29. Minutes of the Meeting of the National Security Council0
[Here follow three pages of discussion of nuclear testing and disarmament.]
The Secretary then turned to Berlin. Here we are no nearer the substance of an agreement but there is a change in tone. At the beginning of the meeting the Soviets had been willing to talk, but the initiative for conversations had come from us. At the end of the meeting the initiative had come from them, and Gromyko had made it plain in his closing statements that they are committed to further bilateral conversations. Yet they are still trying to convert us to their basic view and have not yet really considered our arguments in favor of a modus vivendi which recognizes the fact of basic disagreement.
But the Soviet Union has made proposals on access which, if they could be separated from their unacceptable position on Western troops in West Berlin, would be helpful and worth considering carefully. They also showed some interest in our actions of a modus vivendi.
On the other hand, we did not get much help from Gromyko on harassments in Berlin. He professed ignorance of these harassments both at the beginning and the end of the meeting. The Secretary recalled [Page 94] his firm dealings with Gromyko on the chaff issue and remarked that he had been troubled to discover only later that chaff had been dropped in these areas many times before, although perhaps in not so dangerous or calculated a fashion. The President remarked that he also was troubled, and in response to the President’s question the Secretary said that Lord Home seemed also not to have known the history of chaff when he made a still stronger statement to Gromyko. The Secretary remarked that he had made it plain to Gromyko at the end that we would listen both to what the Soviets said and to what happened in Berlin.
In summary, the Secretary indicated his belief that we must match the Soviets in patience and in persistence in these discussions. They were quite willing to play their long-playing record over and over again, and we should be ready to do the same thing. We should keep at it, clearly and continuously. These discussions had not moved very far because Gromyko had been bound closely by his instructions, but we had kept right on showing our views of the way of moving the problems forward. The conversations had been courteous and sober. Gromyko had personally been affable and friendly. The meeting took place with no indication of an impasse. The Secretary reported that the Germans and the French had been kept informed—although he later asked all concerned to protect the fact of contact with the French (because General de Gaulle is not informed of it).
Mr. Kohler added that the German attitude had been excellent. The Secretary concluded by saying that there was a lot of raw material from these conversations and that he and his associates hoped to study it closely in the next few days and see if we could formulate new proposals which might remove some suspicions. But progress would be slow. The Secretary believed he had brought back a thin piece of bacon, but we could go on from here.1
[Here follow four paragraphs of discussion of unrelated subjects.]
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.↩
- At 4 p.m. Rusk also reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on his discussions at Geneva. For text of his statement and related questions, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), 1962, vol. XIV, pp. 335–357.↩