an acceptable modus vivendi; it is not merely preparation time for Phase III when the NATO contingency plans—the BERCON/MARCON Plans—came into play, although this is always a possible eventuality.

What is involved then is not a 60-day pause before active military operations are undertaken, but rather a period in which major efforts will be made backed by all possible means to achieve a political solution to the Berlin problem. And as long as both sides seek to avoid a military solution, Phase II need not be accelerated. Moreover, in so far as Berlin itself is concerned, we can cope with an extended Phase II for the stockpile and airlift capacities give us a cushion which permits us to withstand substantial Soviet pressure.

McG. Bundy

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. The source text bears the handwritten note: “Taken from Pres Week-end reading dtd 7/20/62.”
1. See footnote 2, Document 79.