74. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk0
The Soviet communication received at the White House on July fifth1 does not, in the slightest degree, represent any shift in the Soviet basic position. It merely provides a new formula to achieve the same result; namely, the total withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin. It provides that this should be done during a period of four years but in the first year, the Western troops, which will constitute only half of the total contingent, would, in effect, be UN forces and, specifically stated, would not be under the command of the United States, United Kingdom, or France. The other fifty percent would also be UN forces but made up of contingents from the smaller NATO powers and Warsaw Pact powers. These troops would be progressively reduced by twenty-five percent a year, so that at the end of four years, there would be no forces at all in Berlin. The paper makes no advance on the subject of access, and refers, in regard to the all-German questions, to all of the points the Soviet Union would like to see accepted.
[Page 213]Since the Soviet document offers no advance from our point of view and is obviously completely unacceptable to us, and certainly to our Allies, the most important question concerning it is what does it mean from the point of view of future Soviet action? Since, in itself, it does not provide any specific clue on this point, it could quite well be the last Soviet attempt to reach some form of agreement before proceeding with the signature of a separate peace treaty. It could equally well be a means of just heightening the pressure on us in connection with the negotiations. It is fairly certain that the Soviets do not expect any Allied acceptance of this proposal and, therefore, it is either a move for the record to clear the way for a signature of a separate peace treaty—which still leaves very much open the question of the effect of any such treaty on the Western rights and obligations in regard in Berlin—or, as indicated earlier, it is merely a further pressure move on their part.
This document is not addressed, officially, to the President, and may, indeed, have been sent to the Attorney General. The question, therefore, arises as to how best to handle its receipt. Since the manner of its delivery is informal, and to some extent unofficial, I would question whether or not we would wish to discuss it with our Allies. To do so would be to depart from the confidential nature of these communications and it would almost certainly leak during the process. The only difficulty with not making our Allies privy to its contents is that it conceivably might be a prelude to moves towards the signature of a peace treaty. I think the manner of a reply, if any, and whether or not to inform our Allies should be given most careful consideration, and I certainly would not feel under any compulsion to get off any quick answer.
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret. A copy was sent to Kohler.↩
- Document 73.↩