72. Memorandum of Conversation Between the President’s Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)0
[Here follows discussion of China.]
Another discussion took place in regard to Berlin. I said I was gaining the impression that Mr. Khrushchev was digging himself in deeper on the removal of United States troops in Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev must know how important a factor this was in our position and the position of all the Allies. To keep emphasizing this point was endangering a real settlement on Berlin which could be part of a package which might include a number of points of real advantage in the relief of tensions.
If Mr. Khrushchev wanted to diminish the prestige of the United States by demanding the withdrawal of United States troops and the insertion of other troops in West Berlin with no penetration of East Berlin by any foreign troops we would not be getting anywhere according to my view. This is not the time to crystallize positions on this important issue. Mr. Dobrynin must remember we did not throw the challenge to Mr. Khrushchev on Berlin. He did, and he heated it up so much we felt impelled to build up our military position. This annoyed Mr. Khrushchev very much and he stepped up his armament and all this leads us nowhere. There is a real opportunity to work out a solution on Berlin which may not suit Ulbricht but which would relieve tensions but they can’t be relieved if Mr. Khrushchev is really trying to get us to back down in Berlin which we will not do. I said this was a matter on which I certainly felt very deeply and I felt the American people did. There was, in my judgment, real danger of war over Berlin if it were not handled temperately and there should never be an effort to force the issue. It carried a terrible danger everytime it was attempted. Mr. Dobrynin said he knew this was a sensitive element in our position over Berlin but he did not see why it was that we objected to neutral occupation of West Berlin. The United Nations could do this as it had in the case of the Suez, for example. The danger in Berlin was the confrontation of our two forces. It was the only place in the world where this was so. The necessity was to remove this danger. The fact that Berlin was surrounded by East Germany did not mean that they would ever be disposed to attempt to overrun the United Nations forces in Berlin. They could never agree to any presence of foreign troops in East Berlin because such a repudiation of the Communist regime by the Soviet Union makes it impracticable.
[Page 207]Then, I said, leave the situation as it is with no further attempts to maneuver us out of position. It was not “intolerable.” It was not challenging; people could very well get on in Berlin if it were not for the new challenge. It was, of course, annoying to Ulbricht but who was Ulbricht to allow him to play with fire. If Ulbricht could be gotten rid of, I had the idea the whole situation would be improved greatly.
The West Germans would be much more forthcoming in regard to East Germany, etc. He suggested we get rid of Adenauer. I said this might be possible if we had controlled the elections in West Germany as they did in East Germany.
I referred to the Wall as a terrible acknowledgment of weakness. This symbol of war and concentration camps was sinister, out of place and a dreadful admission of weakness in that people had to be locked in their own home country to keep them there.
He said that it was only natural to erect such a Wall—there were barriers at every border crossing. I said I knew of only one such penitentiary wall on any boundary. He said a number of people in the United States Government had indicated to him that the Wall was a welcome stabilizing factor.
I said I did not agree. It was just too unnatural and sinister. It induced violence and hatred. It should be disposed of soon.
[Here follows discussion of disarmament.]