Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

206. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State⁰

Berlin, August 6, 1963, 4 p.m.

153. Info SACEUR for POLAD; CINCEUR for POLAD; USNMR SHAPE for Burns; USELMLO via other means. Paris also for USRO.

From McGhee. I met for hour and one-half with Sov Amb to GDRAbrasimov in Sov Emb East Berlin Aug 5.¹ Visit, first courtesy call to Amb as Sov representative in residual quadripartite matters, had been carefully arranged. Abrasimov at first attempted put conversation on broad plane by referring to common Sov-US interests in ensuring FRG adherence to Test Ban Treaty. Abrasimov asked for my views on Bonn attitude this issue. Since I did not wish to pursue such a general line, but to stick to Berlin matters, merely said felt confident everyone would eventually sign except the few states whose views were already known.

Abrasimov said test ban agreement showed progress could be made on other issues. If US would accept Khrushchev’s “free city” proposal and if it would recognize GDR, Berlin and German problems could be solved easily. I replied that US after many discussions on this subject over the past several years, was unconvinced Sov proposals for Berlin offer sufficient guarantees for maintenance Western vital interests in city. US believes Berlin problem can be solved ultimately only in framework reunification of Germany on basis East German people able freely express their will.

Solution Berlin and German problems as a whole are, I continued, large issues requiring extensive intergovernmental discussion and it appears unlikely we will be able to make much progress in this meeting. We do, however, along with our British and French colleagues, have serious responsibility in minimizing points of friction in day-to-day matters affecting Berlin. Abrasimov and I could make useful contribution to good relations between two sides by ensuring that tensions in Berlin were minimized. Increased tensions could have serious effects on three-year talks now in progress. I urged Abrasimov to use undoubtedly great influence on GDR to this end.

Abrasimov disclaimed authority for East Berlin. He was empowered to deal only with West Berlin. What we referred to as East Berlin was part of independent state of GDR, recognized, if not by US, by 14 states. I replied that we did not consider that this did, by any means, relieve the USSR of its obligations under the quadripartite agreements of 1944–45. I pointed out that there was reciprocity involved as between US rights in East Berlin and Sov rights in West Berlin. If Sovs disregarded US interests in East Berlin, they could hardly expect US show regard for their interests in West Berlin.

I then raised following specific points:

(1) GDR June 21 decree on “barred zone” around West Berlin and June 22 decree on undefined “security zones.” These measures could in no way affect US rights under quadripartite agreements. However, they could possibly be source of tension between US and USSR. I urged Abrasimov to exert influence on GDR in order ensure such tension did not arise. Abrasimov said creation security zones was right of sovereign state. If such zones were, for good cause, erected in West Berlin, he would not object.

(2) USCOB visit to East Berlin. I pointed out Soviet general officers visit West Berlin freely, yet USCOB continues be affected by Sov/GDR measures barring his predecessor, Gen. Watson, from East Berlin. USCOB had not exercised right to visit East Berlin solely because of US desire avoid incident which could produce tension. US wished obtain prior Soviet assurances there would be no incidents with East Germans before USCOB went to East Berlin. I urged two sides forget Commandant bans and start afresh on this issue. Abrasimov indicated understanding for my argument and said he would take matter up with Soviet military authorities.

(3) Svenson case. I showed Abrasimov message written by Svenson on his immunization record and given to Italian tourists in East Berlin. (Berlintel 92 Dept, 81 Bonn)²Abrasimov asked for photostat of Svenson immunization record (I said we would provide this) and promised investigate matter with East German authorities. I said if no satisfactory reply received as to Svenson welfare in light his message appealing for help, I would recommend matter be taken up formally with USSR, and there would also possibly be considerable publicity on case.

Abrasimov raised following issues:

(1) He said Western Allies had made all of West Berlin closed zone in sense they did not permit Soviet news correspondents to reside there. Denial of resident permits inconsistent with Western plea for freedom of movement in Berlin. I pointed out Soviet correspondents free to go where they pleased in West Berlin, and issue not comparable to creation “barred zone” around West Berlin.

(2) Abrasimov protested Allied action preventing Sovs from refurbishing Lietzenburgerstrasse property. He said Sovs had been informed US opposition is key factor in issue. I said Sovs more fortunate in regard Lietzenburgerstrasse property than US in regard former US Embassy Berlin, which now located within “barred zone.” Abrasimov, facetiously, said he was sure US could obtain permission if it wished build Embassy in East Berlin.

(3) Abrasimov protested fact Sov artists and sportsmen unable appear West Berlin. He said Sovs would not agree arrange through Bonn for appearances of cultural performers and sportsmen in West Berlin. I said I was not fully acquainted with details this issue but would inform myself and see what if anything could be done.

Abrasimov said he looked forward paying return call. I said this could be arranged, if agreeable to Abrasimov, during my next visit to Berlin in about six to seven weeks. Atmosphere of meeting was relaxed. At end discussion Abrasimov showed me through various public reception rooms of Embassy.

No identification difficulties or other problems encountered either entering or leaving Sov Sector. East German control personnel did not approach my vehicle at any point but simply raised barriers as vehicle approached them. As had been agreed with Sovs, Sov Emb vehicle with protocol officer provided escort from crossing point to Emb and back to crossing point.

Dept will use judgment as to relay to Moscow.

Calhoun

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 US–USSR. Confidential; Priority. Received at 3:23 p.m. and repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, and Moscow.
1. For an abbreviated account by McGhee of this meeting, based on this telegram, see An Ambassador’s Account, pp. 95–97.
2. Dated July 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 US)