Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

61. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, June 5, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Proposed Directive for Meeting Harassment of Allied Autobahn Convoys

There are at present no explicitly stated US or tripartite rules to determine the conduct of convoys which are held up by the Soviets or East Germans on the autobahn except under the specific conditions envisaged in the Live Oak plans. General Norstad has believed that he has had sufficient authority in his capacity as commander of US Forces in Europe to order some employment by US convoys of forceful means (short of use of weapons except in self-defense). We considered it desirable, however, to make the rules explicit so that they could be reviewed in Washington and could be adopted by the UK and France. In response to requests for a plan embodying such rules, therefore, General Norstad prepared a directive which he at first submitted to the US alone. Now, in slightly modified form which takes into account the comments Embassy Bonn and our Mission in Berlin made concerning the first draft, he has submitted it to the US, UK, France and Germany through Live Oak. He has asked for consideration of all four governments on an urgent basis. A copy of this second draft is enclosed (SHLO 5–00288).¹

In essence the proposed directive would authorize the following actions by an Allied convoy:

1) If the convoy is denied passage by administrative resistance (e.g., refusal to clear it through a Soviet checkpoint), by undefended or passive obstacles which can be removed by means integral to the convoy (pioneer tools, unarmed personnel) or by a small group of troops bodily blocking the way, the convoy commander after a series of protests and warnings will proceed forward.

2) If initially, or after first proceeding as in paragraph 1 above, the convoy encounters defended obstacles or obstacles which cannot be removed or crossed with means integral to the convoy, if the troops blocking the way do not move aside, or if sizeable troop units are encountered disposed for defense, the convoy commander after a series of protests and demands for passage, will withdraw when ordered to do so by the Berlin Commandant concerned. During this operation the convoy will fire only in self-defense and only if fired upon. Follow-up action to withdrawal is provided in some detail.

A vital aspect of this plan is that it spells out the limitations on the degree of force a convoy will be authorized to use in these circumstances. However, the course of action envisaged should not be considered as leading to use of force in all or most cases. Actually, we are dealing with Soviet efforts to harass, not block, Allied access. Our threat and evident willingness to proceed in the face of this harassment can be expected to demonstrate to the Soviets that harassment will if persisted in bring upon them the full consequences of blockage, which we do not believe they are at this time willing to incur. A plan for following up our threat is necessary, but only for the unlikely event the Soviets either do not believe it or are willing to go farther than harassment.

I consider that, if you approve the proposed course of action, it should be adopted for US use pending tripartite approval. If the British and French will not adopt it, but have no objection to our doing so, we should retain it. We have the greatest number of convoys and hence have greater need for such a plan. However, we should reconsider the plan in the face of British or French objections of such a nature that their cooperation, following US failure to obtain access with the plan, would be doubtful. Lack of Allied support at that stage would leave the US in the difficult position of having failed in a forceful and public test of will, but without suitable measures to press the matter further. We should make very effort to avoid significant weakening of the plan in such reconsideration, however.

It should be noted in this regard that there has been scheduled for June 9 a US convoy movement which, given its character and the recent pattern of Soviet harassment, may be held up at the checkpoint. Even if US consideration of the plan is completed by that time, tripartite study will likely still be in progress. As pointed out in the first paragraph above, however, General Norstad considers he has sufficient authority to order action along the lines of the plan even if formal approval has not been given to it by that time. If prior to June 9 it is evident that the British or French object so strongly to the proposed directive that unilateral use of this course of action by the US would jeopardize their future cooperation, we should consider whether General Norstad should be instructed not to authorize action along those lines while the problem is being reexamined.

I recommend that you approve the course of action proposed by General Norstad, together with the above considerations concerning its unilateral adoption by the US. This recommendation has the concurrence of the JCS and Defense.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.54/6–562. Secret. Drafted by Day on June 4 and cleared by OSD/ISA and JCS.
1. Not attached to the source text, but a copy is attached to another copy of Rusk’s memorandum in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542. On July 17 Ausland retyped the text of SHLO 5–00288 and in between its paragraphs added comments and suggestions made on them by the Ambassadorial Group and various U.S. posts. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–1862)
2. On June 25 Bundy transmitted to Secretaries McNamara and RuskNSAM No. 167, which reads: “The President has approved the course of action for dealing with Soviet and/or East German harassment of Allied autobahn convoys which the Secretary of State proposed in his memorandum of June 5, 1962.” (Ibid., NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316)