Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

7. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SecDel/MC/56

Geneva, March 11, 1962, 7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Berlin and Germany

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Bohlen
  • Mr. Kohler
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Mr. Foster
  • Ambassador Dean
  • Mr. Akalovsky
• USSR
  • Mr. Gromyko
  • Mr. Zorin
  • Mr. Semenov
  • Mr. Tsarapkin
  • Mr. Grizlov
  • Mr. Usachev
  • Mr. Soukhodrev
• UK
  • Lord Home
  • Mr. Godber
  • Sir Michael Wright
  • Sir Frank Roberts
  • Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
  • Mr. Samuel

The Secretary, Lord Home, and Mr. Gromyko had a conversation among themselves after dinner.

The Secretary raised the question of the very serious harassments by the USSR during the past several weeks of air and ground access to Berlin. He recalled the USSR’s attempts to reserve time in the air corridors for its own flights, which attempts had been rejected by the West. He noted that since then the USSR had employed other methods of harassment, such as saturation of corridors contrary to past practice and to the need revealed to the Western Powers, filing of flight plans in direct opposition to Western flight plans, jamming of air frequencies used by the West to ensure air safety and, finally, three days ago, the dropping by Soviet bombers, which had come from the Soviet Union, of chaff in the corridors to jam Western radar installations. He also noted that the Soviets had now filed plans for flights on March 12th at altitudes from 7,500 to 10,000 feet at the exact times when Western civil airlines flew to Berlin. The Secretary stressed that such harassments were not tolerable and could lead to serious consequences. He emphasized that the U.S. would take all the steps necessary to ensure safety for air access to Berlin. He expressed the hope that Mr. Gromyko would get in touch with his Government so that danger may be avoided, but stressed that the US would not shrink from such danger.

Lord Home pointed out that the Soviet bombers which had dropped metal filings in the corridors had come from a long distance. He strongly emphasized that the Soviet chaffing activity was totally inappropriate since it was something that one would not do to a friend but only to an enemy. If a Western plane had crashed it would have been the same as if it had been shot down, and up to 100 lives would have been lost. He said that he had nearly turned his aircraft back to London after having heard of this action by the Soviet Union, noting that he was not sure that he would not do it even now. He observed that these actions by the Soviet Union were in contradiction to the USSR’s claim that it wishes to relieve tensions. He recalled his warning to Mr. Gromyko in New York that harassment of access may lead to war and urged that it be stopped so as to avoid catastrophic consequences. He pointed out that the chances for agreement in Geneva on much bigger things would be jeopardized should the Soviet harassment activity continue.

The Secretary observed that we knew the identity, the origin, and the destination of the bombers involved, as well as their flight patterns, and said that chaff had been dropped precisely in the corridor. He pointed out that this activity could not have been the result of maneuvers outside the corridor.

Mr. Gromyko said that as far the question of corridors was concerned the Soviet Union had replied to the West in its note.¹ The Soviet Union disagreed with the Western statements that Soviet planes were flying through the air lanes (he avoided the term “corridor”) in violation of the existing agreements and past practice. The Soviet Union could not recognize the West as arbiter in interpreting the existing situation. He claimed that the US assessment of the situation was apparently based on incorrect conclusions by some of its experts. In preparing its note, the USSR had studied the situation, including the existing agreements and past practices, and had based its reply on that study. If the United States intended to take steps to ensure its interests, that was its own business, but the USSR would also take steps to ensure its own interests, as well as those of the GDR, and would not yield them. Therefore, one must appraise the situation more calmly, taking into account the best interests of all concerned. Mr. Gromyko asserted that the USSR did not wish to heighten tensions in connection with Berlin and Germany, as well as Europe in general. He professed that the USSR desired an international detente, as he had stated to the Secretary in New York and to the President in Washington. It would be best if an agreed solution to all these problems could be reached. He alleged that the Secretary and Lord Home were attempting to dramatize the situation by referring to some unidentified bombers which had dropped chaff, and said that the reports about these activities, which he had read in the Western press, were a strictly Western responsibility. Mr. Gromyko rejected Lord Home’s warning, saying the latter should weigh his words and keep such language to himself. He asserted that what should be done here was to find a way of easing the situation and to promote the solution of questions of interest to all concerned, rather than to give warnings.

The Secretary suggested that Mr. Gromyko inquire with his Defense Ministry so as to see that the bombers involved had indeed come from the USSR, dropped chaff, and returned back to the Soviet Union. The Secretary then referred to Mr. Khrushchev’s assertions that the USSR wished to ease tensions. He said that this was one voice of the USSR. The other voice of the USSR was what was happening in Berlin. The problem was to find out which was the authentic voice of the USSR, since the two did not speak the same language.

Mr. Gromyko interjected that there was no point in using such enigmatic language and asserted that the USSR spoke with only one voice.

The Secretary said that then we must weigh the voice we always considered to be authentic, but that we must also weigh the events in the corridors.

Mr. Gromyko reiterated that the USSR did not believe that it was violating the existing agreements with regard to the air lanes. Thus there was no such contradiction as the Secretary was referring to. He also reiterated that the USSR would not yield and would continue to protect its interests in the air lanes, as well as the interests of the GDR, which was an ally of the Soviet Union. He asserted again that the USSR was still seeking agreement on these questions and that it had not changed its view that these problems should be resolved on the basis of an understanding with the West. Otherwise, there would have been no talks with Ambassador Thompson in Moscow and no meeting here in Geneva. The USSR was prepared to talk here in Geneva about these matters but it did not see any contradiction between its statements regarding its desire for a detente and its activities in the air lanes or, to use Western language, air corridors. He then wondered where the true voice of the United States was.

The Secretary noted the lateness of the hour but said he wished to make only two comments. First, it was a simple and fundamental principle that any rights the USSR had in East Germany or Berlin rested only on one basis, which was also the basis of Western presence in West Berlin and of access to that city, namely, the surrender of Nazi Germany; therefore, the Soviet Union was in no position to infringe upon the rights of the Western Powers in Berlin or East Germany. All this was so simple and fundamental that sometimes it was even difficult to understand. Secondly, Mr. Gromyko would be well advised to get in touch with his Government and stop such actions as would necessarily interfere with the settlement of the problems to be discussed here in Geneva. The Secretary then observed that in the following days he would inevitably listen with two ears; one to Mr. Gromyko, and one to what happened in Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko replied that he would be listening with both ears to the Secretary as well as to what the West did in Berlin. If the US intended to complicate the situation in the air lanes, then the United States, and perhaps other governments, would have to bear full responsibility for that.

The Secretary inquired, in a jocular manner, whether Mr. Gromyko was going to telephone the Soviet Commandant in Berlin and have him change the Soviet flight plans.

Mr. Gromyko responded that the Secretary should not prompt him as to how he should conduct his affairs.

Lord Home remarked that if Mr. Gromyko telephoned his Defense Minister he would find out about the chaffing operation.

The conversation ended with Mr. Gromyko again denying any knowledge of such operation.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–362. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on July 9. The meeting was held at the Hotel Richmond. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 11 from Geneva, March 12. (Ibid., 700.5611/3–1262)
1. For texts of the February 15 Western note and the February 17 Soviet reply, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 687–689.